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 This dissertation argues that the origins of civil defense are to be found in pre-
World War II Britain and that a driving force of this early civil defense scheme was fear 
of poison gas. Later iterations of civil defense, such as the Cold War system in America, 
built on already existing regimes that had proven their worth during WWII. This 
dissertation demonstrates not only that WWII civil defense served as a blueprint for later 
civil defense schemes, but also that poison gas anxiety served as a particular tool for the 
implementation and success of civil defense. The dissertation is organized thematically, 
exploring the role of civilians and volunteers in the civil defense scheme, as well as 
demonstrating the vital importance of physical manifestations of civil defense, such as 
gas masks and air raid shelters, in ensuring the success of the scheme.  
 By the start of World War II, many civilians had already been training in civil 
defense procedures for several years, learning how to put out fires, recognize bombs, 
warn against gas, decontaminate buildings, rescue survivors, and perform first aid. The 
British government had come to the conclusion, long before the threat became realized, 
that the civilian population was a likely target for air attacks and that measures were 
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required to protect them.  World War I (WWI) saw the first aerial attacks targeted 
specifically at civilians, suggesting a future where such attacks would occur more 
frequently and deliberately. Poison gas, used in WWI, seemed a particularly horrifying 
threat that presented significant problems. Civil defense was born out of this need to 
protect the civil population from attack by bombs or poison gas. For the next five years of 
war civil defense worked to maintain British morale and to protect civilian lives. This 
was the first real scheme of civil defense, instituted by the British government 
specifically for the protection of its civilian population. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 On September 3rd, 1939, just minutes after Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
announced that Britain was now at war with Germany, the air raid sirens sounded for the 
first time. Many people immediately rushed to their shelters, convinced this was the 
beginning of the end.1 Some thought they were about to be attacked with poison gas.2 
One young girl was bundled up in her coat and sent to shelter under the stairs.3 In 
Southall, people out on the streets, many just returning home from Sunday church 
services, began running. Air raid wardens shouted at people to get off the streets.4 One 
young woman rushed home to find her parents and siblings sitting inside with their gas 
masks on.5 Ultimately, this first sounding of the sirens turned out to be a false alarm and 
no bombs fell on Britain that day. The reaction of the population, however, showed not 
only a general anxiety over war, but demonstrated the significant government effort that 
had already been put into civil defense. People had reacted the way they were supposed 
to—anxious but with a purpose.  
 The air raids did come eventually and with them a serious threat to civilian life. 
During World War II (WWII) millions of British civilians performed these same actions 
thousands of times, using their training in civil defense to protect themselves and their 
fellow citizens. By the start of the war, many civilians had already been training in civil 
                                                        
1 Imperial War Museum: 12/29/1, Raymond Fry, Wartime Schoolday in Surrey, 1. 
2 S. Gaylor, “Wartime Memories,” BBC’s People’s War, accessed August 14, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/30/a3545930.shtml. 
3 IWM: 99/66/1, Heather Macdonald, Wartime Memories 1939-1945, 1. 
4 Doris Anderson, “And So War Began…,” BBC’s People’s War, accessed August 14, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/61/a3699561.shtml. 
5 ibid. 
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defense procedures for several years, learning how to put out fires, recognize bombs, 
warn against gas, decontaminate buildings, rescue survivors, and perform first aid. The 
British government had come to the conclusion, long before the threat became realized, 
that the civilian population was a likely target for air attacks and that measures were 
required to protect them. Civil defense was born out of this need to protect the civil 
population from attack by bombs or poison gas. For the next five years of war civil 
defense worked to maintain British morale and to protect civilian lives. This dissertation 
argues that the origins of civil defense are to be found in pre-WWII Britain and that a 
driving force of this early civil defense scheme was fear of poison gas. Later iterations of 
civil defense, such as the Cold War system in America, built on already existing regimes 
that had proven their worth during WWII. Similarly, later schemes simply replaced 
poison gas as a tool for the implementation and success of civil defense with the nuclear 
threat as the source of fear. 
 Civil defense at first glance might not seem to be a topic with great importance in 
the grander scheme of war or the history of the organization of the the home front. 
However, this dissertation will show that civil defense has far wider-reaching 
implications than might be immediately apparent. Civil defense is not merely a 
governmental policy or a component of national defense, but also touches on many 
different, important topics across society. As a scheme created and implemented by the 
government, civil defense can provide insights into various aspects of how the 
government perceives the homefront at a time of war and what it and its actors see as a 
vital part of the nation that must be protected. Similarly, as a scheme intended for 
civilians, civil defense touches on many thematic aspects of civilian life in a wartime 
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society. As a program that permeated most aspects of a wartime society, civil defense 
traverses topics such as war and policy, war and gender, war and technology, and war and 
health. 
 Civil defense is particularly intimately connected to the topic of war and policy. In 
WWII Great Britain, civil defense showcases the government’s wartime policies and how 
civilians adapted to these policies. Civil defense was a governmental scheme directed 
specifically at civilians and thus a close look at civil defense practices and the policies 
that underpinned these, offers insight into the intersection between policy and civilian 
life. An exploration of civil defense schemes can show the government’s understanding 
of its own civilians, as well as civilians’ perception of their government. Such studies can 
answer questions as to civilians’ roles in government and society during wartime, the 
government’s plan for its civilians, and the overarching priorities of wartime policy. 
Additionally, comparisons of civil defense iterations, such as the discrepant experiences 
in both WWI and WWII practices as this dissertation explores, can provide insight into 
how prior practices shaped contemporary approaches. A study of civil defense also 
demonstrates how war mobilization efforts impact society. Because civil defense is 
directly linked with the war effort on the home front, studies of civil defense can offer a 
better understanding of how civilians interacted with the concept of war, their 
government’s response to war, and their own role in a wartime society. As civil defense 
was used by the government as a tool to control or direct civilian behavior, a study of 
civil defense also touches on the topic of psychology, and particularly psychology as 
reflected in governmental policy. The concept of psychology as policy is a consistent 
theme across regimes of civil defense and is an important component of any study on war 
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and policy, and how such policies affect civilians. Such an exploration of governmental 
aims, civilian responsibilities and roles, and the intersection between the two are a vital 
component of any scholarship on war and policy. 
 Civil defense also pertains to the topic of war and gender. As many other studies 
have shown, war and mass mobilization had a direct impact on the life of women, 
especially through the entry of women into the workforce en masse. Civil defense offers 
another insight into how women participated in and navigated wartime societies. In civil 
defense schemes across the world and throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, 
women played a pivotal role. The success of civil defense practices and the acceptance of 
such practices by the public often hinged on the participation of women. Unlike the labor 
force, where women simply replaced male workers, in civil defense women were able to 
create and define their own roles. Additionally, civil defense jobs often represented 
significant dangers or required a certain authority, allowing women not only to 
participate in the workforce, but to do so in a manner that often ran counter to 
contemporary notions of female vulnerability. Participation in civil defense also offered 
women the opportunity to be directly involved in the war effort and national service, 
allowing them the opportunity to become more complete citizens in societies where 
citizenship was often defined by national service and ability. Studies of civil defense can 
thus offer valuable insight into the role of gender in wartime societies, but also explore 
the relation between women and their government. 
 Civil defense also incorporates issues of war and health. Civil defense particularly 
touches on aspects of public health and can perhaps be seen as a program of public health 
in and of itself. As a scheme intended to protect civilians from both bodily and 
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psychological harm, the primary purpose of civil defense is to maintain civilian health. 
Across all aspects of British WWII civil defense, issues of health were a persistent 
concern. Worries over diseases, vermin, and nutrition permeate British responses. 
Children’s health was a particular concern, as is evidenced by the evacuation plan and 
special programs directed at youth. Maintaining the psychological health of civilians 
during times of crisis was a major purpose of civil defense. Studies of civil defense 
therefore offer insight into how the government perceived issues of health and disease, 
what aspects of health they considered more important than others, and the means by 
which the government sought to address such issues. Additionally, civil defense shows 
how civilians dealt with their own concerns over health, as well as how they perceived or 
interacted with their government’s plans for their health. 
 Lastly, civil defense relates to the topic of war and technology. Many technologies 
owe their existence or improvement to war, and civil defense, as a component of war, 
similarly has influenced and incorporated technology into its practices. Poison gas, a war 
technology born out of WWI, was a major influence on Britain’s WWII civil defense 
planning. In this case, new technologies were required to combat the threat that was now 
menacing civilian lives. The gas mask, in particular, was a technology that saw 
significant improvement and evolution in the lead-up to, and during, WWII. Anti-gas 
technologies, such as powders, creams, and protective garments, sought to combat the gas 
threat. A study of civil defense is thus particularly useful for understanding how war and 
military technologies came to see application in civilian life and how such technologies 
may have been altered or adapted for civilian use. Similarly, civil defense technologies 
directly aimed to counteract military technologies, such as high explosive bombs, through 
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various means. The evolution of the various British air raid shelters shows the importance 
of technology, and its continuous improvement and adaptation, to civil defense. 
 For a study on WWII civil defense the technology of poison gas plays a particularly 
pivotal role, as it informed not only every aspects of civil defense programs and training, 
but was also a driving force of the civil defense scheme itself. Poison gas as a tool of war 
has been examined in scholarly literature, but no scholar has drawn causal links between 
gas and the creation of civil defense as I argue here. Scholarship on poison gas revolves 
heavily around WWI, the only major war where such weapons were used. Such studies 
tend to focus entirely on the military or technical aspects of chemical weapons without 
considering wider societal implications or exploring the cultural effects such weapons 
had on wartime populations.6 While Donald Richter’s use of private letters and diaries of 
the men in the Special Brigade provides unique and valuable insight into the minds of the 
soldiers engaged in gas warfare, the scope of the study does not include the impact on 
British society at large. Richter’s work does, however, provide context on how soldiers 
viewed the use of gas and how these soldiers may have conveyed their own perceptions 
to families back home through letters and diaries. While the effect of gas warfare on the 
home front is outside the scope of his study, Tim Cook’s monograph does seek to explore 
the psychological impact chemical warfare had on the Canadian soldiers in the trenches. 
Two exceptions to this narrow period focus are monographs by Marion Girard and 
Edmund Russel. In her monograph, Girard explores the impact of poison gas use during 
                                                        
6 For literature on WWI poison gas use see: Thomas Faith, Behind the Gas Mask: The U.S. Chemical 
Warfare Service in War and Peace (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2014); Donald Richter, 
Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War One (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2014); 
Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War (Vancouver 
and Toronto: UBC Press, 1999); Albert Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army 
& Chemical Warfare in World War I (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000). 
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the war had on British society at large and traces the public consciousness of the new 
weapon.7 Russell’s study details how the use and development of chemical weapons was 
reflected in the civilian use and development of pesticides. He argues that chemical 
warfare in WWI had a positive effect on the American chemical industry, which not only 
grew in size and production capacity, but also bestowed upon it a certain prestige 
unknown prior to 1915.8 
 Girard, Russell, and other scholars have largely failed to address how chemical 
weapons impacted military and civilian populations culturally and psychologically during 
a later war, when those weapons remained a threat, but were not actually used.9 Russell 
succeeds in showing how chemical warfare directly impacted civilian chemistry and 
civilian terminology, but exploring the wider cultural ramifications of this is outside the 
scope of his study. While William Moore focuses more heavily on the political decision-
making and the work of chemists after WWI, he does address the impact chemical 
warfare had on civilians during the interwar years and WWII.10 Olaf Groehler’s account 
of German preparation, production, and use of chemical weapons provides valuable and 
necessary insight into both world wars and the interwar period.11 He has provided a 
detailed study in particular on German chemical warfare research, as well as political and 
                                                        
7 Marion Girard, A Strange and Formidable Weapon: British Responses to World War I Poison Gas 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 10. 
8 Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to 
Silent Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20. 
9 For more on chemical weapons in general see: William Moore, Gas Attack (London: Leo Cooper, 1987); 
Olaf Groehler, Der Lautlose Tod: Einsatz und Entwicklung deutscher Giftgase von 1914 bis 1945 
(Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1989); Edward Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2010); Kim Coleman, A History of Chemical Warfare (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005); Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New York: Random House, 2002); 
Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al Quaeda (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2006). 
10 Moore, Gas Attack, 44. 
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military planning after WWI and through 1945. His focus is, however, primarily on the 
military and governmental decision-makers, with only brief mentions of civilian impact 
and preparations. Edward Spiers does not offer detailed insight into any time period or 
aspect of chemical warfare, although his chapter on chemical weapons in third world 
conflicts provides a view often ignored by other scholars of the topic.12 While a 
significant amount of literature exists on the topic of chemical warfare, there is a notable 
lack of academic focus on the topic post-WWI. Susan Smith’s Toxic Exposures provides 
one of the only academic explorations of the topic post-WWI and discusses the mustard 
gas experiments carried out on soldiers prior to and during WWII.13 Her monograph, 
however, focuses primarily on the United States and the experiments carried out by the 
Chemical Warfare Service. A much larger selection of the body of literature is aimed at 
popular audiences and often lacks rigorous academic standards. Harris and Paxman have 
provided what is often considered the most comprehensive account of chemical warfare, 
tracing the use of chemical and biological weapons from WWI through Desert Storm. 
However, their account lacks academic rigor and is rife with personal opinions and 
sometimes misinformation.14 Jonathan Tucker offers a readable narrative of chemical 
warfare from WWI to Al-Qaeda, but as a political scientist his focus lies entirely on 
political decision-making regarding the use, research into, and abolition of chemical 
weapons, offering no insight into cultural or larger contextual questions.15 
                                                                                                                                                                     
11 Groehler, Der Lautlose Tod, 62. 
12 Spiers, History of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 
 
13 Susan Smith, Toxic Exposures: Mustard Gas and the Health Consequences of World War II in the 
United States (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2017). 
14 Harris and Paxman, Higher Form of Killing, 22. 
15 Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves, 22. 
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 World War I saw the first aerial attacks targeted specifically at civilians, suggesting 
a future where such attacks would occur more frequently and deliberately. British 
civilians found themselves the targets of zeppelin and bomb attacks that, although limited 
in their effect, caused enough casualties and damage to prove a serious concern for 
government and civilians alike. As early as 1915, the government issued the first air raid 
precautions (ARP) instructions to its citizens. While the government provided some 
advice and people sought shelter from zeppelin raids in basements or underground 
railway stations, there was not yet a concerted scheme or coordinated effort to protect the 
civil population from harm. Even after the war, government officials worried about ways 
to protect civilians from future threats should war come again. Poison gas, used for the 
first time in WWI, seemed a particularly horrifying threat that presented significant 
problems (see Chapter 2). How could the British government ensure the safety of the 
country’s civilians if war came, especially if a ruthless enemy were to employ poison gas 
against a vulnerable population? Civil defense was the chosen solution. 
 Civil defense can be defined as a government-directed scheme intended to protect 
civilians from enemy attack. The key component that separates civil defense from regular 
military defensive measures is that civil defense relies entirely on civilians to participate 
in their own protection. While the government provides for various aspects of civil 
defense, such as equipment, facilities, plans, and training, the level of involvement by the 
government and its officials varies between the different schemes of civil defense and the 
nations implementing it. Civilians are asked to volunteer their time to be trained, to 
practice what they have learned, and, if willing and qualified, to perform the job of one of 
the many civil defense workers. Relying on civilian labor, largely volunteer and mostly 
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unpaid, allows the government to redirect much-needed resources and frees up soldiers 
who might otherwise have been tasked with protective duties. Civil defense also provides 
civilians with a real investment in the government’s plans and foreign policy. 
Participating in the war effort, whether an actual or cold war, invests civilians and ensures 
their continued interest in affairs. Apathy among the population could prove detrimental 
to the government’s overall plans and prove harmful to civilian work that directly 
supported the war effort. Civil defense was therefore one tool to combat civilian apathy 
by offering a job of importance to the nation. Relying entirely on civilian participation, 
however, could often prove problematic for civil defense programs if interest was 
waning. A large component of the plan of each government implementing civil defense 
thus also revolved around publicity and creating civilian interest in the program. To 
present civil defense work as a job vital to the nation was often a good recruiting tool, but 
fear worked even better. Governments that instituted civil defense schemes exploited 
their population’s anxiety over a potential attack to stimulate interest and participation in 
civil defense. Key elements of civil defense have played an important role in the war 
effort and governmental decision-making of nations engaged in war since WWI, with the 
focus and effort invested in civil defense increasing as civilian populations became more 
vulnerable.16 
                                                        
16 Andrew D. Grossman, Neither Dead Nor Red: Civil Defense and American Political Development 
During the Early Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2001); Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at 
Home (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000); Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground: 
The Fallout Shelter in American Culture (New York; London: New York University Press, 2004); 
Spencer Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012); Paul 
Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994, Kindle eBook); David Krugler, This Is Only 
a Test: How Washington D.C. Prepared for Nuclear War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 
iBook); Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); Matthew Grant, After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in 
Britain, 1945-68 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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 The topic of civil defense generally conjures up images of students hiding from 
atomic bomb blasts under their desks or prepared householders building a fallout shelter 
in their backyards, but this view of civil defense ignores the very real and successful civil 
defense schemes that were precursors to Cold War programs. Cold War civil defense 
often enjoys an iconic, and often slightly humorous, image, that reflects contemporary 
interest in atomic culture and the America of the 1950s and 60s. American Cold War civil 
defense was defined by elements such as fallout shelters, gas masks for the civilian 
population, warning sirens, training volunteers, and an organized governmental scheme 
of civil defense services. Popular anxiety over radiation and complete annihilation greatly 
influenced the purpose and execution of American civil defense.17  
 What such a concept of civil defense fails to grasp, however, is that these well-
known schemes of civil defense had their origin much earlier than the advent of the atom 
bomb. Focusing entirely on Cold War civil defense efforts ignores the origins of such 
programs and the foundation for the many later civil defense schemes that was laid in the 
1930s in Great Britain.  Scholars of civil defense have often ignored entirely, or only 
mentioned in passing, the British civil defense scheme prior to 1945, allowing no 
correlation between these early measures and the civil defense schemes of the Cold War. 
Similarly, the literature on chemical warfare has failed to address the impact poison gas, 
or the anxiety thereof, had on the creation and execution of early civil defense schemes. 
The existing literature primarily focuses on the use of chemical weapons or their 
production and preparation after WWI, but has not addressed the very impact a weapon 
can have on the public consciousness and government policy even if it is not used. To 
                                                        
17 For more on atomic fears see Boyer, Bomb;  Oakes, Imaginary War;  Rose, Underground; Grossman, 
Neither Dead Nor Red; Grant, After the Bomb. 
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gain a proper understanding of civil defense, its purpose, its execution, its successes and 
failures, as well as its place in the public consciousness, it is necessary to explore the 
conditions that led to the first implementation of a comprehensive civil defense program 
and the institution of this first civil defense scheme. This dissertation aims to fill the gap 
in the literature by exploring the origins of civil defense in the British efforts to protect 
civilians in the lead-up to, and during, WWII.18 
  The civil defense programs of WWII and later the Cold War both were driven 
by the same ideology and share many elements. Arising out of WWI ARP measures, 
British civil defense in the lead-up to, and during, WWII sought to protect the population 
from an existential threat through protective measures and modification of behavior. This 
was the first real scheme of civil defense, instituted by the British government 
specifically for the protection of its civilian population. While Cold War civil defense, 
both in Britain and America, was distinctive for its nuclear war survival preparations, the 
major themes of civil defense remained the same. Civil defense certainly sought to 
protect civilian lives, but psychological and political aspects were often just as important. 
Civil defense programs throughout the 20th century sought to control civilian behavior, to 
ensure the psychological soundness of civilians, to encourage self-help, and to garner 
support for governmental policies. Additionally, all programs shared similar key concepts 
in their approach to civil defense, such as employing anxiety as a tool to ensure 
compliance and dispersal as a primary form of protection. 
                                                        
18 Among the limited literature on pre-1945 civil defense are: K.W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Susan Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in 
Britain from the Great War to the Blitz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Peter Laurie, 
Beneath the City Street: A Private Enquiry into the Nuclear Preoccupations of Government (London: 
Penguin Press, 1970). 
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 Civil defense was the face of war on the home front. During the Cold War, the 
American government made direct and purposeful links between civilian preparedness 
and the war effort. Tracy Davis argues that it was nuclear weapons that shifted the theater 
of war to the home front, but this argument entirely ignores the strategic bombing 
campaigns of WWII that saw civilians targeted purposefully.19 The Truman 
administration specifically linked civil defense to its Cold War grand strategy, so that 
home front and civilian preparedness, as well as moral fortitude, became necessary 
components of nuclear deterrence.20 Additionally, civil defense training programs 
specifically sought to militarize civilian life.21 The home fallout shelter specifically tied 
the family home to a global threat. The government’s encouragement to its citizens to 
build home shelters both admitted that the home itself was no longer adequate, but also 
implied that the home, in its improved form, was a vital aspect of national security.22 
Civil defense also served as a tool of militarization of the American home. Civil defense 
was the domestic analogue of a militarized foreign policy and although the Cold War 
U.S.A. was not a garrison state, American culture nevertheless absorbed the ideology of 
war.23 During WWII, however, civil defense was not merely symbolic of war on the 
home front, but allowed civilians to directly participate in the war effort. British civil 
                                                        
19 Tracy C. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, N.C: Duke University 
Press Books, 2007. eBook), Introduction. 
Lord Cherwell specifically argued for the bombing of German civilians as a dehousing strategy, which 
would in turn break civilian morale. 
Sir Charles Kingsley Webster and Noble Frankland, The strategic air offensive against Germany, 1939-
1945, Vol 1 (London: HMSO, 1961). 
20 Grossman, Neither Dead Nor Red, 2. 
21 ibid, 104. 
22 Tom Vanderbilt, Survival City: Adventures Among the Ruins of Atomic America (Chicago ; London: 
University Of Chicago Press, 2010), 108. 
23 McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 5, 10. 
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defense recruitment specifically emphasized this concept to draw volunteers who could 
not fight with the armed forces (see Chapter 4).  
 Psychology played a major role in the creation, execution, and success (or failure) 
of civil defense programs. The atom bomb, and later the even more powerful hydrogen 
bomb, presented a threat of complete annihilation that was certain to cause anxiety, or 
even terror and panic, in the general population. During the Cold War civil defense was 
specifically created to ease nuclear anxieties.24 David Krugler points out one of the root 
problems of civil defense: civilians needed to be just the right amount of scared, because 
if they became too scared they might panic and would not participate in civil defense.25 
Guy Oakes has argued that civil defense planners were more concerned with the atom 
bomb as a weapon of mass terror and the maintenance of public morale and thus civil 
defense became a program to teach civilians to resist panic and manage their emotions.26 
Dee Garrison has referred to American civil defense as a massive federal failure to 
control public perception.27 As emotional reactions came to be seen as disruptive or 
immobilizing in a potential nuclear war, many psychologists and psychiatrists actively 
engaged in civil defense planning.28 Such medical experts applied themselves to 
convincing the American population that the atomic threat was not as bad as had initially 
been suggested and that hysteria was uncalled for and counterproductive.29 In Britain, as 
Matthew Grant has argued, by the 1950s civil defense had become a facade and was used 
                                                        
24 Krugler, Only a Test, Introduction. 
25 ibid, Chapter 1. 
26 ibid, 42, 52. 
27 Dee Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 28. 
28 Boyer, Bomb, Loc6957. 
29 ibid, Loc7020. 
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solely to prop up public confidence.30 In contrast to the American focus on civilian 
morale, however, British civil defense planners had few concerns their citizens could 
handle bombardment and war since they had just successfully withstood German bombs 
in WWII.31 During WWII, the threat was on a lesser scale, but serious and persistent 
bombarding of civilians, such as occurred during the Blitz in 1940, was just as likely to 
lead to poor civilian morale and panic. Civil defense programs during both time periods 
thus aimed to employ such anxieties for a more useful purpose, such as volunteer work or 
preparations in the home. Through controlling civilian behavior, achieved by training and 
repeated exposure to relevant information, governments also aimed to control civilians’ 
psychological response to danger. Panic and the subsequent chaos and loss of morale 
were major concerns for both British and American governments. In Britain, in particular, 
panic was likely to undermine the war effort through civilian inaction and apathy. Panic 
and chaos could also overwhelm existing services, such as police, fire, and first aid, so it 
was necessary that governments could ensure their civilians acted in a calm and 
predictable manner in the case of an emergency.  
 Civil defense also often aimed to shift civilian psychology. The themes of self-help 
and personal responsibility were key components of civil defense programs throughout 
the 20th century. Americans during the Cold War were almost entirely reliant on 
themselves for protection, and, although the government offered some fallout shelters, 
citizens were generally asked to build their own shelters and supply their own gas masks. 
Self-help and community preparedness were the first theme of American civil defense.32 
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Education campaigns usually began with a shock treatment that delineated the realities of 
nuclear war and then countered this with information on self-help and civil defense 
training to stimulate volunteerism and a can-do attitude.33 The push by the U.S. 
government for its citizens to build their own shelters was also intended to disincline 
them to rely on the federal government and to deflect resentment they might feel at the 
neglect of civil defense by Washington.34 The emphasis on self-help ensured that civil 
defense appeared as “home-spun” and “grassroots” efforts disconnected from wider 
policy.35 Laura McEnaney has suggested that civil defense defined Cold War 
militarization as a personal responsibility and by blaming citizens’ emotional reactions or 
unpreparedness for threat of attack it absolved the government from blame.36 British civil 
defense called on citizens’ sense of duty and patriotism to enjoin them to enroll and 
engage in the civil defense services.37 Post-1951 the emphasis on individual 
responsibility became a key theme of British civil defense recruitment.38 In WWII 
Britain, self-help was defined mostly by civilians taking the initiative to participate in, or 
make use of, government-provided protection and civil defense training. Civilians needed 
to participate in civil defense willingly, they needed to learn, train, practice, and 
ultimately perform civil defense. Emphasizing personal responsibility and self-help thus 
instructed civilians that their protection was as much their own responsibility as the 
government’s. 
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 Anxiety over a type of weapon that appeared more gruesome than any other was a 
key component of civil defense. Nuclear anxieties comprised fears of mass extinction, not 
merely personal danger, and this drove the civil defense narrative. Nuclear fallout, which 
inspired great anxiety during the Cold War, reflected similar fears of extinction and of 
insidious invisible threats as had poison gas prior to 1945. The threat of an invisible 
danger is to be particularly feared as it represents an unknowable reality outside the realm 
of normal experience.39 Americans’ immediate reaction to the atomic bomb was one of 
intense fear and a somewhat undefined conviction that an urgent public response was 
necessary.40 Scientists and government leaders purposefully employed fear to break 
public apathy.41 Radioactive fallout was presented as just another household germ, 
turning anxieties about cleanliness into the wider discourse on civil defense.42 Kenneth 
Rose exploring the effect nuclear apocalyptic films and fiction had on the American 
psyche, has suggested that such media undermined civil defense efforts because survival 
did not seem plausible, a major factor in why American civil defense was not wholly 
successful.43 Grossman has argued that the American government sought to use this mass 
fear as a tool of control and to channel it through training regimens, such as military 
combat programs.44 For civilians to volunteer for civil defense they needed to recognize 
the threat to their lives, fear it, but still feel that they could do something about it. The 
threat presented by nuclear war was often too overwhelming and thus American civil 
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defense programs suffered as a result.45 Paul Boyer, however, has argued that while 
atomic fears predominated the American psyche and civil defense in the 1940s, this fear 
was displaced by anxiety over Soviet threats and communism.46 From an early stage a 
majority of British civilians felt moral repulsion at the atomic bomb and believed if an 
attack occurred on the island nowhere would be safe.47 After facts about fallout became 
widely known, the British outright rejected notions of survivability, thus undermining the 
success of Cold War civil defense at an early stage.48  
 Unlike Cold War civil defense, where radiation presented a terrifying threat 
intended to ensure compliance with civil defense measures, in WWII, poison gas 
presented a similar enemy. First used during WWI, poison gas was not only a novel 
weapon of war, but seen as especially brutal and barbarous compared to conventional 
weapons. While this weapon was not used against British civilians in WWI or after, there 
nevertheless was a persistent worry that poison gas could be used against the British Isles 
and this worry influenced every aspect of civil defense. Anxiety over a weapon seen as 
horrifying, such as gas or radiation, was vital to stimulate civilian interest in civil 
defense. Poison gas provided the impetus for civilians to engage in civil defense by 
presenting a threat that was not always easy to understand and generally seen as much 
more terrifying than conventional bombs. This anxiety over gas permeated everyday life 
and civil defense service, from building a gas-proof room in one’s house to training in 
anti-gas measures, either as a civil defense volunteer or as a civilian wanting to be 
prepared. Additionally, in WWII especially, poison gas also provided one of the very 
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symbols of civil defense that served as both a reminder of an existing threat and also as a 
reassurance as an item of protection—the gas mask. 
 Chemical warfare may have been outlawed and its use described as inhumane, but 
scholars and authors cannot always agree on why gas, in particular, has obtained such 
notoriety. Girard has tied the gas taboo to early twentieth-century notions of civilization 
and progress. Since the 1899 Hague Convention sought to make war less cruel and as gas 
directly violated the Convention any deployment of this weapon was automatically 
considered as a barbaric act. Thus, when Germany used gas in 1915, the perception was 
that this represented a serious breach of  international law and the use of such a barbaric 
weapon represented a reversion to less civilized times.49 This idea of gas undermining 
civilization and progress continued through the interwar years and led to renewed 
chemical weapons bans.50 Girard also argues that because gas inherently triggered an 
intrinsic fear of suffocation, its perception among the general public was much worse 
than for other weapons.51 Albert Palazzo has argued similarly that because gas robs its 
victims of the ability to breathe it has been condemned as unacceptable.52 James 
Hammond suggests instead that the perception of gas as inhumane was engineered by the 
British, who controlled information reaching North America, in response to German gas 
attacks.53 More questionably he also argues that it was the effect of gas on unprotected 
horses, not soldiers, that so outraged the British public, in particular the English gentry.54 
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Russell’s study of chemical war against both humans and insects suggests that it was the 
similarities between poisoning humans with gas like vermin that drew such visceral 
reactions. He argues that to observers on both sides of the war, chemical weapons looked 
a lot like pest control, singling out poison gas as a weapon far more inhumane than shells 
or bullets.55 Thomas Faith has suggested that it was a culmination of German actions 
(invading Belgium, sinking the RMS Lusitania, and the first use of gas) that allowed them 
to be depicted as a barbaric enemy and thus automatically condemned chemical weapons 
in a similar light.56 Richter puts forth the idea that, unlike conventional weaponry, poison 
gas was seen as ‘unsporting’ by the British and thus quickly condemned.57 Cook has 
argued that poison gas was vilified because it robbed soldiers of their ability to stay alive 
by virtue of their training and their intrinsic valor. There was nothing heroic or brave 
about dying from gas exposure and this alone separated chemical weapons from other 
lethal weapons of war.58 Moore makes the case that, particularly after the first gas attack, 
the British government condemned poison gas because it knew Britain did not have the 
manufacturing capabilities to carry out large-scale gas reprisals.59 It was the image of 
troops fleeing in panic that caused such negative opinions of gas, argues Palazzo, because 
such panic undermined the notion of morale on which the British Army was so reliant.60 
Such chaos would only lead to broken soldiers who had no military value.61 Harris and 
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Paxman point out that only chemical weapons came to encapsulate “frightfulness,” 
because gas, unlike other new weapons of war, became the symbol of a modern war that 
was evil and disgusting.62 Spiers offers a more pragmatic reason, suggesting that gas 
served the purposes of anti-German propaganda, which quickly exploited Germany’s first 
use of the weapon.63  
 While fear served as a tool to implement civil defense programs during both WWII 
and the Cold War, civil defense itself was used as a political tool by both the British and 
American governments. The rehearsal of emergency plans was intended to ensure 
citizens could perform their expected roles even in the confusion of an attack.64 Adding 
sounds, such as sirens, to expected actions ensured citizens behaved in predictable and 
acceptable ways at a time of crisis.65 Davis has also suggested the “indoctrination” of 
children into the civil defense movement ensured a widespread interest and belief in the 
Civil Defense Program in the United States, contrary to allied countries, such as Britain 
and Canada, who had stricter rules on how children could be involved.66 Davis’ 
monograph focuses specifically on civil defense as performance and rehearsal, 
elucidating how governments sought to control their citizens’ behavior. Cold War civil 
defense also sought to demonstrate that the behavior of good citizens in everyday life was 
a model for how they ought to behave when under attack.67 Government planners 
presented civil defense training as the means to control one’s nuclear fear and to achieve 
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self-mastery.68 Government leaders worried that Americans would react fearfully and 
unpredictably to a Soviet atomic attack, which would undermine U.S. military and 
political strategy, so they sought to control civilian reactions through preparedness and 
public relations programs.69 Grossman specifically defines civil defense as a blueprint for 
social control.70 Urban planners saw in civil defense an opportunity to promote the idea 
of decentralization they had failed to successfully sell to populations in the mid-1940s. 
They employed the threat of nuclear war to convince cities and their citizens of the 
importance of comprehensive planning.71 In both cases, providing a scheme of civil 
defense for civilians to engage in was partially intended to garner support for 
governmental policy. To encourage support of a central policy decision, such as entering 
WWII or ensuring nuclear deterrence, the government needed to reassure its civilians that 
means of protection existed and that the government was doing everything it could to 
help. In Britain in particular, government officials consistently took public opinion into 
consideration when deciding on implementing measures of civil defense.  
 Civil defense programs were therefore also tools to manipulate public opinion to 
align with the government’s interests and decisions. In turn, a failure to institute such 
programs could suggest to the civil population a lack of concern by the government for 
its people. Oakes has argued that civil defense was the instrument chosen to convince the 
American public of the price of any failure in the policy of deterrence.72  NSA planners 
specifically sought to align public psychology with the requirements of the national 
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security policy of deterrence through the mitigation of fear.73  Emotion managers would 
control nuclear terror through the promotion of civil defense.74  The American 
government used civil defense to make the policy of deterrence palatable to the 
population by assuring them that through these programs a meaningful number of citizens 
and the basic social structure could survive.75 Civil defense provided citizens with a sense 
of security and a sense of normalcy in anxious times76. Paul Boyer has argued that civil 
defense participation was intended to calm public fears, “[t]he “constructive activity” of 
building a shelter would counteract anxiety and “contribute to the feeling that ‘I am really 
able to do something about it.’”77  Civil defense thus served as a means of “inoculating” 
the populace against panic in the event of a nuclear attack, by both confronting citizens 
with the harsh reality of nuclear war and simultaneously reassuring them of their chances 
of survival.78 Civil defense measures thus also aimed to convince civilians that their 
government was there to protect them. Civil defense itself was also often touted as a form 
of deterrence, particularly in reference to chemical warfare. A population well-protected 
from poison gas, it was argued, would present an undesirable target for gas warfare and 
thus the protective measures themselves might serve to prevent any such attack.79 
 Despite the equalizing force of civil defense, social issues nevertheless penetrated 
all aspects of these programs. American civil defense programs were required to continue 
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segregation practices in the event of nuclear war, with segregated fallout shelters and 
dispersal plans that would keep blacks out of white neighborhoods in the event of 
evacuation.80 Such fears over African American migration out of cities, which were 
considered the main target in the event of nuclear attack, were sometimes more 
concerning to white Americans than nuclear annihilation itself.81  Civil defense films 
generally excluded non-white families or shelter residents, as well.82  Others saw a 
potential nuclear attack on American cities as “Nature’s slum clearance program.”83  In 
hypothetical attack scenarios such crowded, poor, urban, ethnic neighborhoods were 
generally destroyed. 1950s civil defense narratives often echoed fears of racial slums, 
contrasting the elimination of cities with the survival of the idealized white suburban 
family84. Reports of racial bias in civil defense programs, such as among the wardens, 
significantly hurt recruitment and undermined the success of these initiatives.85 In 
Britain, class biases, in particular, provoked some tensions in the civil defense realm, 
particularly in the shelters. Civil defense also domesticated war and ensured that military 
preparedness became a family affair.86 McEnaney has argued that civil defense therefore 
had a dual personality that combined both military ethics and an idealized version of 
domesticity.87 The heavy focus of the family as the center of civil defense unintentionally 
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feminized preparedness.88 Garrison, who focuses heavily on the role of women in civil 
defense and anti-nuclear protests, suggests that women played a much more significant 
role than is usually ascribed to them in civil defense programs.89 In Britain, appeals for 
volunteers were heavily gendered, as were the civil defense services, but a majority of 
volunteers by the mid-1950s were female.90 In the lead-up to and during WWII, civil 
defense offered many women freedoms they had not been able to enjoy before, but their 
ability to work civil defense jobs or to seek shelter was nevertheless restricted.   
 Dispersing the population to prevent mass casualties was a key component of all 
civil defense programs. The morale of citizens under attack was always a pressing 
concern and government officials worried about the toll that mass casualties, or the death 
of vulnerable populations (such as children or pregnant women) would have on overall 
morale. During the Cold War, due to the massively-destructive nature of atomic weapons, 
dispersal was more of an idealistic solution than a practical one. To effectively disperse 
Cold War civilian populations a sweeping reconfiguration of American cities and their 
suburbs was necessary.91 The American government actively supported dispersal, with 
the 1956 Defense Production Act offering tax incentives to diserpsing industries.92 Urban 
planners also believed that dispersal could speed up slum clearance, diminish industrial 
pollution, and create parks.93 Dispersal was effectively seen as a defense mechanism, 
both to minimize the destructive effects of an enemy nuclear bomb, but also as a deterrent 
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by suggesting to the enemy an attack would produce little result.94 David Monteyne has 
argued that dispersal also served as a process of selection that would emphasize, and 
ensure the survival of, the idealized American national identity: white, male, and 
patriarchal.95 In Britain, dispersal took several forms, from limiting the size of air raid 
shelters to physically removing vulnerable populations from areas of danger. In Cold War 
America, threatened by a weapon that would wreak destruction for many miles, dispersal 
was not as easy, but nevertheless was a major theme.  Dispersal operated on a much 
larger scale, as the potential radius of destruction of an atom bomb was significantly 
larger than conventional bombs.96 
 To demonstrate not only that WWII civil defense served as a blueprint to later civil 
defense schemes, but also that poison gas anxiety served as a particular tool for the 
implementation and success of civil defense, this dissertation will explore several aspects 
of British civil defense. Chapter 2 explores the historical background of chemical warfare 
and how such weapons were adopted into the British public consciousness. Additionally, 
this chapter demonstrates the rising concern among the population and the British 
government that poison gas would be used against civilians. Chapter 3 deals with the 
general protection of civilians from enemy attack, from WWI through WWII. The 
particular focus is the government’s plans for instruction, training, and ARP measures to 
ensure that civilians knew how to protect themselves from harm. Chapter 4 provides a 
detailed examination of the various civil defense services, such as air raid wardens, 
auxiliary firefighters, and first aid parties, and their roles in the overall scheme of the 
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home front war effort. Chapter 5 discusses the British gas mask program in WWII that 
distributed masks to every man, woman and child. Additionally, this chapter provides a 
historical overview of British gas masks from WWI through WWII and the persistent 
issues and concerns in developing and providing masks for the population. Chapter 6 
deals entirely with the physical protection of civilians and the British shelter program. 
This chapter discusses the various types of shelters available to British civilians, such as 
communal or domestic shelters, and the many ways in which the government and 
civilians themselves sought to make shelter life more comfortable. Chapter 7 focuses on 
the social aspects of wartime living and civil defense, particularly issues of class and 
national origin. Additionally, the chapter explores how vulnerable populations, such as 
women and children, fitted into civil defense schemes. These components of British civil 
defense not only protected civilian lives during WWII, but they also served as a vital 
‘dry-run’ for the civil defense programs of the Cold War.
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Chapter 2 - “The Very Devil:” World War I Chemical Warfare and its Legacy 
 
The first use of chemical weapons in war occurred on April 22, 1915 on the Ypres 
salient in Belgium. Here, the Germans deployed chlorine gas against the Allies and while 
the attack caused significant casualties, it did not prove more than a limited tactical 
success.  Similarly, subsequent uses of chemical weapons by either side in WWI did not 
materially alter the outcome of the war, grand strategy, or even individual battles. Despite 
the transient tactical advantage chemical weapons provided and their limited impact in 
inflicting casualties, poison gas occupied the minds of military commanders and civilians 
almost immediately.  The idea of a silent killer that stalked the unaware across 
battlefields, a weapon that choked, burned, and blinded its victims, had taken a hold of 
the public consciousness. Additionally, the advent of aerial warfare brought another 
dimension to the potential usage of chemical weapons —  attacks against civilian 
populations on the home front. Newspapers and popular magazines served a particular 
role in inculcating the fear of poison gas in the public consciousness and in creating the 
specter of a sinister threat that exerted disproportionate sway both during and after WWI. 
Although chemical weapons were used for the first time in 1915, apprehension over 
the deployment of such weapons had existed in prior decades.  The Hague Convention in 
1899, especially, sought to prohibit the potential use of weapons of war deemed “contrary 
to the laws of humanity.”1  Article 23 prohibited the use of poison, poisoned arms, and 
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weapons “of a nature to cause superfluous injury.”2  The subsequent Declaration II more 
specifically prohibited the use of “projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of 
asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”3 Neither the British nor the American delegates signed 
the poison gas provision, a fact welcomed by some commentators during the Second 
Boer War when Britain was fighting an enemy not bound by any part of the Convention.4  
The British armed forces already had their eye on a new weapon, called “Taxpayer,” 
which was rumored to be a rocket projectile more powerful than the best contemporary 
guns, powerful enough to sink an ironclad with one hit, and releasing asphyxiating gas 
upon impact.5  An American writer imagined a future war between America and Britain 
where a noxious cloud of “greenish white fog” envelops the battling fleets, suffocating 
everyone on deck, the survivors and their ships left adrift and ramming into one another 
aimlessly.6  One British chemist’s speculations about gas weapons in 1900 read more like 
science fiction than science: a bomb that would release a gas to create a forty to sixty 
yard radius of temperatures so low anyone walking through would instantly freeze to 
death, a gas that would quadruple a man’s heartbeat until his blood vessels burst, and a 
bomb containing a sleeping gas that could render unconscious an entire city.7  Actual 
science fiction writers, too, used the idea of a noxious gas to terrify.  The most popular 
example, perhaps, being H.G. Wells’ 1898 novel War of the Worlds, where Martian 
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invaders fire canisters that, instead of exploding, discharge a black vapor which spreads 
across the countryside and the “touch of that vapour, the inhaling of its pungent wisps, 
was death to all that breathes.”8  Although before WWI such weapons were still fictional, 
ideas about systems that might cause instant and invisible death may certainly have 
impacted the public long before chemical weapons were actually used. 
In the months prior to the Second Battle of Ypres, reports in British newspapers were 
already stoking fear in the public over weapons that had yet to be used—and, in their 
reported form, did not even exist.  A news report in early April 1915 suggested the 
Germans were practicing the use of new asphyxiating gas grenades on dogs.9  
Newspapers also leaked reports of German POWs who divulged to their Allied captors 
secret plans to release gas from buried cylinders against enemy trenches.10  Headlines of 
these reports ranged from the factual and direct, “Suffocating Gases: New German 
Threat” or “A Modern Battle,” to the more provocative “The Suffocation Plan” and “To 
Choke Our Men”.11 
By the end of the war in 1918 poison gas had become a commonly-used tool in the 
arsenals of the belligerent nations, Great Britain and Germany, especially. Chlorine gas, 
effective in its initial use but soon negated through the use of proper protective 
equipment, was supplanted by new chemical weapons that exacted a horrifying effect on 
the human body. Phosgene, like chlorine, attacked the lungs and caused inflammation 
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that drowned the victim in his own fluids.12 Lachrymators, such as K.S.K., C.A.P., and 
B.B.C., caused profuse tearing of the eyes and pain, to the point where vision became 
impossible.13 Chloroarsine gases like D.M. were not lethal on their own, but produced 
intense pains in the throat and chest, nausea, headaches, and mental depression, causing 
considerable temporary disability.14 The gas most symbolic of WWI, and its most 
effective chemical weapon, was mustard, a vesicant gas that caused blisters and burns to 
the skin of anyone who came into contact with it.15 The Germans systematically color-
coded their gas shells: Yellow Cross for mustard, Blue Cross for chloroarsines, and Green 
Cross for phosgene and diphosgene.16 While initially attacks were made by releasing the 
gas from cylinders placed in the trenches, by mid-1916 the combatants were firing lethal 
gas shells.17 
While contemporary and modern scholars have often argued that the use of gas was 
ineffective, it is difficult to discern the true impact of chemical weapons based on 
casualty statistics alone. Casualty statistics include only those treated at Casualty 
Clearing Stations or Field Ambulances, but some soldiers may have been mildly gassed 
without seeking treatment. In the confusion of a battlefield the Field Medical Card, filled 
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out by medical personnel at aid stations, may have been filled out erroneously or 
inadequately.18 Other soldiers may have suffered from serious physical wounds and were 
counted as a shell or bullet casualty although they may also have been gassed. 
Additionally, it was not always possible to tell whether a soldier who had died had been 
gassed, especially if he also suffered from other injuries. Some gassed casualties may 
have been taken prisoner by the enemy and never counted. Casualty statistics are 
particularly lacking for the early gas attacks in April and May 1915.19 Casualty statistics 
also do not account for the harassing and neutralizing power of gas. Soldiers wearing 
cumbersome masks or other anti-gas equipment are less efficient than soldiers without 
such paraphernalia.20 Fear and anxiety can also seriously hinder the effectiveness of 
troops and just the thought that gas could be present often caused apprehension in 
soldiers. 
Casualty statistics show that gas was less lethal than conventional weapons of war. 
Prior to July 1917, gas casualties accounted for just under 2% of all British casualties in 
the war.21 After the introduction of mustard gas this number rose alarmingly to 14%, yet 
gas-related deaths accounted for only 2% of the overall British combatant fatalities in 
WWI.22 Just over 3% of all 180,981 British gas victims that had been counted by the end 
of the war died.23 The French, however, with less effective anti-gas protection than the 
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British, were a preferred gas target of the Germans and this combination of poor 
equipment and frequent attack may have caused a gas mortality rate as high as 20%.24 
Mustard gas was the most effective chemical weapon used by either side in the war. 
First used in July 1917 by the Germans against the British, mustard gas caused more 
British casualties in its year of use than all the other gases combined.25 Between the first 
use of mustard gas in 1917 and the end of the war, a total of over 160,000 gas casualties 
were admitted to medical units, over 77% of these were mustard gas cases, although this 
number may be higher due to underreporting.26 Mortality rates for mustard poisoning 
may not always be accurate because of the long period between exposure and death, as 
well as the underreporting of cases, however, the mortality rate of gas shell victims 
during the yellow cross period was 2.6%, less than half the gas mortality rate of the 
period before mustard was used.27 The effectiveness of mustard gas lay in its casualty-
producing power, not its killing power. While estimates suggested 80% of mustard 
casualties could be returned to duty in eight weeks, the average mustard gas case was 
unfit for duty for two to three months; this meant a significant loss of manpower for the 
British Army for often lengthy periods of time.28  
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One British officer claimed mustard gas shelling was the first “undoubted success” the 
Germans had had with gas.29 Sall’s Manual of Chemical Warfare referred to mustard gas 
as the most effective casualty-producing agent.30 
How did a weapon that was seemingly ineffective and actually less lethal compared 
to other weapons of modern war come to be vilified and feared long after its last use in a 
major conflict? Media coverage of gas weapons, via newspapers, magazines, paintings, 
photographs, novels, and radio, strongly influenced public opinion in Britain almost 
immediately after Second Ypres. The experiences of soldiers in the trenches who had 
been gassed or lived through a gas attack also contributed to how the public at large came 
to see the new weapon. Additionally, the very nature of chemical weapons, conjuring 
fears of invisible killers and suffocation, added to their extremely negative perception. It 
was a weapon that seemed inherently more unfair and horrifying than conventional 
weapons such as bombs or bullets. The media coverage of gas weapons in WWI ensured 
that chemical warfare entered the public consciousness as something to be feared and set 
the tone for how the public and government decision-makers alike would come to dread 
its use in the interwar years and WWII. 
After Second Ypres Germany was immediately vilified in the press for using chemical 
weapons.  Because Germany had signed the Hague Convention’s ban on poison gas their 
very use of this weapon, and the gas’s horrifying effects, provided new impetus to the 
depiction in British media of an especially treacherous  enemy.31  The use of asphyxiating 
gases ran counter to all rules of warfare, wrote one paper, and directly defied the Hague 
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Convention.32  One special correspondent wrote that subsequent to the use of poison gas 
at Ypres, Britain and her allies were “no longer fighting against a nation, but against a 
scourge such as cholera or pest.”33  A headline in the Daily Mirror read “Devilry, Thy 
Name Is Germany.”34  A captured German soldier was reported to have laughed at the 
suffering of gassed British troops struggling for breath as he was led past.35  While 
reports of the enemy killing prisoners or the unarmed were common on both sides, at 
Ypres the Germans taking the gas-heavy trenches were accused of telling suffocating 
Allied soldiers to lie down, where the gas concentration was highest, in order to “die 
better36.”  Similarly, a lack of clear understanding of chlorine gas, amongst soldiers in 
particular, led some to believe the gas had simply put soldiers to sleep, where they were 
then bayonetted by the Germans entering the trenches.37  Some British troops reported 
that the gas attacks personalized their anger against the Germans, while one soldier was 
now convinced of supposed German war atrocities in Belgium after having been gassed 
himself.38   
Newspaper reports detailed the horrors of a weapon that seemed to kill without 
leaving visible wounds and the suffering of those who had been exposed.  The Daily 
Mirror ran an image in May 1915 claiming to depict gassed soldiers unconscious in a 
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trench.39  While it is impossible to tell from the image whether the soldiers depicted had 
been gassed or were merely sleeping, the image worked to convey to the British public 
the idea of an unstoppable, invisible weapon, that left no marks on the bodies it touched.  
A chaplain of a regiment annihilated at Ypres summed up best the fear this new weapon 
evoked: “War! Glorious war! Not one of these men even saw an enemy; they had no 
chance to fight man to man, but were killed like poisoned rats in a trap.”40  Sir John 
French, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force, in describing the attack at 
Second Ypres, was quoted as saying: “What follows almost defies description. The effect 
of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line […] practically 
incapable of any action at all. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and 
hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose and dying condition[…].”41  Survivors of 
gas attacks described the spectacle of a greenish cloud drifting along the ground towards 
them, as tall as a man, with an acrid smell that burned their lungs. Many fled and were 
found later dead on the sides of the road with no visible injuries.42  Men who thought they 
had escaped the gas clouds often died more than a day later from its effects, only 
contributing to the fearsome reputation of this invisible killer.43  Sir John French 
countered German claims that the gas was painless, arguing instead that its victims 
suffered acutely and a large number of the cases died a “painful and lingering death.”44  
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John Scott Haldane, a Scottish scientist renowned for his work on the causes of mining 
disasters and eventual inventor of the British gas mask, was sent to the front to examine 
the Canadian victims of the first gas attack.  Upon arriving at the casualty clearing station 
Haldane found the victims struggling to breathe and blue in the face.  He determined the 
deaths were the result of a slow asphyxiation and called the use of the gas “brutally 
barbarous.”45   
While Haldane and French’s observations were relatively subdued, other 
correspondents ensured readers could fully visualize the horrific nature of the new 
weapon.  A gassed officer of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers referred to poison gas as “the 
very devil.”46  One unnamed Times correspondent wrote specifically to inform the world 
of this new horror after visiting French Senegalese troops who had been gassed at Ypres.  
The victims, he wrote, sat propped up against walls, “with mouths open and lead-glazed 
eyes, all swaying slightly backwards and forwards trying to get breath.”47  Gas warfare, 
the correspondent informed the British public, was the “most awful form of scientific 
torture.”48  A Canadian private described the suffering of gassed soldiers, who had fled 
without rifles and equipment, falling over on the road, tearing at their eyes and chests, 
kicking and struggling until they died.  “Tell you what,” he added, “it was just like a fish 
does when you take him out of the water.”49  Another correspondent wrote of those 
fortunate enough to survive the gas coughing and spitting blood, while the dead left 
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behind “turned black at once.”50  Some victims showed no significant symptoms until 
thirty hours after exposure they suddenly developed severe pneumonia, their bodies 
turning purple.51  The gas’s effects were so horrific, one paper suggested that the 
Germans ought to fire diphtheria, enteric fever, or cholera germs instead.52  French writer 
Pierre Loti gave a detailed account of the suffering of gas victims, translated and printed 
by the New York Times in 1916.  Loti described a makeshift field hospital housing gas 
victims as a place of “horror which one would think Dante had imagined,” where stoves 
burned furiously to ease the patients’ labored breathing, and men “who are struggling  in 
agony stretch out their poor hands to beg for [air balloons filled with oxygen].”53  The 
most seriously injured, he wrote, swollen in the chest, face, and limbs, looked like “India 
rubber dolls blown up.”54   
The media also contributed to society’s newfound fear over chemical weapons in 
other ways.  Just days after the initial chlorine gas attack, the British War Office issued a 
call to the public for homemade respirators that could be sent to troops at the front.  
Although dubbed the “Daily Mail Respirator,” the call for this early type of gas mask ran 
in other publications as well, asking the public to make pads of bleached cotton-wool to 
cover nostrils and mouth.55  The public’s response was overwhelming:  Families, 
hospitals, girls’ schools, and women’s societies all rose to the occasion and wagon-loads 
of respirators arrived at the Royal Army Clothing Factory.  Churches used their weekly 
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collection to purchase materials and make respirators.56  Just one day after issuing the 
request for half a million respirators, the War Office made an official announcement that 
needs had been met.57  Such calls to public action not only allowed the British public to 
contribute in some way to the war effort, but here it also cemented in the national 
consciousness the horrors of a new type of weapon that could asphyxiate unprotected 
troops.  Although the Daily Mail Respirator was ineffective (even dangerous as it could 
cause asphyxiation) and was recalled almost immediately from the front, its importance 
lay not in providing protection for the troops, but in forcing the British public to interact 
with the concept of chemical weapons.58   
The public and government also quickly realized the potential of this new weapon to 
be a direct threat to civilians.  With the advent of aerial warfare and the ever-increasing 
range of planes and airships, civilians suddenly became potential targets.  German 
zeppelin bombing raids, while limited in scope and destructiveness, had done enough 
damage to cement a newfound fear of aerial raids in the British public.59  Although there 
is no record of chemical weapons being used on civilians during this war, the potential of 
such an attack became readily apparent.  Civilians, having been introduced to the menace 
of chemical warfare through the experiences of soldiers and their mobilization in the war 
effort, suddenly had to worry about their own safety from poison gas. The Chemical 
Warfare Department discussed what the public ought to be told in the case the Germans 
were to start “dropping poison in London.”60 To use poison gas in London, one member 
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of the department argued, would be “sheer civilian slaying” but did not think this would 
deter the Germans.61 
British newspapers almost immediately combined the legitimate threat of zeppelin 
bombing with the less-realistic use of chemical weapons.  Just a few months after Second 
Ypres rumors circulated that the Germans had developed, and were testing over the 
Baltic, a “gas-emitting zeppelin,” that was heavily armored, with several reservoirs to 
hold poison gas.62  Other reports claimed the new zeppelin was also fitted with a new 
“bomb dropping apparatus,” and could drop its poisonous load mechanically, while a 
small crew worked to fill more bombs with gas.63  While the majority of these reports left 
the potential of a civilian gas attack unspoken, others specifically informed readers that 
these new zeppelins were intended for the “proposed ‘aerial invasion’ of England.”64  
Officials fully expected zeppelins, already dropping explosive and incendiary bombs on 
Britain, to employ asphyxiating gases on the civilian population, as well.65 When, in 
October 1917, bombs from an air raid in Shoreditch released noxious fumes that affected 
sheltering civilians and even killed a ten week old baby, it gave renewed weight to claims 
that the Germans would carry out gas attacks against civilians.66 
Chemical weapons had earned a negative reputation during the war and ultimately 
became the only one of the new war technologies to be banned.  Gas weapons were seen 
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as an unchivalrous form of warfare, able to be deployed from cover and out of sight. 
British Lt. Gen. Charles Ferguson referred to chemical weapons as a “cowardly form of 
warfare.”67  Newspaper and eyewitness reports had driven home the idea of poison gas as 
an inhumane weapon that silently choked or burned its victims without their knowledge.  
The London Medical Society called for a prohibition against chemical weapons.68  By 
1925, 27 nations had signed a ban on gas weapons, including Great Britain and 
Germany.69  While official opinions were often split on the use of gas weapons, public 
opinion was overwhelmingly against chemical warfare. Imagery of troops in gas 
protective equipment, their human features all but obscured, also impacted public 
perception of the new weapon.  One writer worried that, because “chemistry makes no 
attempt to preserve manly beauty,” women would find it especially difficult to deal with a 
war where poison gas would obscure the features of their husbands and sons.70   
Not all agreed with the notion of gas as inhumane. One officer argued that the 
mortality of gas was much lower than that of shell wounds and the suffering it caused not 
necessarily greater. He added that if gas were to be abolished it would have to be on 
grounds other than its inhumanity.71 The Commandant of the Royal Engineers claimed 
that calls to abolish gas were based on “foolish sentimentalism” and that gas was actually 
the most humane weapon used in war, because it led to a decision with the least amount 
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of human suffering.72 A scientist argued poison gas was misunderstood and represented 
the most humane weapon of war, citing the low mortality rate of gas casualties as proof.73 
Whether seen as a horrible and cowardly scourge or as an effective and humane 
weapon, all those who talked about poison gas assumed it would play a significant role in 
future wars.  American Maj. Gen. William Sibert, Director of the Chemical Warfare 
Service at the end of WWI, considered chemical weapons one of the most effective 
instruments of war and that they would play an important part in any future conflict.74  
Months before the Treaty of Versailles, there already existed a collective fear over the use 
of new war technologies on a grander, more destructive scale in a future conflict. Lord 
Grey, Britain’s foreign secretary, suggested that in the next war there would be no 
fighting in the normal sense and everything would be done by poison gas.75 Others 
suggested poison gas had proven superior to explosives and that a future war had the 
potential to be a war of gas entirely.76  Speculations saw the poison gas of the future as 
colorless, odorless, packed into compact pill form and able to be shot from guns or 
hidden in the ground, with the power to contaminate acres of land for months, forcing 
infantrymen to stagger about hidden behind masks and rubber coats.77  The Germans 
were rumored to have invented a gas that remained deadly for up to eight days and could 
be sprayed in a dried form from airplanes, making the strategic occupation of territory 
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nearly impossible for troops.78 One American speculated a future war where scientists 
piloted unmanned wireless planes with the capability to drop poison gas onto vast 
amounts of the civilian population.79  The somewhat sensational Liberty Magazine 
dedicated several pages to speculation on a horrific future poison gas war in Europe.  The 
nation under attack, the magazine wrote, would not know what had happened until “the 
streets and homes, cellars and subways, houses and business buildings of some great city 
[are] filled with gasping, twisting, choking men, women, and children or littered with 
tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of dead […].”80  
The news media also ensured the public was reminded of the danger of poison gas 
even during peacetime.  The plight of veterans who had been gassed during the war 
regularly received public mention after 1918.  A case of a veteran destroying his house, 
attempting to murder his wife, and ultimately committing suicide, was attributed to his 
exposure to chemical weapons during the war.  The coroner suggested poison gas victims 
were often “afflicted with impulsive insanity.”81  The British Legion, aiming to abolish 
the seven years’ time limit a soldier had to file for disability pension, drew attention 
particularly to gas poisoning victims, whose condition often deteriorated most noticeably 
when they were outside the time limit.82  Soldiers who succumbed to gas injuries years 
after the war still received attention in the papers, with headlines that could have 
stemmed from the war as easily as from the 1920s or 1930s.  One disabled veteran, who 
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died more than ten years after the end of the war, had his death directly attributed to gas 
poisoning suffered in 1918.  The Lancashire Evening Post ran coverage of his death not 
as an obituary, but as an article under the headline “Accrington Man Succumbs to Effect 
of Gas Poisoning.”83   
Reports also suggested poison gas was dangerous by itself, without anyone’s intent to 
use it as a weapon.  Chemical factory explosions often made headlines.  A French 
chlorine gas factory exploded in 1926, killing 19.84  An explosion at a chemical factory in 
Germany spread green clouds of poisonous gas into nearby towns and necessitated the 
wearing of masks for relief workers.  As many as 1,500 died in the explosion and 
subsequent gas release, leading to some in London to issue renewed calls for chemical 
disarmament.85  In 1920, a British worker handling scrap metal drums died from 
exposure to the mustard gas the drums had once contained.  The Ministry of Munitions, 
seeking to deflect all blame, claimed all usual methods of neutralizing chemical agents 
had been followed, but must not have been sufficient.86  Just a few years later large 
quantities of German Blue Cross gas shells were buried in a moor near Cologne, yet fears 
over continued dangers led German officials to close the moor for a period of 30 years.87  
In the Times report of the incident, the paper ensured its readers understood the 
implacable dangers of poison gas, explaining that even though the shells had been 
neutralized, burned, buried, disinterred, and reburied in a special concrete coffin, they 
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could not be rendered completely harmless.88  Such instances suggested to the public that 
poison gas was so dangerous, that once in existence it could never be destroyed or made 
safe.   
Newspapers were not the only medium, however, that ensured citizens understood the 
horror of chemical weapons.  In the aftermath of WWI former soldiers from both sides 
published their war experiences in the forms of diaries, memoirs, poems, and novels.  In 
Erich Maria Remarque’s popular novel All Quiet on the Western Front, the protagonist 
finds himself in a graveyard during a gas attack, combining imagery of fear, gas, and 
death in an eerie scene.89  The narrator also describes the suffering of gassed soldiers who 
“cough up their burnt lungs in clots” and he is later gassed himself.90  Wilfred Owen’s 
anti-war poem Dulce et Decorum Est vividly described the agonizing death of a gassed 
soldier.  In Goodbye to All That, British officer Robert Graves detailed his experiences at 
the Battle of Loos, where the British use of gas turned out disastrously for their own men 
because of a headwind.91 Correspondent Frederic Villiers illustrated his experiences on 
the front with various sketches.  His sketch of the first gas attack at Ypres depicts the 
cloud of chlorine gas as a force strong enough to knock soldiers off their feet.92  Other 
sketches included soldiers in a trench putting on their respirators, canisters leaking gas 
into French trenches, and French soldiers soaking hay in hypo sulfate solution as an early 
form of gas protection.93  While these published materials spoke of soldiers’ experiences, 
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civilians could easily extrapolate such dangers into their own lives, particularly in light of 
the war’s civilian casualties and technological advances in aviation after 1918.  
Fiction also made use of the idea of poison gas. Olaf Stapleton’s 1930 novel Last and 
First Men tells the story of a devastating war where bomber fleets deploy large amounts 
of poison gas against the cities of Europe, ultimately leaving the continent practically 
uninhabited.94 H.G. Wells speculated on the future of gas warfare in The Shape of Things 
to Come, telling the reader from the perspective of a writer in the 22nd century about 
“past” wars where gas was used and developments in chemical warfare, such as gases 
which “[…] killed instantly and cruel and creeping poisons that implacably rotted the 
brain. Some produced convulsions and a knotting up of the muscles […].”95 A Permanent 
Death Gas turned a several square mile area of East Prussia into a death zone that no one 
dared enter for several decades.96 Cicely Hamilton’s dystopian Theodore Savage 
imagined a future aerial war that collapses British civilization. It described refugees 
fleeing the war as “a horde of human rats driven out of their holes by terror, by fire and 
by gas.”97 The government had failed to provide its civilians with gas masks, ultimately 
dooming them to death.98 When the protagonist comes across a village filled with bodies 
he finds that “These people had died suddenly, in strange contorted attitudes—here 
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crouching, there outstretched with clawing fingers. Gas, he supposed—a cloud of gas 
rolling  down the street before the wind—and perhaps not a soul left alive!”99 
Films, too, fictionalized poison gas. A reviewer at the Nottingham Journal was 
disturbed at a German film that envisioned a future war with soldiers fighting in gas-
proof diver suits and rifles that could fire poison gas.100 The 1929 picture The Spy was an 
action film about the efforts to upset organized society and included, among other 
sensations, poison gas.101 A 1934 film titled The Right to Live was advertised with the 
tagline “War! Poison Gas! Is there an antidote?”102 In the 1938 film Flash Gordon’s Trip 
to Mars, the hero Gordon and his sidekicks confront the evil Azura who employs poison 
gas to escape and orders a bombing raid on civilians.103 The 1939 Anything to Declare 
was touted as an “ARP thriller” that revolved around the invention of an anti-gas formula 
that made all poison gases harmless.104 A film made during the war depicted the exploits 
of a British sabotage expert who goes to Czechoslovakia to blow up a Nazi poison gas 
factory.105 
After the end of WWI, fears over a chemical threat to civilians only increased.  The 
speculation regarding future wars fought entirely with chemical weapons, or featuring 
increasingly sophisticated gas weapons, were extrapolated to impact the civilian 
populations, as well.  Britain determined that 50 tons of the latest arsenical gas, spread by 
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modern, low-flying bombers, would be sufficient to wipe out all of London.106  British 
experts assumed future air attacks would occur in three phases, beginning with incendiary 
bombing to cause congestion through fires, high-explosive bombing, and, lastly, an attack 
with gas to “stampede the civilian population.”107   U.S. Congressman Julius Kahn argued 
that in a future war there would be no non-combatants because bombs dropped from 
airplanes did not distinguish between soldiers and civilians.  The gas fumes, he said, “will 
strangle the soldier, then search out the innermost crevices of the nursery.”108 Someone 
else envisioned a future archaeologist digging up the lost civilization of the British 
Empire after a machine war that saw the gas menace catch unawares a population that 
had no protection, was too large to be evacuated, and had not been properly drilled or 
trained in what to do. The writer continued that people were driven into the streets and 
even those with masks could not withstand the barrage of deadly gas which “began to 
spread, rolled down the street canyons and enshrouded the houses, and death came to the 
citizens, if not that day, then the next, through the simple act of breathing poisoned 
air.”109 
There were calls throughout the interwar period to abolish poison gas entirely. In 
1925 the League of Nations drafted a charter to ban the use of all chemical weapons in 
war. Known as the “Geneva Gas Protocol” the charter was signed in 1928 and ratified by 
most signatories, but concerns over a possible future use of gas persisted.110 In 1928 these 
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concerns were significant enough to be addressed at an international conference in 
Brussels.  Chemical warfare experts from fifteen nationalities met to discuss efforts to 
protect civilian populations from poison gas.111  The committee concluded that in a war 
of the future, no proper protection existed for civilians and that anti-gas measures were a 
delusion.  If a chemical war were to take place, they wrote, it was “likely to produce the 
most frightful catastrophe among a country’s noncombatants.”112  Other experts agreed 
that civilians living in urban centers would likely be the targets of future wars, but that 
protecting civilian populations through the distribution of gas masks or the building of 
bomb shelters was financially and physically unfeasible.  Only through promoting peace, 
they concluded, could nations protect their civilians from modern warfare.113 The Anti-
Poison Gas Association was still engaging in propaganda work nearly a decade after the 
League of Nations charter, seeking to make all people realize the need to abolish poison 
gas.114 Others argued politicians were failing to protect populations from gas and 
scientists would have to do their part to promote abolishing chemical weapons.115  
Britain also kept a close eye on the chemical warfare preparations of its potential 
future enemies. Reports that Germany was developing a new and deadly poison gas 
reached Britain as early as 1924.116 A German War Academy syllabus that trained its 
students in the gas protection of civil populations suggested that Germany expected their 
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civilians to become gas targets.117 A source informed British military leaders that German 
chemical factories had been so organized that they could be converted to manufacturing 
poison gas within 48 hours.118 Germany was also reported to have created a material that 
was proof against mustard gas and were already manufacturing overalls in German field-
gray out of it.119 
In the 1920s the British government began considering how to protect its civil 
population from gas. The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was intended to provide 
answers on a variety of subjects and its Air Raid Precautions Sub-Committee specifically 
dealt with protecting the civilian populations from air raids. In 1924 the Sub-Committee 
first considered how to protect the civil population from a gas attack.120 In 1931 the CID 
argued that it was important to continue such preparations even after the 1925 Geneva 
Gas Protocol because some signatories had added a clause making their assent to the ban 
dependent on being allowed to retaliate should they suffer a gas attack.121 The Committee 
considered that it might be likely that civilians would be subject to future gas attacks, the 
effects of which on a population ignorant of the dangers and with no scheme of defense, 
could be disastrous.122 The Committee saw  the preparation of a defense scheme and the 
education of the public on gas warfare as a vital necessity, arguing that this would largely 
negate the terror of chemical weapons, which it saw as the worst effects of gas.123 This 
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demonstrates that the Committee understood that the psychological effects of gas on the 
population would be much greater than those of other types of bombs and that only 
reliable information released by the government could counter the ignorance and 
exaggerated notions about poison gas held by the public.124 
As tensions in Europe rose, so did anxieties over the potential use of poison gas in a 
future war. The Czech Crisis in 1938 especially hurried preparations for what seemed like 
an inevitable war. All government departments, including those responsible for protecting 
British civilians, accelerated their civil defense measures in response. During this period, 
the Home Office assembled and issued approximately 38 million respirators to civilians 
that had been previously stored for a future emergency.125 To those engaged in civil 
defense services the Home Office issued duty respirators, protective clothing, and bleach 
powder.126 The lack of ready protection for small children and babies was particularly 
worrying during the crisis.127 
 The outbreak of war in 1939 was marked by concerns that gas would be used 
against civilians. Immediately after the outbreak of war on September 1st, newspapers 
across Britain informed their readers on what to do if the Germans attacked, notifying 
them that rattles would signal a gas attack and asked that people keep their gas masks 
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close by as they might not have much time to prepare.128 One newspaper reported that 
Germany intended to break her pledge not to use chemical weapons129. The Ministry of 
Home Security (MHS),  its mission the protection of civilians on the homefront, had been 
preparing for a possible war and within the first few months of the conflict issued 
pamphlets to citizens that would teach them how to prepare for an attack. Poison gas was 
an important topic. A few months before war was officially declared, the Home Office 
printed and distributed through the post office millions of public information leaflets to 
instruct citizens on air raid precautions in case of war.130 Public Information Leaflet No. 2 
instructed readers on how their gas masks functioned, how to wear them, and how to 
properly care for them.131 The pamphlet Shelter from Air Attack included a section titled 
“Bombs and Gas” that informed its reader on the various bombs that might be used and 
how they operated.132  
 The Home Office sought to publicize the gas threat throughout the war without 
causing undue alarm among the population. Gas publicity became a balancing act 
between engendering enough worry to get people to act, but to also provide enough 
reassurance to avoid panic and disorder. A pamphlet titled How to Defend Yourself 
Against Gas suggested that gas might be used to terrorize people, but that there was no 
need to be frightened if one knew how to be prepared.133 This pamphlet included 
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instructions on how to recognize gas, the types of gases that might be used, how to 
protect oneself, and how to use the civilian respirator.134 After the start of the Blitz, Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill asked the MHS to review anti-gas precautions for the public 
and the resulting gas publicity campaign began with Home Secretary Sir John Anderson 
broadcasting a speech to remind civilians of the gas threat.135 One official suggested that 
this pamphlet and Anderson’s speech needed to be supplemented with a broadcast of 
reassurance by the Minister, a full press statement of reassurance and instructions, and a 
poster containing the main points of the leaflet to forestall any panic and stampeding that 
might be caused if gas were used.136 After seeing a draft of a poster depicting a drawing 
of a man and woman donning respirators as a gas attack occurs, an employee of the 
Public Relations Department wrote to the officer in charge with a suggestion: “could you 
persuade the artist to take the look of terror out of the lady’s eyes? We are anxious to 
convince the Public that there is no need for apprehension if you have your gas-mask 
with you […].”137 Public Information Leaflet No. 6 instructed readers on how to protect 
the food in their homes from poison gas, intending to reassure the anxieties of many who 
worried about losing food in a time when it was already strictly rationed.138 Another draft 
pamphlet proclaimed that “Gas will be no more than a nuisance - if we are ready.”139 
Gas—what you should know was a pamphlet issued by the MHS in 1941 that informed 
the reader that gas might be used to “upset your daily life,” but that this could be avoided 
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by following the instructions provided, which focused on using the respirator and simple 
first aid.140 A film trailer dealing with anti-gas precautions was also prepared, in addition 
to short BBC broadcast talks on the subject.141 The MHS and Ministry of Information 
(MI) also collaborated on an anti-gas exhibition held at the Charing Cross Underground 
Station and considered locations for further such exhibitions.142  The MHS also found 
that it was increasingly difficult to ensure public attention to the topic when no gas attack 
had transpired several months into the Blitz and suggested that publicity measures should 
be spaced out carefully to provide a fresh start for the campaign every few weeks.143 
 Government offices responsible for educating the public also employed the press as 
a tool of gas publicity. This campaign published a series of four anti-gas advertisements 
in all of the Sunday newspapers, which enjoyed a large readership.144 While these 
advertisements were primarily visual and provided only basic instructions, the ministries 
involved in gas publicity also published “Gas Raid Quizzes” to provide more in-depth 
information to readers. Over a period of several months, as many as twenty different 
quizzes were published in British newspapers, each asking several questions about gas 
precautions and providing a short answer. Questions included what to do with a child 
unwilling to wear a respirator, whether or not a man should give up his mask for a 
woman, how to wear spectacles with a respirator, what to do if one is driving while a gas 
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rattle sounds, and how to deal with mustard gas splashes on the skin.145 Readers were 
expected to look at the questions and determine how much they knew themselves about 
gas precautions. By the end of 1941, the gas raid quizzes, which had initially been 
entirely textual, were published in the form of advertisements, with a related drawing, 
large text, and only one or two questions and answers.146 When the press published 
reports and images covering a gas exercise in Brighton, however, the MHS and MI were 
quite upset, arguing that it crossed the boundary of mere press publicity because it did not 
simply provide instruction or advice.147 Officials in both ministries quickly sought to shut 
down any coverage of gas exercises (and pictures thereof especially) to avoid alarming 
the public.148 Similarly, it was planned to censor newspaper accounts of actual gas 
attacks, should they occur, and in particular references to where gas had been dropped, 
what type of gas was used, the effects of the gas, and the number of casualties.149 
 That the Germans would use gas against the British Isles was a recurring theme 
during the war. Early in the war, a rumor suggested the Germans were trying to 
impregnate dust clouds with vesicants which they could release from aircraft or let drift 
across the Channel.150 It was also reported that the Germans planned to attached gas-
                                                        
145 TNA: HO 186/2247, Ministry of Home Security, Gas Raid Quiz No. 1, June 1941; Ministry of Home 
Security, Gas Raid Quiz No. 2, June 4, 1941; Ministry of Home Security, Gas Raid Quiz No. 3, June 4, 
1941; Gas Raid Quiz, June 16, 1941. 
146 TNA: HO 186/2247, Ministry of Home Security, Gas Raid Quiz No. 17, October 27, 1941; Ministry of 
Home Security, Gas Raid Quiz No. 18, November 10, 1941; Ministry of Home Security, Gas Raid Quiz 
No. 19, December 15, 1941; Ministry of Home Security, Gas Raid Quiz No. 20, December 15, 1941. 
147 TNA: HO 186/2116, Publicity for Brighton Gas Test, n.d. 
148 TNA: HO 186/2116, Letter to J. Radcliffe, February 25, 1941. 
149 TNA: HO 186/2116, Hillier to Mr. Leslie, March 6, 1941. 
150 TNA: WO 188/2053, Possible German Secret Weapon, February 2, 1940. 
 
 56 
filled tanks to submarines to be towed into British seaports, where their deadly contents 
would be unleashed on the civilian population.151 
Until mid-1940, the war had been relatively quiet for British civilians, but emerging 
rumors about imminent gas attacks caused new anxieties. In July 1940 the MHS was 
greatly concerned about a gas attack on Britain after reports that gas bombs had been 
distributed in German aerodromes and that the German ARP department had been 
instructed to test all civilian respirators.152 Intelligence also strongly suggested the 
Germans planned to use gas in preparation for an invasion of the island.153 By the end of 
the month an attack with gas on Britain was considered “a definite possibility.”154 New 
prime minister Winston Churchill asked that further and repeated warnings be given to 
the public about gas and that every gas mask ought to be tested and civilians told to carry 
them everywhere.155 While the MHS wanted citizens to be prepared for a chemical 
weapons attack, they worried the public would panic unduly if excessive attention was 
paid to gas.156 Subsequently, a July 30th broadcast by Home Secretary John Anderson 
enjoined citizens to prepare for gas in between reminding them of other air raid 
precautions.157 A year later, a new report surfaced from Switzerland that Hitler intended 
to employ a new gas that persisted at ground level for an attack against Russia and an 
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attempt to invade Britain.158 Again, in 1943, a source claimed Hitler had told Mussolini 
he intended to use gas “in the near future” against England.159 The War Office was also 
concerned at reports that German troops had been made to carry full anti-gas equipment, 
had increased anti-gas training, and were practicing in their masks.160 
 Often private citizens wrote to the Ministry of Information about gas rumors they 
had heard. One man heard a tale while dining that Hitler had developed a very powerful 
gas that could not be smelled and killed very suddenly about a month after inhalation.161 
Another wrote that a “reliable source” had informed him that a white powder lying in the 
streets after German raids was a new form of poison gas that was inert in its dry state, but 
upon a rain shower a “extremely potent poison” would be released.162 A concerned 
civilian even wrote in from Australia to inform the Intelligence Department that Hitler’s 
secret weapon was a new type of gas.163 An anonymous letter was sent to the British 
legation in German notifying them that the Germans had been storing enormous amounts 
of poison gas and were intending to use it in an upcoming offensive.164 
 The worry over a gas attack was often more pronounced in the British colonies. An 
official 1935 report considered the need for protection in Malta. It argued that the island’s 
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high humidity and porous limestone made it an ideal target for gas warfare.165 
Subsequently, sufficient cheap respirators were made available for the civil population of 
Malta.166 At Aden, officials called for supplies of anti-gas equipment for the civil 
population as early as 1936, as a result of the Italians using gas against the 
Abyssinians.167 Over 4,000 respirators were sent for the protection of British civilians in 
Aden.168  The Egyptian Consular Office asked for respirators for its British civilian 
subjects as early as July 1938, although some worried that panic-stricken “natives” might 
try to take possession of the coveted masks.169 British subjects in Egypt particularly 
feared a gas attack if Italy were to enter the war, as the Italians had already employed 
poison gas against Abyssinia and the Egyptians offered a similarly unprotected target.170 
The British civilians in Egypt were getting “very anxious” when by 1941 the full 
allotment of babies’ and children’s gas masks had still not been received.171 By 1942, 
Singapore, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and Canada had requested civilian 
respirators from Britain, but rubber shortages meant these requests could not be met.172 
 Fear of chemical warfare was also evident in rumors of Germans poisoning 
civilians through everyday objects. Just after the start of the London Blitz, the police 
received reports in several regions about cobwebs, a white “gossamer like” substance, 
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that had supposedly been dropped from German planes during a raid and that caused 
blistering of the skin when touched.173 The material was said to have floated from the sky 
and, in one area, covered as much as five square miles in fine white streamers that hung 
from hedges and poles.174 After testing it was determined that the purported enemy 
weapon in fact comprised spiderwebs spun by a special type of spider that created its web 
on the ground surface.175 This incident mimicked WWI fears of German poison dropped 
from planes. Sweets found on the ground by civilians after an air raid were suspected of 
being poisoned, but upon laboratory testing no traces of poison or biological agents were 
found.176 Some chocolates received similar attention, although the local police did not 
bother with lab tests, instead throwing the chocolates down the stairs to prove they could 
not have been dropped by a plane.177 Another rumor claimed that German planes had 
dropped poisoned soup packets on Calais, killing a French family. This was shocking 
enough to receive attention in British newspapers, but testing again revealed no known 
poisons.178 Poisoned cakes were also said to have been dropped.179 Such reports of 
poisoned items dropped from planes caused enough public anxiety that one news agency 
was reprimanded for its exaggerated and falsified reports.180 
 During the war the news media continued to ensure civilians did not forget about 
the gas threat. In August 1940, one paper urged its readers to carry their gas masks as 
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“the use of poison gas by the enemy is now a possibility not to be discounted.”181 
Reminding British civilians of their own duties in the case of a gas attack was a common 
theme in newspaper articles during the war. A member of the MHS suggested most 
civilians were ill-prepared for a gas attack.182 The Coventry Evening Telegraph asked its 
readers “Is Coventry Prepared Against Gas?” and suggested each citizen was responsible 
for his or her own preparedness.183 By 1942, newspapers were suggesting that the more 
desperate the Nazis became, the more likely they were to use poison gas.184 The 
Lancashire Evening Post juxtaposed a similar article on Nazi gas plans for Britain with a 
large-print call for readers to carry their gas masks, although underneath in smaller print 
this was explained to be for a gas exercise to take place later.185 Reports of a new type of 
German gas were repeated throughout the war. In 1942 newspapers reported the Germans 
were going to use a new gas in their offensive against Russia.186 This new gas was said to 
attack the nervous system.187 A few years later the Germans were said to have a gas held 
in glass phials that soldiers would smash against enemy tanks to blind their crews.188 
 Poison gas loomed large in the British public consciousness by the end of WWI 
and, with the very real threat of civilian targeting in WWII, solidified its standing as a 
significant factor in public anxiety. The basic concept of poison gas as a killer and 
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something to be despised was well-understood by all members of society. Poison gas was 
such a readily understood concept that it could be used in analogous reasoning to non-
related things, such as gossip, which also had many types and could be spread unseen.189 
The public had a deep enough understanding of gas warfare and its accouterments to give 
meaning to images such as one printed in Britannia & Eve that showed two uniformed 
members of the Legion of Frontiersmen in gas masks, one holding an unconscious 
woman, while the other crouches in front of her with his hands in a bag on her chest. 
Only readers familiar with gas masks and gas warfare would understand that the 
Frontiersman is attempting to pull out the woman’s mask to put it on her, instead of 
robbing her of her belongings.190 The actual use of chemical weapons in WWI taught 
civilians and government decision-makers the very real effects such weapons had on the 
human body and its condemnation as barbaric ensured that people feared poison gas 
immediately. The interwar period only reinforced notions about poison gas as a weapon 
to be dreaded. Contact with WWI veterans provided civilians with first-hand experiences 
of what it meant to be gassed and popular media often made poison gas a tool used by 
villains. Continued tensions in Europe ensured that future conflict was often on the minds 
of civilians and government leaders alike and speculations concerning such a war often 
included the use of poison gas. When war did break out again, Great Britain had 
expended a massive effort of money, materials, and man-hours to ensure its population 
was not just protected from air raids, but that it was well-protected from a possible use of 
poison gas. While chemical weapons were not actually used in WWII, both government 
and civilians worried throughout the war that a gas attack could happen in Britain.  
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Chapter 3 - “An Unconquerable People:” Air Raid Precautions for the British Civil 
Population, 1914-1945  
 
 The advent of aerial warfare  and the start of German raids on Britain in WWI made 
it clear to government and citizens alike that civil populations had become targets. While 
WWI raids on the British population were limited in scope and the destruction these 
caused, they nevertheless presented enough of a threat to worry a large part of the 
citizenry. Almost immediately the government had to create some means of warning and 
education for the public, a scheme that proved relatively successful in light of the 
restrictive nature of WWI raids. These early raids, and the damage they wrought, did, 
however, allow the government and civilians to extrapolate this threat to a possible future 
war, where technological improvements in aircraft and bombs could potentially wreak 
havoc on an unprotected population. In the years following WWI government decision-
makers discussed the need for a system that provided uniform education, training, and 
equipment to civilians to deal with air raids and that could channel possible negative 
energies into useful, or at least purposeful, actions. The idea behind civil defense was that 
it would allow all civilians to protect themselves and their families from harm during 
raids and to remain calm and ordered during such times to forestall morale-sapping panic.  
 During WWI, Britain saw several dozen attacks by German planes and airships, 
primarily in coastal areas. The first raid occurred in December 1914 and was carried out 
by an airplane that targeted Dover.1 By the end of 1916 thirty air or seaplane raids had 
targeted Britain, usually via a single raider that never penetrated very far past the 
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coastline and did little damage.2 The first zeppelin raid occurred in January 1915, when 
two German airships crossed the coastline to drop bombs on prominent buildings, such as 
a church and a racecourse.3 While soldiers manning anti-aircraft guns and pilots 
attempting to shoot down zeppelins enjoyed some success, German air raids did enough 
damage during the war to make British civilians conscious of their sudden vulnerability. 
One man who lived through both world wars remembered the WWI raids as just as 
frightening as those of WWII.4 From the start of raiding in Britain to the end of the war 
German air raids caused over 2,000 casualties, most of whom were in London.5 The 
zeppelins were seen as especially menacing, both for their unique size and shape and 
their silent flight when the engines were turned off which would suddenly see an airship 
emerge from behind cloud cover to drop bombs. One civilian who remembered the 
zeppelin raids equated the terror that zeppelins spread as similar to that of the V-2 rockets 
of WWII.6 
 Despite the dangers, many watched the airships as they hung in the sky. Air raids 
were still a novelty and people could only guess at the actual danger they might be in 
from a raiding zeppelin or plane. One child remembered that many people were more 
curious of the zeppelins than afraid enough to take shelter. The child and his friends were 
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sent home from school as a raid was coming, but instead went to a high bridge to watch 
the zeppelin.7 One woman remembered the first zeppelin that appeared over West-Ham 
Park and watched as it was shot down on “a lovely afternoon.”8 A girl who sheltered in 
the basement with her family was lifted up to spot the zeppelin through the window as it 
flew over London.9 A young boy remembered being allowed to watch from the basement 
window if anything spectacular occurred during a raid.10 Another family went to the front 
door when the anti-aircraft guns sounded to watch the zeppelin from the porch, not too 
close, but quite “near enough to be unpleasant.”11 A young woman described seeing the 
zeppelin as “a wonderful sight. It looked like a silver cigar […]” and when searchlights 
and guns had the airship in their sights “it was something like looking at a magic 
lantern.”12 Someone else remembered the zeppelin looking like a “silver fish” highlighted 
in the searchlights.13 Others watched from their roof garden as a zeppelin caught in the 
searchlights suddenly caught flame and came down from the sky, bending in the 
middle.14 Millions of Londoners cheered when a zeppelin was brought down in 
September 1916.15 Young boys often spent hours looking for shrapnel or pieces of 
zeppelins to collect and trade.16 When a zeppelin was brought down at Potters Bar 
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hundreds of people set out the next day to go see the wreckage and were sold souvenir 
pieces of the airship, although these were swiftly confiscated by police.17 
 Some passive means of defense, such as lighting restrictions, existed even before 
the first raids on Britain. Lighting restrictions were initially applied only to London and 
Eastern and Southeastern counties, but after the penetration of zeppelins farther inland 
these restrictions were extended and ultimately covered the whole of England and Wales 
and a part of Scotland.18 This restriction ordered that all lights, other than those not 
visible from outside of a house, must be extinguished between specified hours.19 This 
included lit advertisements and shop windows, as well as street lamps, while lights inside 
shops, buses, and tram cars had to be shaded.20 In 1915 the Admiralty (which was 
responsible for home defense) added a requirement that the headlamps of cars be 
extinguished or shaded.21 There was no legal compulsion for civilians to comply with 
lighting orders, however, and after the first zeppelin raid several local authorities asked 
the Home Office for compulsory powers.22 London, with its multitude of motor cars and 
variety of streetlights, presented a significant light problem and required special orders 
and extended police powers.23 The concern over visible lights leading the enemy to his 
target was so serious that authorities questioned the use of flashlights by pedestrians, who 
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needed them to walk after dark since streetlights had been extinguished, and in some 
cases people were even prosecuted for striking a match in the open after dark.24 
 The government eventually instituted a crude warning system to allow people to 
prepare for an attack. Initially reluctant to give warnings over concerns that it would 
cause too much work stoppage in factories, the government eventually relented, in part 
because many munition workers, female especially, refused to work at night unless they 
would be warned in time of an air raid.25 Because it was impossible, especially in the first 
two years of the war, to give prompt and reliable warning, there was a good chance that a 
hostile raider or airship might appear unannounced, undermining the sense of security a 
public warning was intended to convey.26 For the purposes of issuing a warning the 
whole of England and Wales and parts of Scotland were divided into seven “Warning 
Controls,” each under the leadership of a “Warning Controller.”27 The Controller received 
information on the movement of hostile aircraft and, if it appeared that the aircraft were 
heading towards his Control he would inform the telephone exchange manager, who 
would then send on the warning to the various telephone exchanges.28 Only those who 
had subscribed to the warning lists would receive the telephone warning and this included 
those who needed to make preparatory arrangements, such as factories, businesses, and 
government offices.29 This WWI warning system suffered seriously from the limitations 
of communication. In February 1916 nine German airships penetrated British defenses in 
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what is often known as ‘The Silent Raid’ because no air raid warnings were given in most 
of the locales bombed. The zeppelins penetrated as far inland as Derbyshire and many 
towns that were attacked did not fall under the lighting order. Clogged telephone lines 
and inadequate arrangements to transmit warnings from region to region led to the lack of 
a public warning.30 Confusion also arose over the type of warning sound various 
localities employed. Birmingham, for instance, discontinued the use of warning sirens in 
the city, but the adjoining borough of Smethwick continued to use theirs, which were 
easily audible in Birmingham, leading to significant confusion in the case of a raid.31 
 Civilians were also warned before an attack. Such warnings in WWI served 
primarily to allow people to extinguish any visible light and urge those outdoors to find 
cover.32 Initially, a number of means of warning the public were considered, including the 
ringing of telephone bells, the turning on of street lamps, the ringing of tramcar bells, and 
the firing of blank charges by the anti-aircraft guns, but all these were considered to take 
too long or be ineffective.33 By the middle of 1916 over 500 places of public 
entertainment in London, such as cinemas, theaters, and music halls, were included on 
the official warning list.34 When there was an imminent threat policemen were sent out on 
bicycles or foot carrying placards that read “Air Raid Take Shelter.”35 Sometimes these 
signs were printed front and back marked ‘Take Cover’ and then “All Clear’ for after the 
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raid.36 The policemen would blow whistles or a bugle would sound for the “all clear.”37  
In other areas Boy Scouts blew whistles to indicate the “all clear.”38   There was no 
consistency between regions, however, and in some locales constables and the fire 
brigade would call out a warning when an attack was possible, but there was no specific 
warning when an attack was imminent.39 Eventually maroons were used to warn the 
population before a raid, but these exploded with “a shattering bang and scarlet flare” 
loud enough to be mistaken by many for the raid itself and thus may often have caused 
more panic than they prevented.40 These maroons, sound bombs usually used as a distress 
signal at sea, rose to a height of 1000 feet before exploding and could be effectively 
heard over an area of a square mile.41 Because of the slow speeds of planes and airships 
at the time, warnings were given as much as twenty minutes in advance of a raid, a stark 
contrast from WWII.42 For many civilians the air raid warnings caused indignation and 
often aroused curiosity rather than impelling people to seek shelter.43 At night, most local 
authorities were reluctant to employ sound warnings and only policemen with placards 
and whistles or bells were used to clear the streets, although some members of the public 
complained that such warnings did not reach those indoors who wanted to seek shelter.44 
By 1917, the public were increasingly demanding something more emphatic than 
                                                        
36 IMW: Documents.15933, Letter by R. Dance, March 27, 1973, 3. 
37 TNA: HO 45/14650B, Home Office, Anti Aircraft Precautions (Civilian) 1914-1918, Part IV, 33; IMW: 
Documents.15933, Letter by John F. Milsom, May 30, 1973. 
38 IMW: Documents.15933, Letter by Wihdman, March 21, 1973. 
39 TNA: HO 45/14650B, Home Office, Anti Aircraft Precautions (Civilian) 1914-1918, Part IV, 5. 
40 IMW: Documents.15933, G. Davies, Notes on Bombing of London During the first World War, n.d., 1; 
TNA: HO 45/14650B, Home Office, Anti Aircraft Precautions (Civilian) 1914-1918, Part IV, 30. 
41 TNA: HO 45/14650B, Home Office, Anti Aircraft Precautions (Civilian) 1914-1918, Part IV, 30. 
42 IMW: Documents.15933, G. Davies, Notes on Bombing of London During the first World War, n.d., 3. 
43 TNA: HO 45/14650B, Home Office, Anti Aircraft Precautions (Civilian) 1914-1918, Part IV, 6. 
 
 69 
placards at night and in February 1918 the decision was made to fire maroons at any time 
during the day.45 Hull’s Chief Constable admitted he would not have used sound signals 
had he known what the effect would be, especially in light of the complaints of the upper 
classes, who preferred to stay at home during a raid, and opposed the noisy warnings.46  
 Civilians were quickly instructed on ways to protect themselves from air raids. It 
was important that civilians came to appreciate the risks to which they might be exposed 
during an attack  and how to take steps to protect themselves.47 There was, however, no 
definite or prescribed course of action the government or local authorities could point to, 
and thus only general principles of protection were issued to the public. Early in 1915, a 
poster illustrating the shapes and types of German and British aircraft was widely 
distributed and achieved significant popularity.48 The British Fire Prevention Committee, 
consulting with the Home Office, issued a series of leaflets on fire prevention.49 
Instructions were issued to towns in the East in 1915 and printed in local newspapers. 
These instructions were minimal, telling people to disperse, seek shelter, go into cellars 
or lower rooms if possible, and not to touch unexploded ordinance.50 
In Hull, middle and lower class people would trek into the countryside with their families 
upon the sounding of the public warning, which on some nights may have affected up to 
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as many as 40,000 people.51 Civilians were generally instructed to remain indoors upon a 
warning, but experience showed only the “educated and responsible” section of society 
complied, while the “masses” living in the East End were quick to leave their homes for 
what they saw as better shelter at the slightest sign of a raid.52 
 Civil defense services, however, were generally unsophisticated, disorganized, and 
often unofficial. In some areas there was a voluntary night patrol, a precursor to the 
Wardens' Service in the next war. At the Holy Trinity Church in Islington, London, 
civilian volunteers patrolled the church grounds every night during the war in teams of 
two men for two-hour shifts that began at 10PM and ended at 4AM.53 If an air raid 
warning sounded the patrolmen would turn off all the lights, open all doors, set out guide 
lamps, and control the crowds who sought shelter in the church.54 Without a 
comprehensive medical system to deal with air raid casualties, treatment for victims was 
sometimes delayed. One doctor suggested that Special Constables should receive a short 
first-aid course to treat serious casualties on the spot and potentially save lives.55 In 
London, by 1917, there existed about sixty air raid depots with fleets of ambulances 
operated by voluntary organizations and coordinated by the police to ensure air raid 
victims could be dispatched to hospitals more quickly.56 Local groups and charities often 
held first-aid courses for civilians to allow them to render assistance during a raid, but 
there was no official system of training or training requirements for those engaged in air 
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raid precautions.57 A national relief fund and charities, such as the Mansion House Fund, 
offered financial assistance to the victims of air raids.58 
 After the raids of WWI, it was clear that a better system of air raid precautions was 
needed in case of a future war. In 1924 the Sub-Committee on Air Raid Precautions was 
added to the CID with Sir John Anderson, future Home Secretary, as its chairman. The 
sub-committee was established to consider the question of air raid precautions in light of 
“the exposed situation of the Capital and seat of Government and other parts of southern 
England to air raid attack.”59 The members of the Sub-Committee were alarmed by an Air 
Staff report of the danger to which Britain was exposed, which estimated that the nearest 
enemy could drop a higher tonnage of bombs on Britain in the first 48 hours of a future 
war than had been dropped in all of WWI.60 The Committee also suggested that for 
precautionary measures to be taken seriously the public had to be receptive and 
understand the danger of air attack. They did not, however, wish to institute the 
immediate and wide distribution of information on the topic, instead arguing that 
education on air raids should be “slow and gradual” to avoid creating “undue alarm” in 
the population.61 A 1925 report by the CID considered necessary aspects of an air raid 
precautions system, such as a warning system, damage prevention, vital services after a 
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raid, and anti-gas measures.62 The Sub-Committee saw the education and morale of the 
public as cornerstone of national defense, assuming that in a future war “that nation, 
whose people can endure aerial bombardment the longer and with greater stoicism, will 
ultimately prove victorious.”63 
 The Committee drew conclusions based on air raid experiences in WWI. They 
thought an ad hoc warning system would only aid the enemy in disrupting normal life, 
but considered a fully worked out warning system to be necessary, partially in light of the 
refusal by munition workers to continue their work during a raid.64 Additionally, they 
recommended the use of the wireless broadcasting service as an important alternative or 
supplement to the warning system, especially if telephone lines became congested or 
interrupted.65 The Committee recommended that, in the future, lighting restrictions be 
vested entirely in the Home Office, to avoid the confusion and conflicting guidelines 
from WWI.66 They realized the necessity for a well-staffed and organized medical system 
and ambulance service to care for the many casualties to be expected in massive air 
raids.67 While British civilians did not suffer from a gas attack in WWI, a future attack 
with chemical weapons seemed likely. To combat the gas menace the Committee 
suggested the creation of a decontamination service, the gas-proofing of buildings, 
                                                        
62 TNA: HO 45/14650B, Committee of Imperial Defence, Sub-Committee on Air Raid Precautions, Report, 
July 8, 1925. 
63 ibid, 6. 
64 ibid, 7. 
65 TNA: HO 45/14650B, Committee of Imperial Defence, Sub-Committee on Air Raid Precautions, Extract 
from Minutes of the Meeting of the Sub-Committee held in Conference Room ‘A’ , No. 2 Whitehall 
Gardens, November 1926, 9. 
66 TNA: HO 45/14650B, Committee of Imperial Defence, Sub-Committee on Air Raid Precautions, Report, 
July 8, 1925, 11. 
67 ibid, 17. 
 
 73 
training the police in anti-gas measures, and educating the public on how to protect 
themselves.68 
 Even prior to the outbreak of WWII, the Home Office put into force many of the 
recommendations of the CID. The Home Office implemented a whole system of civil 
defense to educate, protect, and organize the civilian population of Britain in case of 
another war. Unlike WWI, the government departments responsible for air raid 
precautions and the various local authorities had had time to make detailed plans and had 
the benefit of prior experiences on which to improve upon. The 1937 Air Raid 
Precautions Act was based on Home Office instructions to local authorities on the 
provision of civil defense measures and services, such as warning systems, lighting 
restrictions, and rescue services, and detailed who should bear the financial burden of 
civil defense preparations.69 While the 1937 act made provision for basic air raid 
precautions, the international crisis in 1938 showed that it needed strengthening. The 
Civil Defence Act of 1939 was drafted to further enable the protection of life and 
property through such services as evacuation, civil defense training for staffs, the 
treatment of casualties, and the provision of improved shelters.70 These two acts 
combined allowed local authorities to take civil defense measures in their regions and 
receive financial aid from the government, such as building or designating air raid 
shelters, which ranked for grant-aid up to 70% of expenditure.71 The acts ensured not 
only financial support, but also uniformity in civil defense across Britain. The Home 
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Office now could set standards and requirements for local authorities to implement, 
avoiding the often disorganized and sometimes contradictory nature of WWI air raid 
precautions in the event of a future war.  
 Unlike the case of WWI, in the 1930s anticipation was high that civilians would 
become deliberate targets of enemy air attack. While there had been some means of 
protection for civilians during the previous war, and the state had provided some 
information on ARP, future attacks were expected to occur on a much wider scale, 
necessitating a much more comprehensive system of civil defense. Civilian response to 
enemy air raids in WWI had often been lackluster and evidenced more curiosity than fear 
and government officials knew they needed a well-educated and well-prepared public to 
withstand a future attack when faced with ever-improving technology. As a result, prior to 
the outbreak of war, the state engaged in ARP publicity and education campaigns to 
ensure every civilian would know what to do if war came again. Civil Defense was the 
term preferred by London County Council (LCC) Leader Herbert Morrison to describe 
air raid precautions, as it “implie[d] a co-operation of citizens in the defence of their 
homes and their very existence which [was] in harmony with democratic traditions.72” 
 An effective ARP measure adopted from the experience of WWI was the restriction 
of lighting. The purpose of this was to prevent hostile aircraft being guided to their target 
on the ground by visible lights.73 In WWI the warning time had been sufficient to allow 
localities to station men in sectors ready to extinguish street lamps when necessary, but 
the shorter warning time resulting from increased air speed meant that lights could not be 
put out in time. Some advocated for a system to allow a central controller to immediately 
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extinguish all street lights in an emergency.74 Some officials worried that the sudden 
darkness, should all lights be extinguished simultaneously, was apt to cause panic.75 
Lighting exercises suggested that the speed with which visible lights were extinguished 
upon the receipt of a warning was too slow and the Home Office reached the conclusion 
that a general condition of darkening for the entire period of the war would be the best 
solution.76 In areas of the country where the warning period would be very short, 
permanent darkness was necessary, while in other areas some screened streetlights were 
permitted.77 All householders were required to mask their windows, skylights, and doors 
to allow no inside light to be visible.78 This could be accomplished with dark curtains, 
blinds, stout cardboard, screens of wood, or black paint.79 Illuminated advertising signs 
were prohibited and factories had to mask their windows through dark blinds or black 
paint.80 Theaters, cinemas, and other places of entertainment were prohibited from using 
illuminated displays or advertisements throughout the war, day or night.81 Local 
newspapers published the blackout start and end times.82  
 Noncompliance with lighting restrictions could lead to a heavy fine or even 
imprisonment. Police had the legal power to enter civilian premises and order lights be 
                                                        
74 TNA: HO 45/17583, Manchester Chief Constable to Mr. Johnston, January 24, 1938, 1-2. 
75 TNA: HO 45/17583, Exeter Chief Constable to Mr. Johnston, January 22, 1938. 
76 TNA: HO 45/17583, A. Johnston to M.J. Egan, January 19, 1938. 
77 TNA: HO 45/17583, Report of Lighting Experiments Committee. Scheme of War-Time Lighting 
Restrictions, December 21, 1937, 1. 
78 TNA: HO 45/17583, Draft Memorandum on Lighting Restrictions in Time of War, n.d., 1. 
79 Ministry of Home Security, Air Raids What You Must Know What You Must Do (London: HMSO, 1941), 
57. 
80 TNA: HO 45/17583, Draft Memorandum on Lighting Restrictions in Time of War, n.d., 1. 
81 TNA: HO 45/18530, Air Raid Precautions in Places of Public Entertainment, February 13, 1939, 6. 
82 Ministry of Home Security, Air Raids What You Must Know What You Must Do (London: HMSO, 1941), 
57. 
 
 76 
extinguished.83 Without proper street lighting, pedestrians resorted to using flashlights to 
guide their way, but these also had to be screened to no more than an inch diameter, or 
dimmed by inserting a newspaper, and were required to be pointed down at all times.84 
The Ministry of Transport also installed aids to movement on roads, including white paint 
to mark the middle of roads, curbs, junctions, and pedestrian crossings, and illuminating 
street signs, route numbers, street names, and obstructions.85 Motorists were asked to 
screen the headlamps of their cars with a special ARP-approved mask if driving at night 
and to proceed with great care and at low speed.86 
 The lighting restrictions often made being out after dark both dangerous and 
unappealing to most citizens. Just two months into the war, the rate of road accidents had 
risen to an alarming degree and when reported to the House they were received with a 
“gasp of dismay.”87 In the first month of the war, and the first month of the 
implementation of lighting restrictions, road deaths had doubled in comparison to the 
same period in the previous year.88 By October 1939, however, vehicular accident 
numbers had actually dropped below average, because of petrol restrictions and a 
reduction in the number of vehicles on the road, but pedestrian road casualty figures 
remained unchanged.89 Pedestrians were encouraged to carry a white object with them or 
wear a white piece of clothing if out at night to make them more visible to drivers.90 The 
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Pedestrians’ Association was especially incensed at road accident numbers, reporting that, 
in three months of war, more people had died on British roads than soldiers and sailors on 
active war service.91 They emphasized this point with a cartoon of British soldiers 
huddled together in a trench over a newspaper article on blackout road deaths, with the 
caption “It must be dangerous over there.”92 One Chief Constable blamed poor 
attendance at ARP lectures on the blackout.93 Some believed lack of lighting had a 
negative effect on the mental state of citizens.94 While some argued that darkened streets 
lowered morale, others countered that lighting restrictions actually increased morale 
because it made civilians feel that the government cared about their security and was 
doing something to protect them.95 
 Entertainment opportunities were either curtailed during the war or restricted 
entirely to prevent the massing of people. While such measures directly aimed to limit the 
loss of life in case of air raids, the reasoning behind this was to avoid mass casualty 
events that would negatively affect morale.96 The continuation of entertainment also 
depended on the capability of the venue to protect its customers. Traveling circuses, 
performing under canvas tents, were shut down.97 Prior to the outbreak of war the Home 
Office considered what venues would likely need to be closed in the case of war, 
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considering cinemas and theaters, in particular. Theaters, cinemas, and most other public 
places of entertainment lacked adequate overhead cover to protect audiences from bomb 
explosions.98 Short periods of warning were a concern and officials also suggested that 
the capacity of all venues ought to be restricted to 50-75% of normal.99 Others suggested 
restricting business hours primarily to daytime and prohibiting queues in the open.100 
Officials, however, also recognized the importance of entertainment to civilian morale. 
Most cinemas and theaters remained open and stationed a staff member where he could 
hear the public warning siren. Upon hearing an air raid warning, the manager would 
inform the audience and suggest that they remain in their seats, although anyone wishing 
to do so was free to leave.101 The Association of County Councils in Scotland, however, 
considered the danger of panic so high that they recommended closing all places of 
entertainment for the duration of a war.102  
 Football games especially caused logistical and safety concerns during the war. 
Football grounds, many holding 40,000 or more spectators, would lead to the type of 
large concentrations of people that the government wanted to avoid.103 In addition to the 
concern over population concentration, such large gatherings also meant crowds making 
use of public transport and public roads, possibly at a moment of attack.104 The 
competitive and financial nature of league matches, in particular, were seen as 
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inappropriate during a time of war and only friendly matches were to be played.105 The 
Football Association (FA) was instructed to limit attendance at matches to 8,000 
spectators in evacuation areas, or half the capacity of the stadium, whichever was less.106 
Some in the Home Office also wanted to require all spectators to book tickets in advance, 
but the London Clubs, reluctant to go to this expense, argued that if the press did not 
“ballyhoo football” and considering the “second-rate nature of the games that will be 
provided” the likelihood that large crowds would try to come to the matches was slim.107 
The FA was also quick to ask that the Scottish Football Association and greyhound 
racing, often held on football grounds, be similarly restricted.108 Crowds that did attend 
matches were to be distributed across the stadium, and stands, built out of concrete, were 
thought to offer some shelter.109 The first returns of attendance numbers after the 
outbreak of war were positive. In Scotland, attendance was “very poor” due to the non-
competitive nature of the matches.110 In the Midland Region, attendance numbers were in 
some places less than a sixth of peacetime numbers, often influenced by lack of traveling 
facilities.111 With the younger men away in the Forces or doing National Service, many 
potential spectators also stayed away from matches because the men now playing in them 
were “too old.”112 Fear of being caught in the open during an air raid, the discomfort of 
carrying gas masks in the press of a crowd, the lack of popular players, and the absence 
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of football pools also discouraged attendance.113 When air raid warnings did occur during 
a match, however, instructions given to spectators differed by locality, with police in 
some places stopping matches while allowing them to continue elsewhere.114 The Home 
Office subsequently issued a circular instructing that spectators out in the open should 
take cover at once, preferably under the stands or other available shelter, but to avoid 
flocking into the streets and overwhelming public shelters.115 While the match was to be 
suspended upon the air raid warning, it needed only be abandoned if it was close to the 
end or there was no adequate cover for spectators.116 
 The Home Office sought to educate the public on ARP primarily through pamphlets 
and posters. In some instances, when information needed to be disseminated quickly, 
Head Wardens would instruct teachers, who would inform the children and, through the 
children, who, in turn, would tell their parents.117 One ARP pamphlet was issued based on 
location, listing shelters, first aid posts, and warden posts in the local area, as well as 
reminding the reader of the major points of civil defense such as the use of respirators 
and the air raid warning signals.118 The MHS’ most popular pamphlet, Air Raids What 
You Must Know What You Must Do, included 60 pages of instructions on various ARP 
topics, such as types of bombs, war gases, first aid, shelters, and lighting restrictions, and 
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sold for three pence.119 The pamphlet How You Can Help, issued after the outbreak of 
war, sought to explain the part every British civilian could play in the struggle and 
brought together the various instructions issued by different government departments on 
ARP.120 Public lectures were also an effective way of teaching the public about ARP, 
often employing lantern slides for added effect and demonstration.121 Ten posters were 
printed, but held back until an air raid emergency, informing the public to carry their gas 
masks, to seek shelter quietly in case of a raid, to allow passersby to seek shelter in one’s 
home, to take cover at once upon a warning, and for motorists to turn off their headlamps 
at night.122 Over 50,000 of these posters were printed.123 In 1940, the Chief Medical 
Officer of Scotland was appalled that the government seemed to think pamphlets it had 
issued to the public once only in 1939 were sufficient to ensure continued education 
simply because civilians had been instructed not to throw it away.124  
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He argued that these pamphlets were “dead as the Dodo” and that it was necessary to 
communicate “again and again, always from a fresh angle” the information necessary to 
save civilian lives.125 The Treasury took a more positive view, arguing that if heavy raids 
began, the public would adopt precautions of their own volition, because the Office 
balked at having to pay for more instructional posters.126  
 Other media were also employed to teach ARP. Short films on ARP subjects could 
be shown in cinemas before the main feature and reach large parts of the population in an 
easy-to-understand format. The film If War Should Come was produced prior to the 
outbreak of war, although before it could be shown the war had already started and the 
title was hastily changed to Do It Now.127 This ten-minute film instructed civilians on fire 
precautions, storing food, building shelters, carrying gas masks, keeping the phone lines 
open, carrying an identity label, evacuation, lighting restrictions, air raid sirens, and on 
what to do in a gas attack.128 Another short cinema filler film taught viewers how to put 
on and use the gas mask, instructing them to fit the mask and breathe out forcefully 
“never mind the noise it makes.”129 In the 1940 film London Can Take It, the strong 
resilience of Londoners in the face of the Blitz was mythologized, particularly for 
viewers overseas. “Today the morale of the people is higher than ever before,” claims the 
narrator over scenes of Londoners carrying on the morning after a raid, adding that there 
was “no panic, no fear, no despair in Londontown.”130 With permission from the Home 
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Office, one record company made two gramophone records for ARP purposes, one for 
local authorities to use at ARP exhibits, and the other for the public to learn the sounds 
and meanings of official air raid signals.131 The record included the sounds of “action 
warnings” with wailing sirens, intermittent sirens, and wardens’ whistles, as well as the 
gas warning, “raiders passed” signal, and the gas all-clear signal, with commentary and 
explanations included on the record intended for the general public.132 
 A major aspect of civilian ARP was preparing one’s home for air raids. One 
pamphlet urged civilians to be prepared, stating that “A.R.P. begins in the home.”133 
Education campaigns and pamphlets specifically focused on preparing the home for 
attack, ensuring the home was darkened, and that everyone in the home knew what to do 
in the case of a raid.134 Early instructions suggested selecting a ground floor room, 
preferably near a bathroom, covering the windows with wood to prevent splinters raining 
in, storing alongside gas masks, first aid kit, and non-perishable foods, and readying 
buckets with sand and water in case of fire.135 A family might need to spend several hours 
in their Refuge Room and instructions therefore focused particularly on ensuring access 
to food, water, and sanitary arrangements.136 In 1940 the Home Office issued a pamphlet, 
titled Your Home As An Air Raid Shelter, specifically to instruct civilians in the 
preparation of their homes, offering advice on selecting refuge rooms, sheltering, 
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protecting windows and doors, and fire precautions.137 A large aspect of preparing a home 
for air raids was fire prevention. Civilians were instructed to keep at hand buckets of 
water and sand, to turn off gas and electricity when leaving, to train the entire family, and 
to clear all attic and roof spaces of clutter and everything flammable.138  
 Civilians were also instructed on what to do in the case of a gas attack. Detailed 
instructions taught civilians the differences between persistent and non-persistent gases 
and the different types of war gases that might be used by the enemy.139 In a gas attack, 
the safest rooms would be those upstairs, and civilians were urged to ensure all windows 
and doors were closed and sealed, if possible.140 Householders could prepare a gas-proof 
room in their house, by blocking cracks and seals with newspapers, felt, or mush made 
from soaking newspapers, although this meant the room could not be used for other 
purposes as it was not properly ventilated.141 The primary protection for civilians, 
however, was the civilian gas mask, and no ARP instruction on gas attacks failed to 
mention the respirator and its vital importance (See Chapter 5 for an in-depth discussion 
of gas masks).142 Some instructions focused only on mustard gas, suggesting civilians 
avoid gassed areas.143 If one were splashed, however, he or she was to “forget decency” 
and remove all clothing, before taking a warm bath and scrubbing well with soap, 
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followed by donning clean clothes and lying near an open window.144 One leaflet 
suggested that if “Hitler uses blister gas, Soap and Water will help to beat him.”145  
 The protection of special populations that were incapable of properly protecting 
themselves were a major concern. What to do with young children was a consistent 
problem throughout the war. While some suggested children should be sent home to seek 
shelter upon an air raid warning, others pointed out that the reduced warning time meant 
most children would be caught out in the street.146 The government’s best solution for 
protecting children from air raids, and the one that was at least partially adopted, was to 
evacuate all school-aged children from areas where heavy raids were thought the most 
likely (see Chapter 7 for more on evacuation). Well before the outbreak of war there were 
concerns about how to deal with ARP in mental hospitals. Ministry of Health officials 
were frustrated that the ARP Department could not give a satisfactory answer on whether 
it was best to disperse or collect mental patients in case of an air raid.147 Five big mental 
health hospitals had their patients evacuated entirely to other hospitals, although this was 
less a precaution to protect patients than a need for more hospitals that could accept air 
raid casualties.148 Mental hospitals were also encouraged to make their own firefighting 
arrangements in regards to staff, equipment, and water supplies, because they would not 
be able to rely on assistance from the Fire Brigade in the event of a serious outbreak of 
fire.149 The reasoning behind this lay in the location of most mental hospitals distant from 
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town centers, and that local fire brigades would have too much to do in the event of an 
attack to reach the hospitals in time.150  
 People were not the only ones needing protection and animal ARP was a serious 
concern both before and during the war. The Home Office formed a National ARP for 
Animals Committee (NARPAC) made up of representatives of animal welfare societies 
and veterinarians, with the objectives of preventing and alleviating animal suffering, 
protecting human beings from panic-stricken or contaminated animals, the conservation 
of animals of economic value, the provision and protection of food supplies for essential 
animals, and giving general information and advice to animal owners.151 NARPAC 
arranged for the establishment of first aid posts to facilitate speedy treatment of animals 
injured in air raids.152 Animal Guards registered all animals by visiting every animal 
owner in their street, recording the animals’ information, and issuing a free numbered 
identity disc to be attached to the animal in case it became lost.153 While the job of an 
Animal Guard was in some ways similar to that of an Air Raid Warden, the guards were 
not expected to be out during an air raid or actually deal with injured animals.154 
NARPAC also urged owners not to have their pets destroyed, as animals were in no 
greater danger from air raids than humans, but many did not take up this advice.155 A 
considerable concern was how to protect animals from gas warfare as no real protective 
devices existed, and NARPAC offered a chart of war gases and their effects on various 
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animals, such as horses, birds, and dogs, as well as first aid measures and possible 
protections.156 The MHS also included instructions for pet owners in some of their ARP 
educational material. Ideally civilians would send their pets to the countryside for safety, 
as public shelters did not allow them, but this was not an option for the majority of the 
public.157 Pet owners were urged to walk their dogs close to their homes so they could get 
back quickly if an air raid occurred.158 For dogs frightened by noise, the MHS offered the 
remedy of tying cottonwool under the dog’s earflaps with strips of cloth.159 For nervous 
dogs it was suggested that they be dosed with bromide tablets obtained from the 
pharmacist, or aspirin if bromide was unavailable.160 Commercial options included a 
powder given before a raid that would put the pet “into a quiet and sleepy state.”161 To 
protect dogs’ paws from broken glass caused by air raids, the Dumb Friends’ League 
made special dog shoes available for pet owners.162 One veterinarian, however, argued 
that dogs showed little fear during raids and often showed better common sense than 
human beings in leading the way to shelter upon the sound of the sirens.163 
 Special air raid protections were also required for various government institutions 
and buildings. Westminster Abbey was a particular concern because of its large stained 
glass windows that were impossible to screen and officials considered closing the Abbey 
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after dark.164 The Dean of Westminster, however, argued that closing the Abbey would 
severely affect civilian morale, and the Abbey remained open.165 Windsor Castle was 
treated as its own civil defense precinct, with its own fire brigade, first aid post, stretcher 
parties, and rescue service.166 Additionally, gas proof rooms were selected at Windsor and 
the entire staff and all occupants trained in anti-gas measures.167 At Marlborough House, 
the sitting room was turned into a first aid station and all doors, windows, vents, and 
fireplaces were treated, caulked, and shuttered to prevent the entry of gas.168 The Royal 
Mews had their own ARP Party that included stretcher bearers.169 For museums, art 
galleries, and libraries a special booklet was printed with ARP instructions that included 
information on normal precautions and the civil defense services, as well as specific 
measures of protecting, storing, and evacuating sculptures, books, documents, and other 
such items.170  
 It was difficult to maintain people’s interest in ARP, particularly when there was 
little or no enemy activity. While immediately after the outbreak of war in September 
1939, civil defense measures had been fervently adopted across the country, by mid-
1940, with no enemy air raids having occurred, apathy and boredom had set in. In March 
1940 the Home Office held a special meeting to address how to revive public interest in 
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ARP.171 Their main objectives were twofold: to reeducate the public by repeating and 
amplifying the information provided the prior year, and to devise and ready for use 
publicity material for when intensive bombing began.172 The members of the meeting 
argued that this new publicity campaign should forego house-to-house distribution of 
materials and instead focus on posters, broadcasting, and newsreels.173 Some Boroughs 
reissued ARP leaflets. The Reigate Borough leaflet reminded readers of the major points 
of ARP because “Five months of War with no Air Raids has, no doubt, lulled many of us 
into a false sense of security.”174 Apathy extended also to public education events. One 
Chief Constable had anticipated that a public ARP lecture with lantern slides on a 
Saturday evening would be well-patronized, but was disappointed to find no more than 
250 people present.175 
 A mainstay of the purpose of civil defense was the upkeep of civilian morale. Air 
raids were specifically seen as aiming to demoralize civilians and break down the “spirit 
of resistance to injustice which is necessary to knit a people together for a continuous war 
effort.”176 It was thus necessary to ensure the spirit or morale of the people did not break. 
Queen Mary planned early on to remain in London partially because she believed this 
would have a beneficial moral effect upon the population who could not leave.177 
Civilians were consistently told the importance of their own psychology in the war, and 
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that the war would be won if only the home front remained strong.178 “Come what may,” 
instructed one pamphlet, “we must show the enemy that our resistance cannot be 
broken.”179 While ARP measures were intended to protect and save lives, the nature of 
education programs and ARP preparations also sought to ensure civilians avoided panic 
and stayed morally strong during a war. The Yorkshire Post suggested that ARP training 
must also be concerned with measures “for guarding against panic and disorder among 
the civil population.”180 A Ministry of Information memo, specifically intended to aid 
civil defense regions in allaying air raid panic, defined the importance of ARP measures 
in preventing fear: “The public must be prepared beforehand to act in definite ways at 
given cues  so that while performing certain pre-arranged actions more or less 
automatically they will have time to recover their mental poise and courage.”181 A 
pamphlet told civilians that they could defeat the Nazis by “keeping calm, by carrying on 
quietly with your work, by finding out how best you can help, and by helping with all 
your might.”182 The noise of air raids could also impact morale. The terrifying sound of 
the anti-aircraft guns and dropping bombs strained the nervous systems of civilians.183 
The air raid sirens themselves often had a depressing and demoralizing effect on the 
populace. One bishop suggested that instead of the common wail of the siren, it should 
instead play a “cock-a-doodle-doo” note to sustain the civilian spirit.184 Winston 
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Churchill was impressed by the resilience of the civilian population as he saw their 
devotion to the cause despite the damage done by the enemy after months of heavy raids, 
seeing in them “the spirit of an unconquerable people.”185 
 To preserve the civilian “spirit” it was necessary to restrict demoralizing news and 
contain rumors. How and when to report on air raid casualties was a question that was 
addressed several times throughout the war. Up to mid-1940, the casualty numbers had 
been released in a monthly return, but, knowing the next report would show high 
casualties, the War Cabinet considered issuing weekly returns instead.186 It was decided, 
however, to continue with monthly returns and simply express the casualty rate as a 
percentage of the normal death rate or peace-time road casualty rate, in which case air 
raid numbers “were not high.”187 The government wanted to refrain from publishing 
exact casualty figures, because it was assumed the Germans could use such numbers to 
determine the effect and efficiency of their raids.188 The release of casualty numbers and 
other particular information was often published solely to combat rumors. Regional 
Information Officers were allowed to distribute discrete particulars on bombings (such as 
the types of bombs used and material damage caused) to local Information Committees 
specifically so they could counter “noxious rumours.”189 After bombings in Derby, 
Leicester, and Croydon, casualty figures were highly exaggerated and after a heavy raid 
in Coventry rumors abounded that many public shelters containing dead had simply been 
sealed never to be reopened. All such rumors were considered “harmful to public 
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sentiment.”190 The MHS also wanted to particularly avoid information passed verbally, 
where such reports could easily be distorted and exaggerated.191 Casualty lists were 
generally posted at local Town Halls for everyone to view, but names were added as they 
became known and one official worried that no one took the time to add the numbers 
together before spreading exaggerated rumors of casualties.192 In most cases of air raids, 
exact casualty numbers were not authorized for publication and vague official references, 
such as “a very large number [of casualties],” only exacerbated the problem of rumors.193 
The MHS eventually reversed the policy of  publishing casualty figures only in general 
terms, realizing that it encouraged the spread of rumors and had a depressing effect on 
morale.194 Figures were now to be given when “the moral effect seems likely to be 
good.”195 A committee organized to discuss the preservation of civilian morale during a 
war argued that people must be told the truth, but continued “But what is the truth? We 
must adopt a pragmatic definition. It is what is believed to be the truth. A lie that is put 
across becomes the truth, and may, therefore, be justified.”196 One pamphlet specifically 
instructed readers to ignore all rumors, especially those spread by the enemy about 
horrible new weapons “in order to shake [British] morale.”197 
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 Concerns over morale also determined the response to the advent of the German V 
weapons in 1944. The government had intelligence on both the V1 pilotless aircraft and 
the V2 long-range rocket months before the first use of these by the Germans, but, 
despite newspaper reports on a secret new German weapon, made no statement on the 
existence of these bombs.198 The first V1s, also known as “buzz bomb” or “flying bomb,” 
fell on June 13, 1944 within minutes of one another, causing a few casualties and 
damaging several homes.199 Within a week over 670 flying bombs had made landfall, 
causing over 5,000 casualties in London, of which at least 500 proved fatal.200 Home 
Secretary Herbert Morrison, however, in a speech to Parliament downplayed the effects 
of the flying bomb on the civil population, saying that “[t]he morale of the British takes a 
lot of upsetting.”201 Newspapers, however, took quickly to the new weapon, referring to 
the flying bombs as the “robot menace202.” They criticized the government’s secrecy 
surrounding the flying bombs, arguing that this led to exaggerated rumors and 
indignation among the population.203 The blind and indiscriminate way of the flying 
bomb, capable of attacking at all hours of the day, was “robot terrorism,” claimed the 
Dundee Courier, and imposed a special kind of strain on morale.204 It was also argued 
that a bomber that had no control over its target, was intended solely to break civilian 
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morale, but the writer was quick to add that this would be a lost hope for the Germans.205 
The unique sound of the flying bombs could be mimicked by training aircraft throttling 
their engines as they flew over London, leading to significant anxiety among the 
population and the Air Ministry subsequently prohibited its bombers from flying over the 
city.206 Londoners’ morale was not only affected by the buzz bombs themselves, but also 
by how non-Londoners perceived their plight. Civilians and government officials alike 
believed that other regions were not moved about the bombing and that some regions 
were particularly apathetic to London’s suffering.207 A film about the flying bombs was 
prepared, but the censorship office refused to let it be shown.208 
 The first V2 rocket likely fell on September 8th, 1944 in Chiswick with a noise so 
that terrific windows rattled in adjoining boroughs and people in London’s city center 
were disturbed.209 While the government refused to make an official statement about the 
arrival of the V2 rocket, rumors and anxiety abounded amongst the civilian population. 
After over four years of war and bombing the potential arrival of another new and deadly 
weapon increased anxiety, with many civilians saying they could not “stand anything 
more at this stage of the war.”210 A majority of Londoners assumed this new bomb was 
the successor to the V1, even without a government statement on the topic, and many felt 
anxious and defenseless because there were now no warnings of attack and no barrage 
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balloons or anti-aircraft guns to stop them.211 One rumor suggested that a rocket 
explosion instead had been caused by sabotage at a factory, while another claimed that 
the British government was exploding rockets to deter evacuees from returning to 
London.212 Outside of the capital rumors began to circulate warning that  “something 
dreadful” was happening in London.213 Without official information, rumors claimed that 
rocket bombs had caused terrible damage in London.214 A majority of people wanted the 
government to make an official statement, as the lack of information was worrying them, 
although some civilians expressed concern that a statement would make the bombing 
worse and provide information to the enemy.215 The use of the V2 was seen as another 
futile attempt against British morale, as well as an effort to boost lagging German morale 
in the face of certain defeat.216 
 The limited air raid experiences of WWI had taught the British government the 
importance of protecting its civilians and prior to the outbreak of another war means were 
put into place to ensure this. WWI air raids on the British Isles had come as a surprise, 
with the government relatively unprepared to instruct, protect, and reassure its civilians. 
ARP measures, thrown together hastily, were sometimes disorganized and instructions 
often ignored by the civilians they were meant to protect. The Home Office, which came 
to be in charge of ARP prior to WWII, realized the importance of not only providing 
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protection and education, but that for civilians to undertake ARP in a time of crisis the 
instruction had to be consistent, repetitive, and accessible. While many WWII ARP 
measures were directly responsible for the protection of life, limb, and property, many 
elements of ARP were also specifically intended to safeguard British morale. It was clear 
to government officials that civilian lives would be lost in heavy air raids, but that the 
nation could withstand tragedy as long as people believed they were still in the fight and 
that their government was doing everything possible to protect them. ARP was thus not 
only concerned with actual protection from air raids, but also a reassurance that such 
protection, and therefore survival, was possible.
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Chapter 4 - The People’s Army: The Civil Defense Services in World War II 
  
 As it was vital that the general public were well-informed about ARP and could 
protect themselves when air raids transpired, there was a need for a well-organized 
system of services to assist and inform civilians if war came. Civil defense would provide 
a system of services that not only offered aid and protection during raids, but also ensured 
compliance with civil defense instructions. Despite facing some issues over recruitment, 
supply, compliance, and organization, the British civil defense system in WWII was 
relatively successful. Prior to the actual outbreak of war in 1939, the British government 
had put in place a system of civil defense that would provide various services before, 
during, and after an air raid. These services and the volunteers that manned them would 
help with protection before and during raids, offer vital information, provide medical aid, 
and, most important of all, ensure the preservation of civilian morale and good behavior. 
The services most vital to a successful civil defense program and the protection of morale 
were the Warden’s Service, the Auxiliary Fire Service (AFS),  the First Aid Posts (FAP) 
and Ambulance Service, the Rescue and Demolition Service, and the Women’s Voluntary 
Services (WVS). All of these entities had set roles and functions prior to the start of war, 
but during the course of WWII, and after the experiences of air raids, most of the civil 
defense services were altered in scope and function.  
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The British civil defense services ensured that civilians were prepared to deal with air 
raids, knew how to protect themselves, would be rescued if trapped, treated in a timely 
manner if injured, rehoused if bombs had made them homeless, and fed. In a speech 
delivered in October 1940 Winston Churchill described the civil defense services as 
“forces [that] will descend upon the scene in power and mercy to conquer the flames, to 
rescue the sufferers, to provide them with food and shelter, to whisk them away to places 
of rest and refuge […].”1 
 The government presented civil defense work as being vital to the good of the 
nation. Prior to the outbreak of war, Herbert Morrison, at the time the Leader of the LCC,  
urged Londoners to join the civil defense services so that “if, in the uneasy state of the 
world to-day, the need should arise, the life of the country could be carried on.”2 One 
pamphlet urged readers to participate in national service because the nation’s “strength 
depends on the will of millions of free men and women to make voluntary efforts for the 
ideals we all stand for.”3 Recruitment adverts often called on a citizen’s patriotism and 
referred to the need to help others. One such advert told its readers that both the 
ambulance service and stretcher parties were services “for the relief of suffering. Both are 
of national importance.”4 A recruiting leaflet suggested that those serving as stretcher 
bearers or in the first aid parties would be engaged in “the noblest service of all—the 
saving of human life.”5 An Ambulance Service poster called for “eighteen thousand 
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fearless women” to prove their mettle and bravery and “rise to the occasion.”6 The 
importance of civilian morale was reflected throughout the civil defense services, with 
one training manual specifically stating that the behavior and competence of the civil 
defense volunteers would greatly influence the ability of the civilian population to resist.7 
 Some recruitment initiatives played on ideas of masculinity to draw male 
volunteers. Civil defense service was intended for men over military age, thus offering 
them a chance to prove their patriotism and masculinity through national service without 
fighting overseas. A recruitment advert for the Stretcher Parties and first aid parties 
suggested it was a job that required “courage and strength and endurance. It is a real 
man’s job.”8 Another advertisement agreed that the courage, resolution, and endurance 
required by Stretcher Parties made it “a real man’s job for those between 25 and 50.”9 A 
first aid party recruitment poster reminded viewers that it was a “man’s job” three times, 
adding that volunteering with the service was a “vital, front-line” job.10 
 Civil defense publicity also drew on ideas of personal responsibility. One poster 
urged people not to rely on a mysterious “they” that would prevent war, put out fires, or 
provide aid in case of injury, arguing instead that “There is only ‘you’. On ‘you’, rests the 
safety of yourself and your family.”11 Another questioned what the reader had done for 
national service after weeks of reading civil defense advertisements, reminding him or 
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her how important it was for everyone to be trained in ARP.12 One ARP pamphlet 
reminded civilians that they were “responsible citizen[s]. Don’t wait to be told what to 
do. Think things out for yourself—DO things yourself!”13 When considering how to 
recruit women for the Ambulance Service, one official pointed out that the type of 
women needed, middle-class women in comfortable circumstances without domestic ties, 
simply had not yet realized how great the need was for their help and should be 
encouraged to serve instead of moving out of dangerous areas.14 
 Recruitment for civil defense enjoyed varying degrees of success prior to, and after, 
the outbreak of war. Low recruitment numbers across the civil defense services before to 
the war made the Home Office consider some type of compulsory training for everyone, 
although the wide age range of 25 to 50 for males made such training too difficult to 
implement.15 Had such a system already existed, it was argued, it could have provided the 
basis for filling the civil defense services.16 During 1938, recruitment was relatively 
steady, with a sharp increase immediately after Germany’s annexation of Austria. By the 
middle of the year London alone had over 24,000 volunteers enrolled in the various civil 
defense services, a third of them women.17 Across the country, 385,000 had joined one of 
the civil defense services in their region by the same time.18 One bureaucrat suggested 
                                                        
12 TNA: HO 186/2, ARP Every Day Counts! n.d. 
13 TNA: HO 186/315, How You Can Help in Air Raids,  At Home-At Work in National Service, n.d., 3. 
14 LMA: CL/CD/1/275, Letter to Sir John Anderson, February 1939, 2. 
15 TNA: HO 186/153, Compulsory Service and Civil Defence, 1939, 1. 
16 ibid, 2. 
17 TNA: HO 186/1, Air Raid Precautions Recruitment and Training of Personnel, Position as at 30th June 
1938. 
18 TNA: HO 186/1, Recruiting Returns, June 22, 1938, 1. 
 
 101 
another international crisis could rapidly swell recruitment numbers.19 His words proved 
true when, by October 1938, enrollment for all services had ballooned to over one million 
volunteers.20 Local authorities found, however, that volunteers they had enrolled 
immediately after the September crisis were no longer interested once tensions had 
eased.21 The London Ambulance Service, for instance, enrolled 550 recruits in the ten-
day period prior to the signing of the Munich Agreement, but by the middle of October 
recruits averaged only twenty per day, eventually down to only five per day in 
December.22 Official war establishments for the civil defense services were established in 
early 1939 and authorized 1,131,900 whole and part-time volunteers for the ARP 
services, with an additional 300,000 for the AFS, specifically.23 In the same year the 
Home Office suggested distributing civil defense recruitment leaflets with gas and 
electricity accounts to reach households.24 One recruitment leaflet was distributed 
alongside telephone accounts in London and the provinces and reached as many as 
637,000 homes.25  
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The Home Office also asked employers to help in recruitment, urging them to display 
posters in their shops or factories and to issue recruitment leaflets to their employees.26 A 
National Service Rally in London’s Hyde Park in mid-1939 sought to interest potential 
recruits through exhibitions and a parade of AFS members marching past the King.27  
 While initially the outbreak of war had driven people to volunteer for civil defense, 
by early 1940 interest was again flagging. Renewed concerns over recruitment led the 
Home Office to consider lowering physical and age standards for enrollment in civil 
defense. By mid-1940 the loss of a limb or a hernia was no longer a bar to serving, 
provided the enrollee could perform the necessary actions, such as putting out an 
incendiary bomb.28 To attend the Air Raid Precautions School, a requirement for almost 
all the civil defense services, the maximum age for male attendees was raised from 55 to 
60 in 1940.29 In June 1940 over 1.3 million volunteers were enrolled in the various civil 
defense services, with nearly 230,000 full-time, paid personnel.30 Particularly concerning 
was the loss of civil defense personnel to industrial jobs with attractive wages, and a 
Defence Regulation in July 1940 forced members of the Rescue Service, First Aid 
Parties, and AFS to remain in service until released.31 Civil defense enrollment numbers 
were precarious enough that full-time volunteers were barred from joining the Home 
Guard and unpaid, part-time civil defense volunteers required the written permission of 
                                                        
26 TNA: HO 186/2, An Appeal to Employers, September, 1939. 
27 LMA: CL/CD/1/275, F.B. Circular No. 24/1939, National Service Rally, June 9, 1939, 1. 
28 TNA: HO 186/164, Letter to S.D. Sargent, July 29, 1940; TNA: HO 186/164, Ministry of Home 
Security, Air Raid Precautions School, August 1940, 2. 
29 TNA: HO 186/164, Ministry of Home Security, Air Raid Precautions School, August 1940, 1. 
30 TNA: CAB 120/463, Note on Civil Defence Establishments, n.d., 2. 
31 ibid. 
 
 103 
their superiors to so sign up.32 Officials did fear, however, that a bar to Home Guard 
service might lead many civil defense part-time volunteers to resign, and urged discretion 
on civil defense leaders to ensure no loss of strength among the civil defense services.33 
By mid-1944, 1,250,000 men and 350,000 women were engaged in part-time civil 
defense work throughout Great Britain.34  
 The majority of the many who participated in civil defense were part-time 
volunteers. Part-time service required a minimum commitment of 48 hours over a four 
week period.35 Unlike members of the Home Guard or armed forces, who received 
money for meals, part-time civil defense volunteers did not enjoy the same benefit, 
receiving “light refreshment” at the value of six pence for four hours of duty, or a meal 
valued at one shilling for twelve hours continuous duty.36 In some areas, usually those 
more densely populated, a small number of personnel were engaged in full-time paid civil 
defense work. In Scotland, this number of paid civil defense workers never exceeded 
10,000, a tenth of the total strength of Scottish civil defense.37 The AFS, particularly, 
required full-time volunteers, although part-time workers were nonetheless accepted. In 
1939, full-time civil defense workers received pay at the rate of £3 per week for men and 
£2 per week for women.38 Youths engaged in full-time work were eligible as well: 20 
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shillings a week for those aged 16-17, and 25 shillings per week for age 17-18.39 No pay 
was provided for those under 16 because the Home Office considered it undesirable that 
children of that age be enrolled in civil defense.40 In 1942, the pay of civil defense 
workers was increased to £3 14s. for men and £2 12s. for women.41 The increase in pay 
also sought to increase women’s hours of duty from 48 per week to 60, an increase that 
caused considerable consternation. Opponents of this increased duty burden argued that 
women were required to carry out domestic duties as well as civil defense duties and the 
increase in pay could not allow female volunteers to complete their own responsibilities 
of shopping, washing, and feeding their families.42 Full-time paid volunteers also 
qualified for annual paid leave on the basis of one day for each completed month of full-
time service, up to a maximum of twelve days per year.43 The hours of civil defense 
workers, both part-time and full-time, were not fixed and the Home Office specifically 
pointed out that for paid workers there could be no question of overtime pay because duty 
hours depended on when workers were needed.44 Some decried the paying of civil 
defense volunteers as a waste of money, but Herbert Morrison argued that a full-time civil 
defense worker ready at his or her post was as entitled to receiving a wage as troops 
manning the Maginot Line.45 Without the unpaid labor of part-time volunteers local 
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authorities could not have had functioning systems of civil defense, but the reliance on 
workers who might be engaged in other duties at a time of emergency was also an issue. 
Part-time volunteers who were at their regular place of employment during an air raid 
alert were not required to report to their civil defense duty stations. The Home Office 
urged local authorities to work out manpower needs and determine which part-time 
volunteers would be needed during a raid and for the part-time volunteers to get the 
consent of their employers to leave when necessary.46 Local authorities were authorized 
to compensate volunteers for lost wages up to a maximum of 10s. per day for men and 7s. 
for women.47 
 Training such a large volunteer force for civil defense was achieved through a 
“snowball” system. A small number of volunteers attended one of the Home Office’s ARP 
Schools, where they could qualify as instructors. These instructors then trained select 
local personnel as local instructors, who in turn trained members of their local civil 
defense services and civilians.48 There were two civilian ARP schools in the nation, one 
at Easingwold and another at Falfield.49 Initially known as Civilian Anti-Gas Schools, by 
early 1939 the curriculum was extended to cover other aspects of civil defense and the 
course increased from twelve to seventeen days.50 Graduates of the schools were awarded 
certificates divided into three categories: special, first-class, and second-class, 
differentiated respectively by being allowed to train civil defense personnel and 
                                                        
46 LMA: CL/CD/247, Ministry of Home Security, ARP Department Circular No. 317/1939, Conditions of 
service of part-time Volunteers in ordinary employment, December 2, 1939, 1. 
47 ibid. 
48 LMA: CL/CD/1/275, Note for recruiting speech to be made by Mr. John Wilmot at a recruiting  meeting 
to be held at the Mansion House, May 1939, 3. 
49 Ministry of Home Security, Air Raid Precautions Training Manual No. 2, Manual for Officers 
Responsible for ARP Training (London: HMSO, 1940), 5. 
 
 106 
instructors in all subjects, personnel in all subjects and instructors in some, and personnel 
only in the last category.51 Uniformity  in the training provided by these graduates locally 
was desirable and the Home Office issued a manual for the local officers responsible for 
ARP training to lay out specific training plans.52 The first stage of ARP training involved 
basic individual training of every ARP volunteer, covering topics in ARP organization, 
incendiary bomb control, protection against High Explosive (HE) bombs, anti-gas, and 
first aid.53 The first stage training lasted about four and a half hours, with full-time 
volunteers training while on duty and part-time workers making time as they could.54 
Second stage individual training intended to raise the standard of knowledge acquired in 
the first stage and provide technical experience specific to the civil defense job the 
volunteer had enrolled in.55 Some second stage topics were covered in short or long 
courses, depending on the type of civil defense service. For instance, the short first aid 
course took six hours to complete, while the full first aid course lasted 18 hours.56 While 
all civil defense volunteers received basic training in the major aspects of ARP, second 
stage training was focused specifically on the needs of the particular job the trainee was 
enrolling for. Trainees also practiced as teams in their respective jobs, as well as 
participating in combined exercises that provided practical knowledge in how the various 
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civil defense services worked together.57 Some civil defense workers also attended 
specialty schools for more advanced technical training, particularly in first aid and rescue 
work.58 In 1942 a residential Civil Defence Staff College opened in Surrey to offer 
general instruction in all matters concerning the organization, administration, and 
operational control of civil defense to senior officials.59 The Home Office also regularly 
issued ARP training bulletins that covered or updated topics such as crushing injuries, 
methods of resuscitation, first aid for eye injuries, and incendiary bombs.60 After 1944 
such bulletins also instructed civil defense personnel on how to recognize, safely 
approach, and deal with casualties of flying bomb attacks.61 
 All members of the civil defense services received anti-gas training. Individual 
Training First Stage, completed by all civil defense volunteers, included two 45-minute 
lessons on gas: one taught the nature of war gases and the other covered personal 
protection against gas.62 There were four different anti-gas courses, with the specifics of 
instruction dependent on the trainee’s particular civil defense job. The short anti-gas 
course consisted of over three hours of instruction in the inspection of respirators, 
respirator drill, fit testing respirators in a gas chamber, and the gas protection of rooms.63 
The full anti-gas course, about nine hours in length, taught trainees the fitting and 
disinfecting of respirators, the recognition of war gases, how to avoid becoming a 
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casualty, protection of the eyes and lungs, protection of the body, preventive cleansing, 
the gas protection of buildings, and how to perform routine duties while wearing a 
respirator.64 The Anti-Gas Decontamination Course added four hours of instruction to the 
full anti-gas course on the general principles of decontamination, methods and materials, 
the decontamination of roads and open spaces, decontaminating buildings and their 
contents, and the decontamination of vehicles.65 The Anti-Gas and Voluntary Aid Course 
took over eleven hours to complete and added onto the full anti-gas course information 
on the treatment of gas casualties.66 Trainees were taught how to recognize contaminated 
casualties, how to handle them, how to determine the types of gas used, and what 
treatment to use for each.67 Anti-gas training for ARP volunteers also included the 
wearing of a respirator in tear gas, to confirm fit and provide confidence in the mask, 
using either gas vans or gas chambers.68 The Home Office also trained sixteen medical 
professionals specifically to instruct medical, dental, veterinary, and nursing professionals 
in anti-gas measures across the nation, both to ensure proper treatment of potential gas 
casualties and for its moral effect in enabling the civilian population to regard its medical 
advisers as qualified to assist at a time of need.69 
 First aid training was also a vital component of the skills of all civil defense 
volunteers. Volunteers received first aid instruction based on how likely they were to deal 
with casualties, but all the services received at the very least elementary instruction in 
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first aid procedures. Individual Training First Stage, taken by all civil defense volunteers, 
included a 45 minute lesson on basic first aid, covering topics such as shock, hemorrhage, 
fractures, burns, and dislocations.70 The short first aid course offered lectures on the 
structure of the body, fractures, shock, the circulatory system, hemorrhage, wound 
treatment, burns, concussions, asphyxiation, artificial respiration, and hysterical attacks.71 
Practical lessons taught volunteers how to splint fractures, bandage wounds, apply a 
tourniquet, carry casualties, artificial respiration, and treating burns.72 
 All civil defense volunteers were issued uniforms and equipment. Initially uniforms 
consisted of cotton bluette combination suits for men and bluette coats for women, with 
weather protection, such as oilskin jackets, supplied locally.73 Early in 1941 it was 
decided that rescue and first aid parties required a more durable uniform and boots and 
were issued with serge battledress, which was extended, after much discussion, to all civil 
defense services by the middle of that year.74 Male volunteers received a battledress 
uniform of blue serge cloth, consisting of blouse, trousers, and greatcoat, while female 
volunteers’ new uniform consisted of jacket, skirt or slacks, and greatcoat.75 Women in 
the First Aid Post wore blue-grey flecked gabardine coats.76 A gold civil defense badge 
was worn on the uniform, replacing the old red badges.77 In most services both males and 
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females wore a navy blue wool beret, although women could also opt for the felt hat.78 
Female drivers wore a peaked cap and nurses a white nursing cap.79 Full-time workers 
were also issued with leather boots or shoes.80 Each volunteer wore shoulder titles on his 
or her uniform to indicate to which service the volunteer belonged.81 A few months after 
the introduction of the rationing system for clothing, civil defense was not immune and 
full-time volunteers were required to turn in as many as 18 clothing coupons for their 
uniforms.82 Part-time volunteers did not need to surrender coupons, but were authorized 
to wear their uniform only when on duty.83 All civil defense volunteers were authorized 
to wear war service chevrons and wound stripes on their uniforms.84 Eligibility for such 
chevrons could arise from current or previous service the volunteer may have given, and 
was indicated through one chevron per twelve months of service.85 Gold wound stripes, 
one for each wound, were authorized for wounds received during the current war, while a 
red wound stripe indicated injuries received in a previous war.86  
 Members of civil defense were provided with activities and entertainment similar to 
those enjoyed by members of the military. Civil defense duty often meant long periods of 
inactivity at a post waiting for incidents and both civilians and government officials 
quickly saw the need for offering some forms of entertainment. The LCC considered that 
                                                        
78 ibid, 10-11. 
79 ibid, 5. 
80 ibid, 10-11. 
81 ibid, 6. 
82 ibid, 13. 
83 ibid, 15. 
84 ibid, 42. 
85 ibid, 7. 
86 ibid, 8. 
 
 111 
in light of the nature of civil defense work, every reasonable endeavor ought to be made 
to make working conditions comfortable.87 Officials were especially worried that 
boredom among civil defense workers would adversely affect morale.88 One private 
citizen offered to organize concerts for civil defense workers, with the entertainment 
including singers, comedians, a conjurer, and an accompanist. The funds to pay the artists 
were raised through private collection and no financial burden, other than providing the 
premises, lighting, and heating, fell on the LCC.89 Four concerts a week were to be held 
in the County of London.90 One proposal suggested a series of short lecture courses for 
the services, adding that this was likely to be successful as the level of intelligence among 
civil defense volunteers was “comparatively high.”91 Topics for such lectures included 
“democracy and dictatorship,” “international affairs,” “the political structure and 
economic problems of the British Commonwealth,” and “foreign policy and economic 
organisation of Nazi Germany.”92 The British Social Hygiene Council offered to give 
lectures to civil defense volunteers on venereal disease and while the LCC welcomed the 
offer there was some concern over offending the sensibilities of the young women 
making up the majority of the ambulance service.93 One visitor to local civil defense 
posts noted the lack of reading material and suggested each volunteer be issued a ticket to 
the nearest library branch to enable them to check out material near their duty station.94 
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The publisher of the Oxford University Press offered a donation of books drawn from the 
World’s Classic series to be distributed to various posts of the London AFS.95 Films also 
proved very popular with civil defense volunteers, but this required a duty post to have a 
projector and the estimate to supply just the AFS station in London was just under 
£10,000.96 In London, civil defense volunteers were also invited free of charge to a 
preview of a film “of interest to ‘people engaged on the home front’.”97 Competitions 
were sometimes put on for entertainment purposes. The London Civil Defence Region 
held a Fire Guard trailer pump competition where each local authority selected three 
crews, two male and one female, to compete in the standard operation of the pumps.98 
Teams also competed in a Rescue Service competition in the London region, with the 
winners receiving badges and trophies.99 Civil defense volunteers also put their free time 
to good use by fabricating toys for children in war-time nurseries.100  
 Physical training programs were a useful way to keep volunteers entertained and fit 
for duty. Local authorities were asked to provide physical training, games, and recreation 
for their civil defense volunteers. The wide range of age and physical abilities among 
volunteers, however, meant that physical training could not be compulsory and needed to 
be carefully adapted to avoid injury and illness to participants.101  One volunteer for 
every 250 civil defense workers was to take a class to qualify them to lead physical 
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training for other members of civil defense.102 While participation in physical fitness 
training was purely voluntary, particularly in the services tasked with heavy work, such 
as the rescue and demolition crews, it was strongly suggested that the men be informed of 
the need for physical training to properly carry out their duties.103 In 1941 the Home 
Office issued a pamphlet titled Physical Recreation for Civil Defence Workers to provide 
clear instructions to all civil defense regions on how to facilitate such activities.104 It 
suggested that physical training ought to form an integral part of the training of all civil 
defense workers and that it was essential for the upkeep of morale.105 It further provided 
instructions on various types of activities that could be done at civil defense depots, such 
as keep-fit classes, indoor games like cards or chess, badminton, cricket, basketball, and 
table tennis.106 For male civil defense workers there were also football, baseball, or 
rugby, while female workers could enjoy netball, rounders, or stoolball.107 Competitions 
were also encouraged to stimulate interest, but the pamphlet cautioned organizers to not 
unduly overemphasize competition if physical training was the primary intent.108 
 With multiple services and hundreds of thousands of volunteers, discipline was a 
necessary element of civil defense. In one AFS brigade the men objected to the penalties 
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of a deduction of wages and extra duty for offenses against discipline.109 In London there 
were reports that some men of the Rescue Service were receiving money from members 
of the public as a reward or an incentive to salvage property. The LCC swiftly attempted 
to put a stop to this practice, informing volunteers that it was illegal to accept gifts and 
that any future occurrence should be brought to the attention of the officers in charge and 
the money returned.110 The acceptance of gratuities was forbidden for all members of 
civil defense and volunteers were instructed to suggest to grateful civilians to donate such 
gifts instead to the Widows’ and Orphans’ Fund.111 A General Order by the London Fire 
Brigade also suggests looting may have been a problem. The Order reminded volunteers 
that taking even the smallest article of property, even as a joke or souvenir, was looting 
by law and would be punished severely.112 Officers were instructed to keep strict 
supervision over their men, particularly when attending calls and when going through 
houses after fires.113 
 The members of the civil defense services performed their jobs under dangerous 
and trying conditions. Many civil defense volunteers braved considerable danger in the 
performance of their jobs and the mortality rate for ARP workers may have been three 
times as high as that of the general population.114 The drivers of ambulances, WVS vans, 
and despatch riders faced particular dangers driving at night during air raids, 
                                                        
109 LMA: CL/CD/1/275, Report on Critical Comment in London Local Press, Week ending 15th March, 
1941. 
110 LMA: CL/CD/247, London County Council, Improper Gratuities, October 26, 1940. 
111 LMA: CL/CD/247, Deputy Chief Officer London Fire Brigade, General Order A, Acceptance of 
Gratuities forbidden, 1940. 
112 LMA: CL/CD/247, London Fire Brigade, General Order No. 514, Looting, November 18, 1940. 
113 ibid. 
114 Ministry of Home Security, Frontline 1940-41 the Official Story of the Civil Defence of Britain 
(London: HMSO, 1942), 96. 
 
 115 
maneuvering around bomb craters, debris, firemen’s hoses, and trailing wires. One WVS 
driver had her sons lie across the bonnet of her canteen van to call out directions to her as 
she slowly nosed forward in the poor conditions.115 First aid parties, with roads blocked 
by debris, would walk with their medical kits to their destinations as bombs and anti-
aircraft fire raged around them.116 Ambulance drivers left their broken down vehicles to 
carry patients through the streets to hospitals.117 Other drivers refused to return to post 
and continued to ferry casualties to hospitals as bombs and debris fell around them.118 
Some ambulances were machine-gunned by enemy raiders as they made their way 
through the streets.119 Wardens were usually first on the scene and thus actively engaged 
in rescue activities, digging through rubble as fires raged, protecting casualties from 
falling debris with their own bodies, or working to reach trapped civilians near broken 
gas mains.120 Many wardens were casualties of bombs themselves, but carried on their 
duties to report incidents and rescue others who had become trapped.121 Rescue workers 
tunneled into the remains of broken homes liable to collapse on top of them at any time, 
working next to tottering walls, broken gas mains, and fires.122 Despite the dangers, 
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rescue workers continued to dig through debris as bombs fell around them.123 WVS 
workers often arrived at incidents with their mobile canteens pitted with holes from bomb 
shrapnel and machine-gun bullets and these canteens continued to operate, serving tea to 
firefighters during the worst of the raids.124 
 The service and sacrifice of civil defense volunteers regularly received attention 
from both the state and the public.  The film London Can Take It praised the work of the 
civil defense services, saying “they are the ones really fighting this war” and showcasing 
their dangerous and difficult nightly work as “the people’s army.”125 Winston Churchill 
wanted it widely known that acts of gallantry by civil defense workers would be 
recognized.126 The MHS was eager to publicize examples of “heroism and devotion to 
duty,” as well as mention in the press “other deeds” that did not merit an award for 
gallantry, not only as a reward for the individuals concerned, but also to “fortify and 
encourage others.”127 Immediately after the start of the Blitz the MHS urged the heads of 
the civil defense services and local civil defense leaders to report acts of gallantry by 
their members, having only received twenty nominations to date when the prime minister 
had asked for one hundred.128 King George VI specifically created two medals, the 
George Cross and the George Medal, to recognize “deeds of gallantry done by men and 
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women in all walks of civilian life.”129 The George Cross was awarded for deeds of 
“great valour” and ranked immediately after the Victoria Cross and was to be worn before 
all other orders or decorations.130 The first George Medal was awarded to an Air Raid 
Warden who rescued a blind woman trapped in the rubble of her house.131 
 The civil defense services stood by 24 hours a day, seven days a week during the 
whole of the war. Some stood by at a post or center while others were on call, and many 
volunteers remained ready to spring into action while at work, at the factory, or taking 
care of their household. As soon as the warning signal of approaching enemy aircraft 
reached the Control Room, the nerve center of civil defense, the whole organization stood 
alert. Wardens went on patrol while Rescue, First Aid, and Ambulance workers waited at 
their depots to be despatched to the next emergency. In heavy raids on densely populated 
areas, incidents often occurred in rapid succession, requiring efficient organization and 
tactical leadership to ensure resources were employed in the most efficient manner. 
Immediately after the raid, civil defense volunteers focused on recovery efforts, offering 
relief, shelter, and food to the affected civilian population. 
 
The Cinderella of Civil Defense 
 
 The most visible arm of British civil defense was arguably the Wardens’ Service. 
The Air Raid Warden was generally a part-time male volunteer over military age who 
was a well-known and respected member of his community and neighborhood. There 
were exceptions to this, however, and the Wardens’ Service ultimately was made up of 
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men and women, young and old, part-time and full-time, and paid and unpaid volunteers. 
The warden was the civil defense worker most likely to interact with civilians on an 
everyday basis in the pursuit of his duties. While civilians encountered most of the other 
civil defense services only after having become the victim of a raid, their local warden 
was intended to be a constant source of information, reassurance, and control. The job of 
an air raid warden was difficult to define, but in essence the Wardens’ Service was “the 
lever which brings into action the work of the other Services.132” The warden’s job as the 
frontline of civil defense and a source of reassurance and information for the public was 
vital to the nation and the official history of the Blitz cited the Wardens’ Service as “a 
principal reason for the success of the civil defense services.”133 
 The Wardens’ Service was created before the outbreak of war. The Air Raid 
Precautions Memorandum No. 4, issued by the Home Office in 1938, explained the need 
for “an organization of citizen volunteers” who would perform important duties in time 
of an air attack and thereby augment and relieve the resources of the regular civil 
authorities for safeguarding the public.134 With functions allied to those of the police, the 
Home Office intended wardens to be looked upon  by the public for help and guidance as 
they did with the police.135 For this reason the Wardens’ Service was often organized 
under the control of the Chief Constable or directly under the Chief Officer of Police, 
although each local authority could implement its own organizational scheme that best 
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fitted their existing police and governmental organizational structure.136 Each area was to 
have a Chief Warden, who would be responsible for the recruitment and training of 
wardens, often with assistance from the police.137 The local organization of the Wardens’ 
Service depended on population size. A town of 250,000 inhabitants, under the purview 
of a Chief Warden, would be divided into Divisions each with a Divisional Warden. Each 
Division contained ten Groups, each led by a Head Warden and each Group was made up 
of four to five wardens’ posts, with a Senior Warden in charge at each.138 An important 
aspect of the organization of every wardens service was the distribution of wardens’ posts 
in the local area. In residential areas the Home Office suggested one post per 500 
residents, while in industrial or business areas the location would be determined by 
distance, about one post every quarter of a mile.139 A warden’s post needed to be in a 
prominent location, both to provide good observation to the warden and to allow the 
public to easily find it.140 Ideally, such a post would also be connected to the telephone 
network, but if this was not possible the post needed to be in close proximity to a public 
call box or a police box to allow the wardens to make their reports quickly and easily.141 
The post also needed to be large enough to provide storage for the protective gear issued 
to wardens and offer protection for wardens against blast and splinters of HE bombs.142 
The number of wardens in an area was determined by population density. In important 
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urban areas the ratio was six wardens per 500 population, twice the ratio of other areas.143 
Wardens were also sometimes appointed to specific buildings or non-residential areas. 
The staff of Westminster Abbey, some 40 or 50 men, all underwent warden training to 
ensure proper air raid precautions were in place.144 
 The recruitment of volunteers to fill the Wardens' Service enjoyed varying degrees 
of success. Because of a warden’s prominent place in public it was vital that a volunteer 
be “of good character, level-headed, and free from obvious physical or temperamental 
disability.”145 The Home office specifically suggested that wardens be older men who had 
a good sense of responsibility and inspired confidence among their neighbors.146 While in 
the initial organization of the Wardens' Service only men were qualified to volunteer, by 
1939 women were also allowed to become air raid wardens.147 Through 1941 at least one 
in six wardens was a woman.148 By mid-year 1938 some boroughs had only enrolled 25% 
of their needed wardens, while other boroughs had yet to take any civil defense 
measures.149 The Munich Crisis swelled recruitment numbers and by the end of October 
almost 470,000 wardens had been enrolled out of the needed 520,000.150 London was a 
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particularly difficult case, because although out of the required 49,805 wardens over 
36,000 had been enrolled by the end of 1938 some boroughs, such as Chelsea, had twice 
as many wardens as required while other boroughs, such as Bethnal Green, could not 
even fill 50% of their quota.151  
 Wardens received training specific to their jobs, which incorporated parts of the 
training of almost all the other civil defense services. The basic knowledge needed by an 
air raid warden was, particularly, how to provide aid during an air raid and proper 
reporting techniques, as well as the organization of the civil defense services, and details 
on the respirator distribution scheme and respirators themselves.152 It was important that 
wardens were fully conversant of Home Office guidance notes issued to the public to 
allow them to properly advice civilians in their sectors.153 Warden training was conducted 
in two phases—individual and collective. Individual second stage training included local 
information, relations with police and public, fitting respirators, principles of the air raid 
warning system, message writing and reporting, map usage, protection against HE 
bombs, dealing with incendiary bombs, organization of the AFS, elementary first aid, 
damage to water or sewer mains, and the equipment of wardens’ posts.154 Wardens were 
also required to complete the short First Aid Course and a basic course on incendiary 
bomb control.155 The basic training of a warden, not including the locally arranged course 
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on a warden’s special duties or team training, took over 27 hours to complete, a 
significant investment in time particularly for part-time volunteers.156 While the course 
on a warden’s duties was locally arranged, the Home Office nevertheless suggested 
keeping periods of instruction short and classes relatively small.157 Collective training 
would be completed with other wardens, preferably at the warden’s duty location, and 
include exercises on the distribution of respirators, manning a post, patrolling, and 
actions to be taken upon hearing an air raid warning.158 Wardens in training also practiced 
effective message writing on authorized message pads, the use of telephones, 
communications when normal channels failed, dealing with casualties, guiding other 
services to incidents, and what to do in case of panic.159 By 1940, the government had 
issued a training manual intended to cover Individual Training, Stage I for all civil 
defense workers, which included instructions on first aid, anti-gas measures, incendiary 
bomb control, protection against HE bombs, and the organization of civil defense.160 The 
warden training syllabus included a variety of subjects and thus it was often time 
consuming and it was not always possible to provide lecturers on every subject, resulting 
in some topics being covered through issue of printed materials only.161 Some suggested 
that wardens also receive special training in psychology to better handle cases of “air raid 
nerves” and shock among the civil population.162 Some localities, such as Leeds, 
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arranged lectures on psychology for their wardens.163 Anti-gas training was also vital to 
the job of the warden. Wardens took the full anti-gas course, which lasted about nine 
hours.164  
 Most of a warden’s duties, however, did not revolve around actual air raids.  The 
chief duty of an air raid warden was to advise fellow citizens on official air raid 
precautions, to assist in cases of trouble arising from air raid damage and to know how 
and where to find relief measures—to generally “act the part of a good neighbor.”165 It 
was a vital requirement of the job to establish good relations with the civilians in a 
warden’s sector to ensure compliance and avoid conflict.166 A warden, patrolling his or 
her sector nightly, was also the perfect person to ensure compliance with lighting 
restrictions. Wardens, however, had no legal power to compel compliance and could only 
attempt to persuade civilians through appeals to patriotism or advisements of danger.167 
The Home Office considered early on that the fitting and distribution of respirators to the 
civilian population would require a considerable number of trained personnel who knew 
the local area. Wardens were the perfect solution, as their organization revolved around 
communities, their training included information necessary to fit and distribute gas 
masks, and their duties would not fully start until the outbreak of war.168 After war had 
broken out and respirators had been issued to the civil population, much of a warden’s 
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time was often taken up with the inspection of respirators. Wardens were required to 
make house-to-house inspections in their duty section of all occupants’ gas masks and to 
mark the mask’s condition on household record cards. Depending on the region, this 
inspection was carried out anywhere between every month to every six months.169 It was 
also the duty of a warden to distribute and ensure the correct completion of the 
Householder’s Card, a card issued to every household that included a permanent 
reminder of air raid precautions and vital local information, such as the location of the 
closest wardens’ post, the nearest First Aid Post, the closest local warden and Senior 
Warden, and where to obtain help in the case of a fire.170 During public gas exercises 
wardens were encouraged to use the opportunity to check the fitting and efficiency of the 
respirators worn by civilians observing the exercise. Additionally, it was the wardens’ job 
to ensure that civilians who wandered into a gas exercise donned their respirators swiftly 
and in the proper manner.171 While a warden did not have the legal power of a policeman, 
common law allowed for wardens to make a citizen’s arrest when witnessing a felony. 
Wardens were instructed that they might witness felonies such as stealing, housebreaking, 
burglary, or malicious damage and be required to respond, but they were also advised to 
use great caution when making an arrest to avoid doing so wrongfully.172 
 During an air raid a warden had a specific set of duties to fulfill. Most wardens 
operated out of fixed duty posts, manned by as many as three wardens during a raid, with 
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a defined sector under their purview.173 In rural areas some wardens operated out of their 
own homes.174 Upon the sounding of an air raid warning each warden would assemble at 
his or her wardens’ post.175 It was vital that the wardens’ post be continuously manned to 
facilitate the reporting and relaying of messages.176 One of a warden’s primary duties was 
to report the falling of bombs and damage caused in their duty section, allowing ARP 
Headquarters, the fire brigade, and police to immediately direct their services to the 
proper location.177 During his patrol the warden was not only in a good position to report 
bomb damage, but would also be the first to determine that a gas attack had occurred.178 
Thus a warden during an air raid was a first responder who could direct the proper 
services as needed to the right location. Being the first on the scene of an incident could 
also mean that wardens had to perform jobs such as rescue and first aid before the arrival 
of the appropriate parties.179 One job that was specifically outside the purview of a 
warden’s responsibilities was the fighting of fires, as the requirements to man posts, make 
reports, and give advice to the public would preclude them from managing both.180  
Nevertheless, wardens were instructed to help householders fight incipient fires before 
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the arrival of the fire brigade to prevent the spread of flames to other buildings.181 As a 
well-respected member of his or her community, the warden was also responsible for 
shepherding members of the public to the nearest shelter and to administer first aid 
measures to any casualties until more-skilled help could arrive.182 Most important, 
however, was the mere presence of the warden in a community during a raid to set an 
example of “coolness and steadiness” in the face of danger, ensuring good morale and a 
mitigation of panic among the population.183 Additionally, immediately after a raid the 
warden was to become a barrier against rumors by displaying “hearty skepticism” in the 
face of exaggerated reports and through quoting fantastic examples that had proven 
untrue previously.184 Because of the warden’s importance in reassuring civilians, a 
committee on preserving civilian morale suggested that “[e]xcitable air-raid wardens 
should be combed out.”185  
 In the event of a gas attack an air raid warden would have performed a specific set 
of actions. If a gas bomb exploded in his vicinity, the warden would don his own gas 
mask, give the gas warning by sounding his rattle, and reconnoitre the gassed area.186 The 
rattle was intended to be operated with a steady swing instead of isolated jerks and 
wardens were specifically instructed “not [to] be afraid of making a noise with them.”187 
It was the warden’s responsibility to ensure all civilians near a gassed area put on their 
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respirators and to direct them away from the danger area to the nearest cover.188 The 
warden would also need to render first aid and direct casualties to Public Gas Cleansing 
Centers if the victim had become contaminated.189 It was vital that wardens knew how to 
test for the presence of gas and determine its type, to allow them to determine when to 
don protective clothing and to assist the Gas Identification Officer (GIO). 
 Not everyone welcomed the sometimes intrusive presence of an air raid warden. In 
the months prior to the Blitz, when bombs began falling on civilian targets, wardens 
seeking to usher people to shelter were often treated disrespectfully.190 After initial issues 
with the recognition of a warden’s authority, by 1939 all wardens were issued with a card 
of appointment as evidence of their authority in dealing with householders.191 This also 
helped to prevent false representation, such as in a case in Dumbartonshire where a man 
received  a warning from the court for posing as an air raid warden to admonish his 
neighbor about visible light coming from his house.192 In Kent, wardens going door-to-
door to inspect respirators were often “rudely received” and had doors slammed in their 
faces, making many disinclined to carry out further inspections.193 One Group Warden 
complained that his wardens were “roundly abused” while on patrol and were treated 
“more like ‘Gestapo’ than neighbours.”194 While some wanted to fine noncompliant 
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householders under Section 79 of the Civil Defence Act, others cautioned against such a 
stretch of powers and suggested instead that if wardens commanded proper respect in 
their community there would be no issue.195 One official worried that if wardens were 
tasked with reprimanding civilians out in public without their respirators that it could 
“prejudice their relations with their flock” and warned against asking wardens to do 
this.196  
 Many wardens felt under-appreciated compared to the other civil defense services. 
In London, wardens grew increasingly discontent early in the war because they did not 
qualify for pay for rank, did not have proper uniforms, and did not receive a free issue of 
army boots.197 A letter to Herbert Morrison, Minister of Home Security in 1941, accused 
the MHS of “consistently [making] less favourable provision for the Wardens'’ Service 
than for other Civil Defence and the Auxiliary Fire Services.”198 Among the many 
instances of “discrimination” against the wardens, the writer listed the lack of greatcoats, 
mackintoshes, and boots for wardens, not qualifying for pay for rank or meal allowances, 
service as a warden not being considered an alternative to military service while other 
civil defense work was so regarded, and receiving uniforms of inferior quality when 
services with less strenuous jobs were issued with two good uniforms.199 The writer 
further argued that such treatment would adversely affect the morale and efficiency of the 
London Wardens’ Service.200 One official worried that several issues in London had 
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caused discontent among the wardens. Wardens were the sole service not directly under 
the purview of the county boroughs and thus when favors were available to be dispensed 
they went to the other services under county borough control.201 Additionally, wardens, 
unlike the other services, had no representatives on the Borough Council to advocate for 
their interests.202 The official described the wardens as “looking for insults for a long time 
past” and urged that wardens be included in the new uniform issue to prevent 
discontent.203 A survey of other civil defense regions, however, found that London 
wardens were not alone in their grievances. Nottingham civil defense officials were 
“gravely apprehensive” of the consequences if wardens were not given the new 
uniforms.204 In Bristol wardens complained that even though their job required them to 
continuously man their posts and patrol, and other services were only on duty during an 
alert, wardens were still treated less favorably.205 One female warden complained about 
the perception of full-time paid wardens as “taking the job for pin money,” arguing that 
many volunteers, like her, needed to supplement family income with husbands at war or 
businesses negatively affected.206 Other wardens agreed that they were looked down upon 
for receiving pay, one saying that despite the long hours worked he was made to feel like 
“a slacking thief.”207 Such incidents led the Wardens’ Service to consistently believe it 
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was being treated as the “Cinderella of Civil Defence.”208 One official facetiously 
commented that the wardens-as-cinderella comparison was made in the hope that they 
would receive “the traditional reward and be raised to royal rank!”209 
 Under purview of the Wardens’ Service were also the Fire Guards, who played a 
vital role in the protection of the nation. The duty of a Fire Guard involved watching for 
the fall of incendiary bombs and alerting the neighborhood when and where such bombs 
fell.210 Fire Guards were also asked to aid householders in extinguishing fires caused by 
incendiary bombs to prevent larger conflagrations that would require the fire brigade.211 
Fire Guards operated in stirrup pump teams, usually consisting of three people, with one 
stirrup pump team for approximately every 150 yards or every 30 houses.212 Businesses 
and factories were required to maintain their own Fire Guard organizations.213 To avoid 
significant interference with nightly rest, Fire Guards only patrolled during an air raid 
alert and the Guard on watch duty could remain indoors while the other team members 
slept until their turn for watch duties.214 The recognized signal for the fall of fire bombs 
in a neighborhood was a series of short blasts of a whistle, given either by police, warden, 
or fire guard, to alert the stirrup pump duty teams into action.215 Fire Guards not on duty 
when the whistle sounded were still required to dress and to turn out to assist the duty 
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team.216 The training of Fire Guards was done in three stages, starting with basic 
instructions on operating stirrup pumps, putting out incendiary bombs, and how to 
operate in teams of three, followed by practical training with practice incendiary bombs 
and lastly tactical training, sometimes involving local exercises.217 By 1944, the call on 
men for the armed forces had in some areas so reduced the availability of civil defense 
volunteers that women were taking on more and more fire guard duties.218 Women 
operated as fire guards in street parties, as business and factory fire guards, as well as at 
government premises.219 
 
The Auxiliary Fire Service  
 The MHS was aware well before the start of war that perhaps the biggest danger 
from enemy air raids would be fire. While existing fire brigades would be capable of 
fighting fires started by regular or incendiary bombs, especially in concentrated urban 
areas under heavy attack the existing fire service was not large enough to deal with every 
fire that might be started. A large component of civilian ARP education consisted of 
dealing with incendiary bombs to avoid the fire brigade from being overtaxed. The AFS 
was formed as a support to and supplement of existing fire brigades across the civil 
defense regions. A job that often took its volunteers into dangerous situations, service in 
the AFS was the most recognized and respected of the various civil defense jobs.  
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 The duties of AFS volunteers were quite similar to those of the regular fire brigade. 
The majority of AFS volunteers were needed to fight fires. Members of an AFS brigade 
would go with their pumps to the scene of a fire, often working in cooperation with the 
regular fire brigade for serious outbreaks, but were asked to handle smaller fires without 
the aid of professionals.220  Some volunteers would work in emergency water units, 
tasked with bringing water up from lakes, rivers, canals, and other sources to ensure a 
sufficient supply.221 Those unable to meet the heavy physical demands of such work 
could still join the AFS, manning watch rooms at fire stations or driving the trailer 
pumps.222 Youths were asked to enroll as messengers to ensure continued communication 
even if the telephone network stopped working.223 Women were particularly encouraged 
to volunteer for the “essential if not exciting” jobs of watch room work or record keeping, 
which they would be able to do “as well as men, perhaps better.”224 While women did 
enroll in the AFS, things did not always go smoothly. In 1938, Lady Reading, Chair of 
the WVS, complained to Sir Thomas Gardiner that the way women were being treated in 
the London Fire Brigade was “most unsatisfactory,” and that many were resigning 
because of the poor conditions under which women were being trained and the 
unsatisfactory allocation of responsibility assigned to female officers.225  
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 The training of auxiliary firemen focused most heavily on fighting fires, but 
included other ARP aspects, as well. Training varied between the various jobs of the AFS, 
with as many as sixty hours required for the full fire fighter, while other tasks required as 
few as thirty hours of training.226 The latter stages of AFS training were also supposed to 
provide practical experience of  fighting fires to the new auxiliary firemen, but the large 
number of AFS volunteers and the relatively small number of fires prior to September 
1940 often meant that any peace-time fire saw an unnecessary number of firemen 
responding.227 Thus, when the London Blitz began, four-fifths of London’s auxiliary 
firemen had never seen a fire.228 Anti-gas training was also an important component of 
training for auxiliary firefighters and all volunteers undertook the full anti-gas course.229 
Even the AFS messengers received some anti-gas training.230 
 Recruiting for the AFS was often easier than for other civil defense services, but 
more stringent requirements meant enrollment numbers did not meet needs. Men between 
30-50 were sought for the AFS, although those over 50 could enroll if they were capable 
of doing the physical work.231 Additionally, the AFS restricted its volunteer pool by 
requiring all enrollees to be natural-born or naturalized British citizens.232 In 1938 the 
estimated number of volunteers required for the London AFS alone was 30,000; women 
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could make up 5,000 of those needed.233 Over 1,000 AFS recruitment posters were 
displayed at London Underground stations.234 The London Fire Brigade also sought to 
increase recruitment through exhibiting posters on the sides of buses and trams, as well as 
hoping to show in cinemas a five minute “talkie” about the AFS.235 An advertising 
official, however, felt the AFS posters lacked the necessary appeal, emphasizing the need 
for exaggeration.236 Another advertising agent thought a cartoon film was most likely to 
be shown by cinema proprietors and absorbed by the public, but that the serious subject 
of the AFS could not be treated in such a form.237 Exhibitions often served as a useful 
publicity and recruiting tool. At an ARP exhibition in London it was suggested to 
showcase working fire appliances and for the AFS to periodically exhibit how to fight 
incendiary bombs.238 Another suggestion involved stationing a fire engine with its 
complete equipment in Trafalgar Square for a week to act as a “propaganda and recruiting 
depot.”239 The LCC also agreed to hang streamers across the road outside of each London 
fire station with slogans such as “Enrol here for the A.F.S.” to supplement the poster and 
newspaper recruitment campaigns.240 One type of AFS advertisement had been intended 
to scare people into volunteering, but this was quickly shut down by the LCC, who 
agreed that the scare appeal held many advantages, but would have to depict a state of 
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affairs so dire as to possibly be unfavorable to recruiting.241 To address a lag in 
recruitment, the London Fire Brigade considered asking for time on the BBC to have an 
AFS volunteer “put over his own story in a comradely style” to provide a more personal 
pull to recruitment that was lacking in national service campaigns.242 By mid-1939, 
22,000 volunteers had enrolled in the London AFS, but at least 40,000 were required as 
the bare minimum.243 5,000 youths between 14-18 years of age were needed as 
messengers for the London AFS.244 Particularly early on, with the AFS still in its infancy, 
some recruits may have been reluctant to join because of rumors of inefficient equipment 
and uniforms, as well as sub-par AFS posts.245   
 Incentives were thought to improve recruiting. Service in the AFS was often 
portrayed as adventurous and interesting to encourage recruits. In a recruitment 
broadcast, the training of the AFS was referred to as “varied and interesting.”246 
Volunteering for the AFS was the closest an amateur could come to doing a professional 
fireman’s job.247 Another mentioned incentive was that in peacetime, once volunteers had 
passed training, they were also allowed to ride out to fires with the regular fire brigade.248 
While men volunteering as a whole-time firefighters could receive the regular civil 
defense pay, those who undertook positions of greater responsibility, such as Company 
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Officers, Group Commanders, and Deputy Commandants, could earn between £4 to £8 a 
week.249 
 The work of the AFS was particularly vital to the nation. Incendiary bombs 
presented a special danger to lives and homes and an efficient system of dealing with 
fires was required. Civilians were urged to enroll in the AFS to ensure the prompt 
extinguishing of fires and the safety of their homes and families.250 Incendiary attacks 
produced conflagrations unimaginable in peacetime—the first night of the Blitz in 
London produced nine fires that each alone required three to ten times as many pumps 
and men as a peacetime “big” fire.251 During the first 22 nights of the Blitz, the London 
Fire Brigade, their auxiliaries, and reinforcements attended nearly 10,000 fires.252 The 
raids of December 29th caused over 1,500 fires in the City of London, conflagrations so 
intense great clouds of smoke seemed to overwhelm the entire city, and one observer 
thought it impossible “that the City, that London, could be saved.” Only through the 
unrelenting efforts of the AFS was St. Paul’s Cathedral, and the city, saved from the 
flames.253 
 Volunteers of the AFS regularly exposed themselves to great danger to save lives 
and property. Incendiary bombs falling on arsenals or railcars sometimes saw volunteers 
fighting fires among boxes of live ammunition and crates of nitro-glycerine, while bombs 
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continued to rain down around them.254 At the docks, pepper fires made breathing 
unbearable, while rum fires blasted firemen with burning liquid. Paint and rubber fires 
exposed the men to toxic fumes and black smoke, coating equipment and uniforms in 
varnish and soot.255  
 
The Casualty Services 
 While the Home Office had heavily invested in teaching civilians how to protect 
themselves from air raids through education campaigns and the Wardens’ Service, as well 
as providing shelter and other protective measures, it was inevitable that air raids on the 
nation would cause casualties. The several thousand casualties from zeppelin raids in the 
previous war in London alone made clear that if heavy raids were to occur the numbers of 
civilian casualties would quickly overwhelm existing systems of first aid, ambulance, and 
hospitals. What was required was a system similar to that of the AFS, a supplemental 
service to boost existing first aid structures and ensure civilian casualties of war were 
treated quickly and appropriately. The casualty services were comprised of the First Aid 
Post (FAP),  ambulance service, and stretcher parties (called first aid parties in some 
areas). Volunteers of the casualty services often found themselves at the frontline of the 
aftermath of an air raid, rushing into sometimes dangerous situations to provide treatment 
and transportation for injured civilians. 
 The services worked together to provide swift and competent care for air raid 
casualties. Ambulance drivers manned auxiliary ambulance stations and would drive out 
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to wherever casualties were reported to take them to hospitals or FAPs.256 The ambulance 
staff consisted of one driver and one attendant, manning either a stretcher-carrying 
ambulance or “sitting case” cars that could carry minor casualties to FAPs.257 The 
members of the stretcher parties were the first line of casualty treatment and their 
decisions, made swiftly and often under the dangers of an air raid, could decide whether 
someone lived or died. Stretcher parties diagnosed casualties and decided on the need for 
priority in treatment, decided on and applied first aid treatment, and decided whether a 
casualty needed to be sent to a hospital, FAP, or whether no further treatment was 
required.258 Each stretcher party consisted of four persons, one of whom acted as a leader, 
along with a driver and a car, used to carry the party to the scene of the incident and carry 
the first aid equipment and stretchers.259  
 The first aid posts were specifically intended to divert non-serious casualties away 
from hospitals. They were set up to cover convenient areas and were staffed by a doctor, 
a nurse, and a number of nursing auxiliaries.260 The FAPs were intended to treat non-
major and non-operative injuries, generally providing preliminary first aid treatment, 
such as administering anti-tetanus serum or morphine.261 While some beds existed in 
each FAP, it was imperative that they not be filled up with casualties requiring bedrest so 
that a steady stream of casualties could pass through the post.262 In rural or less densely 
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populated areas a First Aid Point was established, usually comprising a room set aside 
with a limited amount of first aid equipment that could treat minor injuries and served as 
a collection point for casualties requiring a FAP or hospital.263 In some urban areas First 
Aid Points were also set up by wardens or householders, usually at houses with a person 
qualified to render first aid.264 
 Training varied between the first aid services, with the FAP attendants and stretcher 
parties most heavily trained in first aid measures. All personnel at FAPs, including those 
employed in cleansing duties, were required to complete the full First Aid Course of 18 
hours of instruction.265 The full course was also mandatory for all members of first aid 
parties and ambulance attendants.266   Select members of the stretcher parties, usually the 
leader, also took an 18-hour special first aid course that focused more intensely on 
wartime first aid, including lessons on casualty aggregation in air attacks, air raid first aid 
procedures, casualty transportation, types of air raid injuries, faking injuries, and 
collaboration with rescue parties.267 By 1942 first aid parties were also being trained in 
some elements of rescue work since trapped casualties often took some time to extricate 
and the workload of the Rescue Service was sometimes exceptionally heavy.268 In some 
areas, such as London, first aid parties were subsequently being converted to Light 
Rescue Parties.269 Ambulance drivers, and domestic staffs at FAPs, completed the six 
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hour short course on first aid.270 For ambulance drivers the primary skill needed was 
driving a motor vehicle. Initial training for drivers consisted of learning to handle heavy 
vehicles and, particularly in London, learning the topography and quickest routes within 
their duty areas.271 Additionally, ambulance drivers had to learn how to drive ambulances 
at night without lights, due to blackout restrictions.272 The average woman could become 
efficient in these skills after about nine lessons.273 Training for drivers also included map 
reading, and the general maintenance and cleaning of vehicles to ensure they were always 
in working condition.274 
 All three services received extensive anti-gas training. Drivers took the full, nine-
hour anti-gas course.275 Ambulance attendants, first aid party members, and volunteers at 
the FAP were required to complete the Anti-gas Full and Voluntary Aid Course, because 
these volunteers, in particular, would comprise the frontline in the treatment of gas 
casualties.276 Anti-gas training also involved practicing one’s duties in anti-gas clothing. 
Ambulance drivers practiced driving by day and night while wearing respirators and full 
anti-gas clothing.277 
 Volunteers for the casualty services often required specific skills or physical 
abilities and thus recruitment could be difficult. Stretcher party recruitment 
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advertisements called for men willing to go out into the street “under conditions of 
danger” to bring casualties to safety and described it as a job requiring “nerve and 
courage.”278 The physical nature of the first aid parties’ duty also required that younger 
men be able to volunteer and full-time members were reserved from liability to military 
service at the age of 30 in the provinces and 35 in the London region.279 While by 1942 
women were allowed to join first aid parties, other than drivers their numbers were quite 
low and only women of “suitable physique” were enrolled.280 Recruitment adverts for 
FAPs pointed out that women have “always borne the main burden of caring for the sick 
and wounded,” and asked women between 18-55 to train as nursing auxiliaries.281 For 
women ambulance drivers their “ability to drive [was] an asset to the nation,” and women 
were urged to offer their services as drivers whether or not they owned cars.282 Women 
were especially recruited for this service because there were already “so many other calls 
on the male citizen.”283 Women between 18-50 were the primary recruitment targets, 
although anyone older was eligible to enroll if they could prove physically capable of 
carrying out the work.284 A First Aid Certificate enabled a volunteer to work as a First Aid 
Helper at FAPs, but untrained volunteers could still be employed as First Aid 
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Assistants.285 The London Ambulance Service specifically sought to target places women 
would frequent for recruitment advertising. Recruiting posters were exhibited in large 
department stores’ female lavatories, beauty parlors, and hair dressing salons.286 Another 
suggestion called for a recruiting depot set up on the premises of Harrods department 
store, if possible with an actual ambulance on show at the store.287 It was also suggested 
that by approaching all local women’s hairdressers to request that they display 
recruitment posters, the ambulance service could be sure of “getting practically every 
woman motor driver within a month.”288 Under consideration was also the targeting of 
matinee performances at theaters and cinemas to specifically reach women and one 
official lamented that a great idea would have been to have current ambulance drivers 
picket the West End theaters “if only they had uniforms!”289 In London a recruiting 
leaflet was also sent out with the renewal of every woman’s driver’s license.290 One 
official suggested that instead of spending money on press advertisements actually 
opening ambulance stations in a few districts would attract more volunteers.291  
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The London region also sought to gain publicity for civil defense through an exhibition 
where female ambulance drivers were present to exhibit their uniforms and training.292 
Nonetheless, as of February 1939, the London Ambulance Service alone was still short 
17,000 drivers and attendants.293 
 
The Rescue and Demolition Service  
 The destruction that air raids would wreak on urban infrastructure was a major 
concern, both in terms of property damage as well as the danger to life and limb. Debris 
on roadways could make streets impassable for ambulances or civilians trying to reach 
first aid posts, while unsafe structures damaged by bombs could present hazards even 
after a raid. Most important, however, was the need to rescue casualties trapped under 
rubble and debris after raids. The Rescue and Demolition Service was formed specifically 
to remove, demolish, or secure debris, rubble, and unsafe structures that presented 
hazards to civilians and civil defense services after a raid. The service’s primary mission 
was to reach civilians trapped in the ruins of their homes or shelters. Volunteers in rescue 
parties provided vital services that directly saved lives and enabled the other civil defense 
services to complete their own missions. 
 The training and organization of the Rescue and Demolition Service was important 
to ensure the effective carrying out of their work. While initially the service had been 
divided into Light and Heavy Rescue parties, by 1942 this distinction had been 
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abolished.294 Each rescue party consisted of ten men and a driver, although this number 
was sometimes reduced to eight in some areas.295 Wardens or police reported incidents to 
the borough control center, from where the officer-in-charge of the rescue service would 
send out rescue parties depending on the information received.296 The leader or foreman 
of the first party to arrive at the scene would take charge, deciding on the method to be 
adopted and the scale of effort put into the work.297 Incidents of material importance 
would also see a clerk of works sent out to assess the scene, to ensure the work was being 
done correctly, and to keep progress under review.298 Upon arrival at an incident, the 
party leader would decide if another party was required or special equipment needed.299 If 
a fire had broken out and could not be contained with a stirrup pump, the fire brigade was 
also summoned.300 The rescue party also inspected gas and water mains, as well as 
electricity cables, to determine if workmen needed to be sent out to shut them off 
(although a training manual suggested controlling gas leaks by ramming lumps of clay 
into the gas main).301 Before any rescue could commence the party leader also needed to 
inspect the site and determine whether demolition or shoring was required, and then 
organize volunteers to move debris, sending for men from nearby shelters if necessary.302 
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 Volunteers of the Rescue Service were trained primarily in aspects of casualty 
rescue. Rescue party members completed the basic training of all civil defense services, 
as well as the short course on first aid, because they usually were the first to reach 
trapped casualties and could thus provide a modicum of care before the arrival of first aid 
parties.303 First Aid Parties were generally not sent into unsafe structures and thus it was 
imperative that members of the rescue party could render basic first aid before casualties 
were extricated.304 Of special importance was that rescue party members knew how to 
recognize and deal with shock, as well as how to move casualties gently to prevent 
further injury and shock.305 Specialized training for rescue workers also included lessons 
on building construction, safety measures, shoring, ropes and knots, lifting heavy 
weights, cutting with an acetylene torch, scaffolding, demolition, damage to public utility 
mains, and the rescue of casualties.306 It was also necessary to adapt training for both 
services to local conditions, as each locality had its own special type of building 
construction, and in some areas multi-storied buildings were more common.307 
 Members of the Rescue and Demolition Service were trained in anti-gas measures. 
Rescue party members would still be required to rescue casualties in the event of a gas 
attack and thus would be likely to come into contact with contaminated people and work 
in a contaminated environment. Rescuers completed the full anti-gas course, which 
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taught the use of protective clothing and in-depth anti-gas measures.308 Prior to beginning 
any rescue at an incident site party leaders needed to test for poison gas. If wardens had 
not reported gas initially, the rescue party would arrive at the incident in overalls, with 
their protective clothing along in a box.309 If a war gas was recognized on site, the rescue 
party would immediately don respirators before proceeding. In the case of a persistent 
agent, such as mustard gas, the party would withdraw to an uncontaminated district, dress 
in their anti-gas clothing, and seal their regular clothes in a box with adhesive tape.310 
Work in anti-gas clothing would have made an already physically demanding job almost 
unbearably taxing, official instructions describing work in anti-gas suits as “very 
exhausting.”311 
 These jobs involved some of the hardest physical labor in the civil defense system. 
In one MHS publication rescue work was described as “the heaviest and most dangerous 
work of all the [civil defense] services.”312 While the service’s purpose was not the wide 
scale shoring up of debris or demolition, rescue party members nevertheless performed 
difficult work in destroyed structures to ensure civilian safety and rescue.313 The work of 
the rescue services involved three primary operations. The first operation was the moving 
of debris, using picks, shovels, crowbars, and barrows.314 The second operation was the 
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lifting of heavy weights, for which members used jacks, levers, and lifts.315 The Rescue 
Service also worked to shore up walls and floors and carried out any demolition work 
necessary to safeguard the public and to carry out further rescue work.316 Rescue parties 
were usually the first to reach trapped casualties and one training manual warned that 
rescuers be prepared to encounter “horrible and revolting injuries” and to steel their 
nerves against this sight so their efficiency in rescue would not be impaired.317 Rescue 
work also involved the unpleasant task of extricating dead bodies, although volunteers 
were instructed to treat all casualties as gently as possible in case victims were still 
alive.318 Where possible the rescue service employed dogs trained to find casualties, 
although numbers were so limited that the entire London region only had two pairs of 
Alsatians for the purpose.319 A third task sometimes undertaken by rescue parties was the 
recovery of essential foodstuffs. This was only undertaken after the rescue of all 
casualties, under guidance from the Local Food Officer, usually a few days after an air 
raid.320  
 Only specific types of civilians could volunteer for the Rescue or Demolition 
Service. The heavy physical demands on rescue workers meant only men were eligible to 
enroll in the service and men of good physique and stamina at that.321 Prior to the 
experience of actual air raids, the theory had been that men from the building trade would 
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be best suited for rescue work and the initial composition of each rescue team consisted 
of one foreman, four skilled and five unskilled men.322 To draw skilled labor to the rescue 
and demolition service, the Home Office set a rate of pay above that normally approved 
for full-time civil defense volunteers: £3 17s. a week for skilled men and £4 5s. a week 
for foremen.323 Unskilled, regular volunteers received the same pay as other civil defense 
volunteers.324 By 1942, however, practice had shown that rescue work required a 
technique all of its own and volunteers could be quite well trained from the start without 
prior knowledge of construction.325 Like the first aid parties, men over 30 who 
volunteered full-time with the Rescue Service were not liable for military service to 
ensure a sufficient number of physically fit men could enroll.326 
 Public perception of the rescue and demolition services was not always positive. 
After several months of air raids, the North Midland Region found that heavy raids could 
mean that it took as long as two weeks for dead bodies to be recovered from the 
wreckage of their homes and that this created a doubt in the mind of the public that 
people may have been saved if they had been extricated in the first 24 hours.327 To ensure 
that no person (whether dead or alive) be kept under wreckage beyond 24 hours it was 
proposed to enlist military assistance, as well as draw on rescue parties from across the 
region to concentrate on the most damaged areas.328 In Weybridge, an official worried 
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that rescue parties were being dismissed before all reasonable doubt had been removed 
that there were bodies under the wreckage, citing an incident where a body was recovered 
after ten days delay.329 Lack of speed in rescue work was a complaint common across the 
civil defense regions. Officials were concerned that rescue parties lacked proper technical 
supervision, that modern buildings were too large to be tackled by parties of ten men, and 
that sometimes equipment, such as cranes, were used by unskilled men.330 In other parts 
of the country complaints suggested that rescue parties were not sufficiently numerous, 
that they were slow to extricate casualties, that they were unnecessarily destructive, and 
that they did work they were not supposed to do.331 One woman rescued from the debris 
of her house complained to the Daily Mail that the rescue party was refusing to continue 
to work in order to free her trapped mother and sister, although the government report on 
the incident countered the claim, stating that two rescue parties had been working full-
time at the incident.332 Accusations of “lack of vigour” in the workers’ attitudes to their 
job was a particularly concerning complaint, because it could undermine public 
confidence in the service and thus negatively affect morale.333 The number and types of 
complaints led to an official investigation into the Rescue Service, which found that the 
number of complaints in comparison with the number of incidents was relatively small 
and there was no reason to suspect a general defect with either the service or its 
volunteers.334 The investigator also concluded that the conditions under which rescue 
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parties worked was particularly apt to cause misapprehension in the uninformed 
onlooker, especially when his judgment and susceptibilities were affected by personal 
grief.335 Additionally, the nature of rescue work did not always allow all ten members of a 
party to work simultaneously, so to avoid men standing around idly, which could be 
perceived negatively, the report suggested dividing parties into teams of three, with one 
skilled and two unskilled men each, who could then work three different points 
simultaneously.336 
 
The Gas Services  
 While all of the civil defense services were trained to deal with poison gas as part 
of their jobs, there was also a need to provide personnel specifically intended to deal only 
with a gas attack. A major concern was how to decontaminate civilians who had fallen 
victim to a gas attack and, as a result, cleansing centers were created. To decontaminate 
roads and buildings it was necessary to create a Decontamination Service. While wardens 
received some training in recognizing types of gas, if a gas attack occurred a special 
person trained in the recognition of gas would be necessary. The Gas Identification 
Officer (GIO) would be responsible for testing gassed areas and making 
recommendations as to further precautions and treatment. Regional Gas Advisers would 
oversee the network of GIOs and liaise with the Home Office on issues of chemical agent 
identification and protection. 
 The duties of both the GIO and the Decontamination Service only began with a gas 
attack. The very first use of gas by the enemy would require collaboration between the 
                                                        
335 ibid. 
336 TNA: HO 186/441, Lewis Silkin, Investigation, Second Report, October 24, 1940, 2. 
 
 151 
Gas Identification Service and the MHS because “utmost care is necessary before an 
accusation of the use of gas is made.”337 The GIO would report the first use of gas, along 
with the region’s Senior Gas Adviser, to the MHS, where scientific and military advisers 
would carefully examine the evidence, before reporting the use of gas to the 
government.338 Thereafter, any use of gas would be reported by wardens or police 
patrolling their districts and the control center would subsequently send the GIO, and a 
decontamination squad if necessary, to the scene.339 The decontamination squad, each 
consisting of seven men, would be sent to deal with the liquid decontamination of streets 
and buildings, arriving in a lorry that also carried their equipment and supplies.340 Using 
bleaching powder and wearing full oilskin anti-gas suits with respirators the 
decontamination squads would work during daytime to decontaminate gassed areas.341 If 
the GIO discovered that food had become contaminated with gas he would summon the 
Gas Contamination Officer of the Ministry of Food, who would assess the situation and, 
if necessary, call out the Food Treatment Squads, specially trained to deal with the 
decontamination of foodstuffs.342 
 Contaminated civilians would be directed to  wash their skin immediately at one of 
several options. Public Gas Cleansing Centers (GCC) fell under the purview of the First 
Aid Post Service, with the centers either directly attached or affiliated with specific  
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FAPs.343 Staffs at the GCCs received training in the cleansing of contaminated persons in 
order to provide assistance to civilians, particularly as those who may have received other 
injuries during the raid would have been unable to wash themselves.344 Civilians splashed 
with blister gas would make their way either to a street gas cleansing service, a private 
house available for decontamination, or a GCC, where they could remove their 
contaminated clothes and wash their skin.345 Contaminated clothing would be 
decontaminated free of charge and GCCs stocked some emergency clothing to allow 
decontaminated persons to return home.346 Laundry operatives engaged in the 
decontamination of clothing had to received special training to carry out the process.347 
 The training of both GIO and Decontamination Parties therefore heavily revolved 
around anti-gas measures, but also included other aspects of civil defense. 
Decontamination Squads completed the basic Individual Training First Stage, as well as 
second stage training that included incendiary bomb control and the short course on first 
aid.348 The 13-hour full anti-gas and decontamination course was also required. GIOs 
underwent the same training as Decontamination Squads.349 GIOs also attended special 
courses given by members of chemistry departments at universities and colleges.350 
 Volunteers for both decontamination squads and the Gas Identification Service 
needed special qualifications. In general, the men and women of the Gas Identification 
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Service already had some training in chemistry prior to volunteering as GIOs and their 
scientific experience would allow them to properly advise the other services about poison 
gas.351 The heavy work of the Decontamination Service and the physical strain of 
working in anti-gas clothing required men of good physique and stamina and only men 
had been enrolled for this service by 1942.352 Manpower difficulties, however, made the 
MHS consider enrolling a limited number of suitable women, particularly after trials 
showed that women could carry out ordinary decontamination in streets, as long as no 
shifting of debris was involved.353 
 
One Million Women - The Women’s Voluntary Services for Civil Defence 
 One of the largest and usually untapped sources of labor in the nation were women. 
In WWI women had proven their capabilities in the workforce and prior to the start of 
WWII it was expected that women again would rise to the occasion to work in factories 
and offer their time for civil defense. Several of the other civil defense services recruited 
female volunteers, but a major component of civil defense was staffed entirely by 
women—the Women’s Voluntary Services (WVS). This service offered women the 
opportunity to volunteer their time to assist fellow citizens in their time of need through a 
variety of jobs. The WVS was a vital service without which many aspects of the 
government’s civil defense scheme would have been unsuccessful. With its volunteers 
engaged in all aspects of civil defense and its mission often revolving around the welfare 
of British civilians, the WVS’s image was one of hard work, enthusiasm, and devotion to 
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duty: “No job is too strenuous, too dangerous, too dirty or too small — if it must be done 
, the W.V.S. will do it.”354 
 The WVS came into being prior to the outbreak of war. The service was formed in 
May 1938 in response to a request by the then-Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, for the 
help of women for the task of enrolling ARP volunteers and for the education of women 
in ARP measures for themselves and their families.355 The Home Secretary wanted such a 
service specifically because women were not engaged enough in ARP, because women’s 
organizations would be better able to reach other women, to make women aware that they 
could play a part in national defense, and because through energizing women for civil 
defense men, householders, and local authorities could be stimulated to do so, as well.356 
Subsequently the WVS was also tasked with recruiting women for the various hospital 
services and to aid with evacuation. Although initially titled “Women’s Voluntary 
Services for Air Raid Precautions” by the end of 1938 the service had taken on such a 
variety of tasks that its founder and leader Stella Isaacs, the Dowager Marchioness of 
Reading, asked that the name be altered to “Women’s Voluntary Services for Civil 
Defence.”357 By early 1939 the WVS was represented in over 80% of 175 scheme-
making authorities in England and Wales.358 The WVS, headquartered at Westminster, 
consisted of nine departments each responsible for various aspects of civil defense and 
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coordination with the government. A Technical Department dealt with all questions of 
ARP training, the Transport Department coordinated with the AFS and Ambulance 
Service, the Meetings Department supplied speakers for meetings, while other 
departments dealt with regional cooperation, evacuation, architecture, and publicity.359 
 The WVS offered more than one type of job to its many volunteers. Most women 
who enrolled with the WVS did not directly work with the service, but were parceled out 
to the other civil defense services in need. In London, for instance, the WVS enrolled 
several hundred drivers who were then sent on to the London Ambulance Service.360 The 
WVS was actively involved in recruiting women for hospitals as emergency nursing 
assistants, casualty workers, hospital auxiliaries such as clerks, storekeepers, telephonists, 
ward maids, and surgical dressing makers.361 Women recruited and trained by the WVS 
also worked across the civil defense services as telephonists, clerks, messengers, laundry 
maids, and drivers.362 One of the WVS’s largest tasks involved evacuation, particularly 
the education of householders of the plan, securing billets, collecting names and 
addresses, stimulating interest in the plan, and, in general, providing assistance to officers 
engaged in evacuation.363 In receiving areas, WVS volunteers also offered health 
services, communal cooking, and home services to evacuees and those billeting them.364  
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 The outbreak of war further expanded the WVS’s activities. Work parties made 
hospital supplies and clothing.365 Canteen services supplied food and tea in public 
shelters, British restaurants, and rest centers.366 Volunteers manned rest centers and other 
refuges for those bombed out of their homes, while others organized salvage collections 
on behalf of the Supply Department.367 WVS volunteers staffed war-time nurseries for 
children under five who could not be evacuated on their own.368 The WVS was also 
involved in the distribution of ration books, as well as ensuring that children received the 
free issue of nutritious fruit juices and cod liver oil.369 The Architect Department of the 
WVS offered a panel of over fifty women architects and surveyors who were prepared to 
place their technical knowledge at the disposal of housewives, tenants, and others 
desirous of advice on structural problems in connection with the preparation of refuge 
rooms. This panel was solely intended for the assistance of those who could not afford to 
pay for expert advice, and specifically excluded large corporations or factories.370 The 
work of the WVS also concerned troop welfare and volunteers knitted for troops, staffed 
service hostels where service members could enjoy a meal and bed, arranged sightseeing 
tours for allied troops, distributed books, and offered free food through mobile and 
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permanent WVS canteens.371 By the end of the war, the WVS was aiding 20 government 
departments with both the civil defense and war efforts, including the MHS, the Ministry 
of Health, the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Board of Education, the 
Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Information, and the Ministry of Supply.372 
 The Housewives Section of the WVS was an opportunity for those women who 
wanted to help, but had only a limited amount of time that they could volunteer. All 
women were encouraged to volunteer time with the local Housewives Service if domestic 
duties prevented them from participating in the civil defense services, and if no local 
Housewives Service existed they were urged to start their own with help from the 
WVS.373 Every trained housewife displayed a blue card in the window of her home, 
indicating a place where a civilian might obtain assistance for a variety of problems.374 
Much of the duty of a member of the Housewives Service involved information gathering 
and record keeping. Housewives were instructed, for instance, to provide the local 
wardens’ post with a list of people sheltering each night in each home on the street, to 
keep a list of the next-of-kin of every housewife in the road, and to compile a list of who 
owned ladders in the street and where they were kept.375 Housewives also made first aid 
dressings to be distributed to every house in the street for emergencies.376 Additionally, 
the Housewives Service was intended to foster cooperation and the boosting of morale 
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through social gatherings, ensuring there were no lonely people in the street and sharing 
hospitality with one another in the case of houses becoming too damaged to live in.377 
 The training for the WVS was comprehensive, but largely depended on the type of 
job. While the WVS offered some broad ARP training for its members, most women 
subsequently received the training specific to their job in civil defense. Members of the 
Housewives Section were required to complete basic training in first aid, fire fighting, 
and elementary ARP.378 Anti-gas training was included for women in both services. The 
WVS’s anti-gas training included the short course, but many women who volunteered for 
jobs such as wardens, messengers, or in the casualty services or AFS completed 
additional anti-gas training.379 
 Recruitment numbers for the WVS and the Housewives Service usually suffered 
from the same issues as the other civil defense services. The WVS found that large 
numbers enrolled at times of crises, but that at other times recruitment was “very 
poor.”380 At the outset of war there were 336,000 members; by 1943 over one million 
women were in some way engaged in WVS work.381 The WVS also assisted in recruiting 
for other services. To recruit drivers for the London Ambulance Service, the WVS sent 
out copies of the leaflet Calling All Cars to all women’s clubs, car clubs, and to select 
garages and hire firms, and subsequently followed this up with personal visits.382 
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 The work of the WVS was consistently praised and received attention from all 
quarters of the government. The Ministry of Information developed a picture set to 
showcase the WVS’ work, suggesting that this service was best suited for publicity 
purposes as the WVS would be the only one of the civil defense services likely to have 
continuing function after the war.383 The title of this picture set, “One Million Women - A 
Picture Story of the tireless enthusiasm and great achievement of the Women’s Voluntary 
Services for Civil Defence,” indicates the perception of the WVS among the public and 
government agents.384 The work of the WVS was judged invaluable and an official 
claimed the public would not know how to carry on without the help of the WVS.385 
Home Secretary Herbert Morrison, when asked to sum up the importance and 
achievements of the WVS, said the service was one of  “a million magnificent women, 
who are simply applying the principles of good housekeeping to the job of helping to run 
their country in its hour of need […] it is something no man could do, and something that 
the whole nation will not forget.”386 By 1944 WVS members had been awarded five 
George medals and 78 Empire Awards for acts of gallantry.387 
 The contributions of the WVS were often defined in how they supported British 
morale. A Ministry of Information picture set on the WVS commented on a mobile 
canteen “A cup of tea and a snack when it tastes best—inevitable prop to British 
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morale.”388 Much of the WVS’s work involved caring for people post-raids and thus they 
were directly responsible for shoring up morale among the homeless and injured. WVS 
workers staffed the Rest Centers that offered temporary accommodations for the 
homeless, alongside tea, sandwiches, and clothes in the immediate aftermath of a raid.389 
As part of the Queen’s Messenger Convoys they drove into bombed towns to cook and 
serve hot food in the first hours of distress, providing a vital service to boost civilian 
morale.390 WVS mobile canteens offered tea and sustenance to civil defense workers 
engaged during air raids, ensuring that vital work could continue.391 Housewives, too, 
were instructed to “keep cheerful, and keep others cheerful, too,” because cheerful faces 
would make the days seem brighter even in the dire circumstances of air raids.392 
 Four years of war proved the success, and the necessity, of the civil defense 
services. Despite continued issues of enrollment and ever-worsening conditions, the 
volunteers of the civil defense services performed a vital function that directly supported 
the larger war effort. Civil defense workers ensured that the country could continue to run 
in the face of enemy attack and they helped to boost and maintain civilian morale during 
strenuous times. Many civil defense volunteers either directly or indirectly helped to save 
the lives of British civilians, often risking their own lives in the process. Without the 
effort of all of the civil defense services the nation could not have withstood the 
onslaught of enemy bombs and many more civilian lives would have been lost. 
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Chapter 5 - “The gasmask is not a talisman:” Protecting the Civil Population from 
Poison Gas, 1915-1945 
 
 
 The use of poison gas in WWI had drawn significant attention and worry in Britain 
and the most recognizable symbol of chemical warfare, the gas mask, had become 
entrenched in the British public consciousness. Anxieties that a future war would see 
civilians targeted by poison gas were widespread among both the public and the 
government. During the interwar period various branches of the British government 
sought to find a solution for the problem of how to protect the entire civilian population 
from a gas attack, if one came in a future war. Throughout the 1920s the solutions 
revolved around proofing rooms or shelters against gas, with officials arguing that it was 
financially and physically impossible to outfit the entire population of Britain with 
respirators. By the mid-1930s opinions had changed and the government decided, as 
much for reasons of perception and psychology, to issue every man, woman, and child 
with their own mask. ARP education taught civilians and civil defense workers how to 
protect themselves in the case of a gas attack, but the gas mask formed the cornerstone of 
not only anti-gas measures, but British civil defense, in general. 
 British civilians did not directly interact with poison gas in WWI, but the 
experiences with chemical warfare and gas masks of their own armed services, as well as 
those of civilians on the European continent, shaped their perceptions of gas and anti-gas 
equipment. British soldiers were subjected to gas attacks and made use of increasingly 
sophisticated respirators for protection, sharing those experiences with families and 
friends left at home both immediately during the war and in the years to follow. The gas 
mask was the most readily visible and permanent symbol of chemical warfare, an item 
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that was defined by both its protective properties, but also the horror of modern warfare it 
represented.  
 The first use of gas in 1915 also immediately led to the first development of 
protective equipment. Initial masks were crude and usually improvised by the soldiers 
themselves. Canadian troops who had been gassed at Second Ypres found a wet sock to 
be effective.1 To protect against the fumes of chlorine gas others urinated on 
handkerchiefs.2 Days after the first gas attack the War Office issued a call to the British 
public to produce a homemade respirator for the troops, made of bleached cotton wool 
and gauze to cover nose and mouth.3 Dubbed the “Daily Mail Respirator” the call ran in 
several national newspapers and the response was so enthusiastic demands had been met 
within a day.4 This respirator, however, was not only inefficient and useless, but may 
have also been an asphyxiation danger to the soldiers using it.5 The first official respirator 
issued by the War Office consisted of pads of cotton waste soaked in hypo solution, 
wrapped in cotton veiling or muslin long enough to tie around the back of the head, 
intended to cover the wearer’s nose and mouth.6 Following the mouthpad respirator came 
various iterations of hooded gas masks. First came the Hypo Helmet, a hypo-impregnated 
flannel hood with a mica window, then the P Helmet, two layers of phenate-soaked 
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flannelette with round glass eyepieces and an exhale valve, and lastly the PH Helmet, 
which added another protective chemical to the impregnation.7 This unattractive and 
uncomfortable gas helmet came to be known colloquially among British soldiers as the 
“goggle-eyed booger with the tit.”8 By 1917 respirators had become increasingly more 
sophisticated, offering better protection and comfort to the wearer. The Small Box 
Respirator (SBR) consisted of a form-fitting full-face mask of rubberized fabric and an 
inflated rubber edge with two separate triplex glass eyepieces and head straps. A valve 
allowed air to be exhaled more easily, but to inhale air was drawn through a corrugated 
rubber hose that attached to a tin canister carried in a satchel on the soldier’s chest.9  
 British civilians could avail themselves to commercial models of respirators, most 
of them offering little or no protection. Such commercial models were marketed either to 
be used by civilians at home in case of a possible attack or to be sent by worried families 
to their loved ones serving on the front. Ambitious entrepreneurs, like Wallach Brothers, 
Ltd., placed ads in British newspapers selling various forms of “respirators” marketed in 
some way as protecting the troops.  The “Combat” Respirator was an aluminum mask, 
marketed as providing “protection with comfort” and to be used at the front.  While the 
ad never states what the mask is intended to protect the wearer from, its inclusion of the 
word “respirator” and “front” was likely intended to convey gas-protective properties to 
the reader.10  Harrods, too, sought to profit from the new threat and ran newspaper ads 
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instructing readers on which type of respirators were available for purchase in various 
departments.  These respirators included ones made from cotton wool, double stockinette, 
and even models knitted from fine or scoured wool.11  Like the similar Daily Mail 
respirator, these models sold by Harrods provided no actual protection from gas and may 
have even proved dangerous to the wearer.12  Marshall & Snelgrove of Leeds sold 
prepackaged parcels customers could have sent to soldiers overseas, which contained 
socks, gloves, a scarf, a belt, and a “protective gas mask.”13  While it is unclear how 
many commercial respirators may have been sent to troops by well-meaning family 
members or friends, numbers proved problematic enough that the War Office urged the 
public to stop sending non-official respirators to the front.14 For civilians fearful of a gas 
attack at home the War Office urged that they purchase only respirators made to 
government standards.15 Enough civilians purchased and wore masks that news even 
reached British soldiers in the trenches. One soldier wrote in a letter of his amusement at 
hearing that Londoners were wearing masks which sounded useless compared to the 
official equipment and urged his sister not to bother using such a mask.16 
 While civilians did not directly experience gas attacks during WWI, they had 
learned of the horrors of the new weapon and come to recognize the gas mask as its 
symbol. Even the limited aerial raids on Great Britain during the war had given rise to 
anxieties that gas could be used against civilians in such attacks, although this never 
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came to pass. It was easy to extrapolate, however, for government officials and civilians 
alike that a future war, with improved machinery could see civilians directly targeted by 
chemical weapons and such anxieties continued to exist even after the end of the war. The 
gas mask, as the best means of protection against poison gas, also continued to receive 
attention in the years following WWI.  
 Despite the condemnation of chemical warfare and its subsequent ban, there was 
considerable concern in the interwar period that poison gas would be used again and this 
time against civilians. The limited success of German zeppelin raids on England had 
shown that in a future war the civil population was going to be a likely target and the 
British government needed to find ways to protect its citizens, particularly against gas. 
The Air Raid Precautions Sub-Committee and the Sub-Committee on the Production of 
Respirators, under the purview of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID),  took up this 
issue in the 1920s, seeking a solution that would allow for the wholesale protection of the 
entire British population. With the responsibility of ARP transferred to the Home Office, 
both sub-committees came under the direction of the MHS in 1936.17  During a decade of 
discussion the CID considered several options, largely based on financial and physical 
possibilities, before arriving at the decision to issue respirators to the entire civil 
population prior to WWII. 
 In 1924 the CID first addressed the problem of protecting civilians from a gas 
attack. A report by the Chemical Warfare Committee titled “Memorandum on the 
Protection of the Civil Population Against Gas Attack” outlined the potential of a gas 
attack against civilians and concluded that such an attack would have “serious and far-
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reaching effects” if not guarded against.18 The Committee suggested several means of 
protection for the civil population, including the dissemination of knowledge on gas 
attacks and precautionary measures, an air raid alarm, the provision of shelters, the 
creation of a decontamination service, and the creation of a casualty service.19 The report 
considered the idea of gas masks, but dismissed this as impracticable for several reasons: 
Respirators did not protect the body against mustard gas, a respirator needed to be fitted 
to work and the person wearing it required training in its use, there were no respirators 
for infants, and manufacture of the numbers needed would be impossible.20 Instead the 
Committee recommended that people go indoors during a gas attack as the main line of 
defense and to further improve on the protection by selecting one room and sealing it to 
create a gas-proof refuge.21 The CID agreed with the Chemical Warfare Committee and 
adopted their recommendations, stating that the principle civilian protection against gas 
was to go indoors and remain there until the all clear had been given.22 Arguments against 
providing civilians with respirators were not only concerned with feasibility and cost. 
One official argued that if the government provided people with respirators it might give 
them the idea that they were immune from danger.23 
 Over the next decade opinion on the necessity and feasibility of civilian respirators 
shifted significantly as a result of several issues. While a gas-proofed room had always 
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been considered to be the first line of defense against a gas attack, recalculations of 
expected bombardments necessitated a change in policy. By 1930 officials envisioned a 
much greater intensity of bombardment in a future war, which would in turn also cause 
higher concentrations and less dispersal of gas clouds.24 Additionally, heavy 
bombardment would likely break windows and walls and render any room no longer gas-
proof.25 This meant not only that civilians would require more effective protection, but 
that the gas masks supplied to police and civil defense services would need to offer better 
and longer protection against gas.26 Researchers concluded that while the first line of 
defense ought to still be a gas-proof room, it was now necessary to provide some form of 
individual protection, as well.27 Porton Down, the military’s research complex that 
housed the Chemical Defence Research Department (CDRD),  began research into 
designing a cheap form of respirator that would offer a degree of protection for the 
civilian population.28 
 By 1934 government committees had reached the conclusion that some type of 
civilian respirator was necessary. Initially, this meant encouraging private manufacture of 
respirators to a government-specific design that companies could then sell for a 
reasonable profit.29 The government would then urge civilians to purchase masks, but 
only those of an approved design.30 Companies were naturally eager to adopt this strategy 
and several wrote the Home Office to encourage the idea and seek approval for their 
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products.31 One agent likened the purchase of a gas mask to the buying of any other form 
of insurance, such as life insurance.32 Others thought that even if the public were not yet 
ready to buy respirators, “demand [could] be created by skilful publicity.”33 By early 
1934 the CID argued for legislation to cover the design, construction, and materials of 
respirators for sale to the public and to ensure that only officially approved respirators 
could be sold.34 Additionally, they sought to make it an offense to sell any respirator other 
than one of an approved pattern.35 Officials, however, did see some potential problems 
with the commercial model of protecting the civil population. The CID considered that at 
the outbreak of war demand would significantly outstrip supply, which also raised 
concerns over foreign imports, the quality and efficacy of which could not be properly 
controlled.36 Another concern was that private enterprises, naturally wishing to advertise 
their product, would create publicity or propaganda that could cause undue concern  
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among the population.37 A major problem, which had been ignored by officials prior to 
the CID’s March 1934 report, was that many families would be unable, or unwilling, to 
pay the estimated ten shillings per head for a respirator they might never require and 
which needed to be replaced in some years’ time.38 
 Ultimately the government realized it would have to bear the burden of producing, 
issuing, and storing respirators for the civilian population. In March 1934 the Air Raid 
Precautions Sub-Committee considered for the first time whether it was not possible to 
produce “a really cheap respirator at a much smaller price” and whether it was desirable 
to provide such an item to the public.39 The Committee particularly cited the cost of 
private purchase and the psychological aspect of the issue.40 It was also pointed out that if 
the government suggested civilians purchase their own masks for protection that this 
could imply some obligation to provide respirators for all those who could not themselves 
afford to buy one.41 A special ARP Sub-Committee meeting in mid-1934 determined that 
a civilian respirator should be suitable for wear by men, women, and children, that it 
should allow the wearer to be recognized in order to avoid frightening young children, 
that it should provide adequate protection against gas, that it should be both of a low cost 
and suitable for mass production, and that it should have a long life in storage.42 The aim 
was to keep production cost of the civilian respirator at two shillings or less per mask and 
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that materials preferably either be produced in Britain or be available in large enough 
quantities in the country in a time of emergency.43 The standard of protection afforded by 
the civilian respirator against gas was set as approximately two minutes protection in 
heavy concentrations and at lesser concentrations at a quarter to half an hour of 
protection.44 While the Committee did not yet have a solution for the protection of 
children and babies, it was suggested to have a different pattern respirator “less good for 
intelligent people” that could be used for babies and irresponsible persons.45 The 
Committee also expected to accumulate and store millions of respirator prior to an 
outbreak of war, estimating at minimum a store of ten million with the assumption that 
stored respirators had a life of five to ten years.46 Initial plans called for a supply of 40 
million civilian gas masks for free issue, with a supplementary five million added in 
1938, to be produced by 1939, at a total cost of over £4.5 million.47 
 What had swayed governmental opinion was public perception and psychology. At 
a meeting of the Air Raid Precautions Sub-Committee in 1934 one member pointed out 
that at the start of an emergency, when the civil defense services would be issued with 
masks, there would also be “an insistent clamour from the population in general […] for 
the supply of an efficient respirator […].”48 In early 1934 the CID considered the 
likelihood of the public demanding the government provide respirators at the outbreak of 
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war and concluded that “pressure might be so insistent that this might have to be done.”49 
The CID also pointed out the discontent and social unrest that would likely occur when, 
at the outbreak of war, the only respirators available were financially out of reach of a 
considerable percentage of the population.50 Without the production of a cheap and 
simple respirator there was also not going to be a sufficient supply of gas masks at the 
start of an emergency, even if the government decided to issue its existing stocks to 
civilians.51 The CID expected “tremendous public demand” on the outbreak of war for 
respirators and concluded that a simple mask needed to be produced to meet demand and 
prevent social unrest.52 Even after the government had decided to lay in stores of civilian 
respirators for issue in case of war not every civilian would have been eligible to receive 
one. Plans had initially involved grading populations on the likelihood of attack and 
about seven million people (graded as D) would not have been issued respirators, 
however, by 1937 the Home Office decided that to delimit areas where no respirators 
would be provided was “politically impracticable.”53  
 During the interwar years research into respirators and other possible means of 
protection had been extensive. In 1928 an experiment intended to find a cheap means of 
gas protection by treating various textiles with common household items.54 Only thin 
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toweling and wool stockinette offered the right breathing resistance, but when treated 
with alcohol, glycerine, borax, common salt, vinegar, sugar, starch, soap, tea, or milk this 
improvised respirator offered little or no protection at all against phosgene.55 While some 
minimal protection against diluted phosgene was achieved through several layers of 
material treated with certain soaps, it was found that this solution had a caustic effect on 
the skin when worn.56 In the case of mustard gas only fatty or oily substances offered any 
protection.57 The report concluded that if a respirator were to be made entirely of 
household items it would require six strips of stockinette soaked in washing soda and six 
strips treated with melted butter or lard tied together and wrung out, with the butter layer 
worn against the skin. This could offer as many as thirty minutes of protection against 
phosgene and forty minutes against mustard, but the researchers suggested a much higher 
order of protection could be achieved through a simple charcoal respirator.58 
 Foreign inventions were consistently tested and evaluated at Porton Down. Early in 
1931 Porton collated information on civilian respirators in other European nations, but 
could only get detailed information and confirmation of masks provided to civilians from 
Russia.59 A Belgian respirator intended for the civil population, constructed from an old 
inner tube, was dismissed by researchers at Porton because despite its production clearly 
having been intended to keep cost low “this had been carried beyond the limit for which 
reasonable protection can be provided.”60 Foreign children’s respirators were of a 
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particular interest at Porton, who had yet to develop protection for British children. A 
Russian child’s mask tested was found to be of good gas tightness, but with a face piece 
so uncomfortable the mask was unwearable for long periods of time and Porton 
researchers concluded the design was not worthy of note.61 
 Finding a cheap, efficient civilian respirator capable of being mass produced was 
not easy. While other European governments were conscious of the gas threat, they 
balked at the cost of supplying free respirators to their populations and in most nations 
civilians were required to purchase available masks.62 Some researchers worried that the 
feature-obscuring properties of gas masks would prevent civilians from wearing them, 
suggesting that an effective civilian mask must therefore allow the wearer to be seen and 
recognized by friends and family.63 One official worried that if the government put out a 
design for a cheap respirator, rumors might arise that suggested that although a better 
mask could be produced it was impossible because the government was interfering with 
private manufacture.64 Additionally, there was concern that if a respirator was too cheap 
the public would think it was not as effective as a more expensive model.65 Porton 
eventually developed a design that largely met the requirements of cost, protection, and 
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fit, and began production of the model in 1936.66 The first fit tests of the new civilian 
mask followed soon after.67 
 As tensions rose in 1938 the government determined the danger was sufficient and 
began issuing their stock of respirators to the civil population. Civilians would go to one 
of several distribution centers in their area to be fitted with and receive their mask.68 
Some local authorities held fitting drives that would ask civilians to come to one of 
several fitting centers, try on the masks, and be issued with a color-coded card (yellow for 
large, blue for medium, red for small) they would hand in to be given a respirator during 
an emergency.69 In rural areas those who had been fitted previously were supplied with 
respirators in their own homes, while others went to distribution centers to be fitted and 
supplied.70 Another two and a half million respirators were sent to Norther Ireland, Egypt, 
Malta, and other parts of the British empire.71 After tensions eased and it became clear 
there would be no war the Home Office considered withdrawing the respirators it had just 
issued, but decided it was easier to leave them distributed and ensure civilians knew how 
to take care of their masks, instead.72 Boxes were to be delivered to local authorities for 
issue to civilians for the protection of their respirators and the Home Office instructed the 
wardens’ service to make a complete record of who had received a respirator and to 
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inspect the ones that had been issued.73 Experience had shown that the civilian respirator 
was “not a robust article” and significant wear and tear had occurred in the months since 
issue from civilians carrying their masks with them.74 The rush to issue respirators as 
tensions seemed to escalate also meant that masks were not always properly fitted for the 
person, requiring re-fitting and re-issue of respirators several years later.75 Less than a 
year after the September Crisis the Home Office found that initial estimates of 45 million 
needed respirators had been low and requested a total number of 60 million respirators 
for the 43 million British civilians over the age of four.76  
 The General Civilian Respirator (GCR) was the answer to the need for an 
affordable gas mask that offered complete protection from poison gas for a majority of 
the British population. Available in three sizes (small, medium, and large) the GCR 
consisted of a thin sheet-rubber face piece that covered eyes, nose, and mouth, a large 
cellulose acetate window, and a filter container attached directly to the mask near the chin 
by means of a rubber band. Webbing straps kept the mask in position on the head and 
allowed the wearer to tighten the respirator for a gas-tight fit.77 Initially the GCR cost two 
shillings, but minor improvements in design had raised the price to three shillings per unit 
by mid-1939.78 
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 Abnormal facial features could make it impossible to achieve a proper fit with the 
regular civilian mask. To provide a proper seal and offer gas protection the face piece of 
the respirator needed to lie flat against the wearer’s face. Achieving gas-tightness was 
often impossible for persons with abnormal facial features, such as hollow temples or 
cheeks or a narrow face and the MHS needed a simple, and cheap, solution to allow these 
civilians to wear the regular respirator. The solution was elongated, round pads of sponge 
and sheet rubber that were glued to the respirator face piece in the areas of the face where 
the seal could not be achieved.79 
 Much of the Home Office’s ARP education campaign revolved around the gas 
mask. Not only was the gas mask the most easily visible aspect of civil defense, but the 
high-cost program also represented the government’s attempt to protect its civilians. 
Public Information Leaflet No. 2, issued before the outbreak of war, specifically 
instructed civilians on the care and storage of their respirators, as well as urging them to 
practice donning and doffing the mask.80 Another pamphlet urged civilians to treat the 
respirator as “your best friend; know all about it.”81 One official worried that British 
civilians, unlike their German counterparts, were too untrained in gas discipline to ensure 
the proper working of the respirator during an attack, and urged the government to 
increase the education campaign through leaflets and broadcasts.82 Government radio 
broadcasts, given by officials of various departments, usually mentioned the need to carry 
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the respirator, to ensure a good fit, and how to care for it.83 Cinema trailers that discussed 
the respirator served as a visual reminder for the public.84 
 Instilling gas mask confidence in civilians was vital. Civilians needed not only to 
have confidence in the physical function of their respirators, but in the respirator 
program, and in turn the government, itself. Education campaigns ensured civilians knew 
how their masks worked and offered reassurances of the respirators’ efficacy, but doubts 
persisted. An unofficial test done by a newspaper dismissed the GCR as ineffective, 
forcing the Home Office to issue a statement that the GCR was well-tested and worked as 
advertised for brief periods of time in low concentrations of gas.85 ARP officials were 
often called on to reassure the public that their respirators would offer complete 
protection, particularly when rumors sometimes suggested otherwise.86 Newspapers 
played an important role in convincing the public of the efficacy of their respirators. An 
article in the Aberdeen Press and Journal reminded readers that gas was an effective 
weapon only against the unprepared and that they need not be victims as they had 
“dependable” gas masks.87 Another newspaper urged its readers to hold a weekly family 
gas mask drill to instill confidence in using the mask among all members of the 
household.88 Others reported on the confidence gained in the respirators by civilians 
going through tear gas chambers, suggesting to their readers that the masks could be 
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trusted.89 One official, however, cautioned the Times not to oversell the protective 
qualities of the mask, particularly in light of Herbert Morrison’s broadcast claim that the 
GCR offered “complete protection against every form of war gas,” as this could prove 
problematic in the event of a gas attack.90 “The civilian gasmask,” he wrote, “is not a 
talisman, and its powers are limited as its name denotes […],” urging that while civilians 
train with their masks and carry them, they nevertheless needed to comprehend its limits 
and take other protective measures in the event of an attack.91 
 A vital aspect of respirator training involved putting the public through gas 
chambers where they could directly experience the efficacy of their own respirator 
against tear gas. Home Office officials suggested that gas chamber training worked to get 
the public “gas-minded” and to allow them to gain confidence in their masks.92 Gas 
chamber training was not mandatory and the percentage of civilians taking part differed 
greatly in each locality. In Gateshead local officials sent 50% of the population through 
the chamber, in part to combat press rumors that a large percentage of gas masks were 
faulty.93 One regional officer boasted that anti-gas propaganda had sent thousands of 
persons through his gas chambers to test the fit of their masks.94 In Kingston-on-Thames 
local officials set up a gas chamber because many of their civilians were dubious about 
their masks and while many people arrived rather nervous at the test, after going through 
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the chamber they left “with a store of confidence.”95 Such gas chamber tests were vital 
not only to instill confidence in the public that their masks could actually protect them, 
but also served to prove the government’s claim that the respirators were effective and 
that it was doing everything possible to protect its civil population.  
 To be of use in a gas attack the respirator needed to be donned swiftly and civilians 
were instructed consistently to always carry their masks. Rumors of the Germans 
planning to use gas in mid-1940 made the need to carry masks appear more urgent and 
Winston Churchill instructed that civilians be “enjoined to use [their respirators] and 
carry them everywhere.”96 Difficulty of enforcement, however, prevented any order to 
carry respirators from being compulsory.97 It was also considered to bar anyone without a 
respirator from places of entertainment, but the cinema industry were strongly opposed to 
this on grounds of possible loss of custom.98 Some cinemas, however, did bar entry to 
patrons without masks, usherettes checking each person carried their respirator before 
admittance.99 Other venues, such as dance and concert halls, followed.100 The members of 
both Houses of Parliament were asked to set an example for their constituencies by 
regularly carrying their masks.101 Government departments were instructed to ensure that 
all civil servants carried their respirators and civil defense workers were similarly asked 
                                                        
95 “These Gas Mask Tests are Popular,” North-eastern Gazette, September 28, 1939. 
96 TNA: CAB 120/777, Winston Churchill to General Ismay, July 23, 1940. 
97 TNA: HO 186/2098, Home Defence Executive, Notes of Meeting, July 25, 1941, 1. 
98 ibid. 
99 “Humour in Crime Story, Bogart as Conceited Gangster,” Derby Daily Telegraph, September 19, 1939. 
100 “Dancing, Ritz,” Manchester Evening News, September 20, 1939; “Dancing, Monday 20th, in the co-
operative hall, Hartlepool,” Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, November 17, 1939. 
101 TNA: HO 186/2098, Note on Publicity Following on the Minister’s Statement in the House on 27th 
March, 1941, 1. 
 
 180 
to set a good example in their carrying practices.102 A column to be published in the 
morning papers made the claim that most people were complying with the carry 
instructions and that the sight of the mask carrier had become so commonplace that to 
meet someone without it immediately made one wonder what was wrong with his 
appearance. The column also, however, urged civilians to keep carrying their masks.103 
The Illustrated London News depicted the Queen as cheerful despite troubled times, 
pointing out specifically that she was carrying her gas mask in a satchel.104 Newspaper 
articles continued to remind civilians to carry their masks, sometimes even going beyond 
what the Home Office had envisioned. The Manchester Evening Chronicle drew the ire 
of some officials when it called for drastic measures against those caught not carrying 
their masks, particularly when local businesses and cinemas refused to admit people 
without at the behest of the paper.105 While propaganda and education campaigns led to 
increases in civilians carrying their masks, but officials felt that the number of the public 
doing so was still unsatisfactory.106 Women were often a special focus of the carry 
campaign, as officials feared that during a gas attack a man would give up his mask to a 
woman who was not carrying hers.107 Tear gas exercises being held in the streets were 
thought to increase the number of civilians carrying their respirators.108 One such 
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exercise in Birmingham, however, found that while most civilians carried their masks the 
day of the exercise, having been forewarned of the need in the papers, the day after the 
exercise few Birmingham citizens were observed carrying their respirators.109 Tear gas 
tests held without warning caused a number of citizens to suffer “inconvenience and 
discomfort” and incurred “a good deal of odium” for the government department in 
charge.110 
 Despite being urged to carry their masks everywhere at the start of the war, many 
civilians did not comply. An inspector from Porton was dismayed at the indifference of 
the average Londoner to respirators and anti-gas measures.111 At a brewery he found no 
more than five workers out of 300 carrying their respirators, although among the office 
staff 85% had their masks with them.112 The same pattern repeated at other workplaces, 
with the laborers failing to bring their respirators and office staff largely complying with 
the carry instructions.113 Many asked the inspector why the government had not made it 
compulsory to carry masks, and the suggestion was made that entry to entertainment or 
public transport should be barred for anyone without a respirator.114 The general public 
apathy in regard to gas masks led the Home Office to consider altering the guidelines as 
early as 1940, although officially the guidelines were not to be relaxed, only the wording 
altered.115 Civilians were now instructed to not leave their respirators where they could 
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not reach it on short notice, however, this was vague enough to cause confusion.116 One 
London hospital complained that a large number of patients admitted had come without 
their respirators, the majority of them juveniles.117 The hospital blamed the parents, who 
often refused to send the child’s respirator even after being asked to do so.118 By 1942, 
however, rubber shortages made the repair or replacement of damaged masks 
prohibitively expensive or near impossible and the Home Office decided to relax carrying 
guidelines to save respirators from damage.119 The government expected to have some 
hours notice if a gas attack came and instructed civilians that they would warn them 
publicly if such an attack was imminent and the public needed to carry their masks with 
them.120 One leaflet now instructed readers to always take the respirator when leaving 
home overnight or entering a dangerous area.121 Relaxing carrying guidelines not only 
saved respirators from damage, but also made the very obvious defiance of government 
instructions less visible or a non-issue entirely.  
 Inspectors consistently encountered respirator complacency and apathy during their 
duties. Not every civilian was eager to have his respirator inspected and some officials 
considered an Order that would require civilians to bring their masks to a predetermined 
place in each locality to be inspected, and if they did not comply a warden would visit 
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their residence to carry out the inspection.122 The Home Office, however, was reluctant to 
officially compel inspection, as they did not believe local authorities would wish to 
enforce such an order through prosecution.123 One official considered inspecting workers’ 
respirators at the factories where they were employed, but quickly dropped the idea 
because he did not want to be accused of interfering with production.124 When produced 
for inspection some respirators, although in working condition, were found to be dirty 
and full of dust.125 One respirator carton was found to have a mouse nest inside.126 Some 
civilians mislaid their respirators at department stores, buses, trains, and eateries.127 One 
newspaper article claimed that seventy gas masks were brought into lost property offices 
daily in London, with no one bothering to claim them.128 In Hull a large number of 
civilian masks were recovered from municipal refuge dumps.129 One official worried that 
a first gas attack would catch many members of the public without respirators and even 
those who did carry or keep them nearby would find them faulty as a result of neglect.130 
The resulting loss of confidence in the respirator and public panic was the primary 
concern.131 
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 The GCR was also easy to damage. In February 1939, just a few months after the 
GCRs were issued, a house-to-house inspection in Islington revealed 11% of the 
respirators required replacement due to damage.132 A 1941 inspection of respirators in 
Region 6 found between 5% to 10% of gas masks damaged beyond the local ability to 
repair them, while numbers of those who had simply lost their respirators were generally 
negligible.133 One regional officer complained that it seemed those who obeyed 
instructions and carried their masks had damaged respirators and that the masks “of the 
unconscientious only are in good order.”134 Inspectors often blamed unofficial containers, 
usually those of a tin variety, causing the majority of damage, such as cracking of the 
eyepieces and breaking down of the rubber.135 The metal containers allowed the 
respirator to move about, which caused damage through jostling and chafing, while soft 
containers allowed respirators to be crushed and often led to the face piece being folded 
incorrectly.136 The majority of the damage of inspected respirators consisted of small 
holes in the face piece, cracked eyepieces, or worn-through rubber parts.137 Others were 
damaged by dampness, had dented filter containers, or were missing their rubber bands or 
inlet valves.138 Within months of issuing the GCR to all civilians, the CDRD were already 
investigating a more durable type of civilian respirator, which ultimately became the 
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Mark II GCR.139 Some respirators were damaged or destroyed as a result of air raids and 
the Home Office instructed local authorities to ensure those persons could have their 
respirators replaced or repaired immediately, even on a Sunday, at no charge.140 Those 
civilians who had damaged masks not due to air raids were charged one shilling and 
sixpence to repair a damaged face piece and one shilling to repair a broken container.141 
 Complaints about the gas mask were widespread. After the distribution of Public 
Information Leaflet No. 2 some civilians complained that the pamphlet instructed them to 
care for a mask they had yet to receive.142 The people of Cheltenham experienced “great 
anxiety” at the delay of their gas mask issue in mid-1939, arguing that they would have 
been helpless should an air attack have come.143 One lawyer criticized the lack of 
instruction right before the school holidays on whether or not to bring respirators along 
on family travels.144 Some civilians thought the mask was rather flimsy.145 Many people 
who tried on the respirator felt claustrophobic and feared suffocation, tearing it off 
anxiously after only a few minutes.146 Women or girls with long or thick hair sometimes 
were unable to achieve a gas-tight fit, because the hair raised the gas mask too far off the 
face.147 The filter container, attached to the bottom of the mask, was relatively heavy, 
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straining the neck muscles and forcing the mask and head down among some of the 
population.148 One of the biggest concerns among some members of the public was that 
spectacles could not be worn with the respirator, as it would undermine gas-tightness and 
many worried about being able to see while wearing the mask.149 The design of the mask 
also regularly caused the face piece to mist up with condensation, sometimes making 
vision near impossible.150 
 Despite some public apathy in regard to the respirator, the gas mask nevertheless 
became concomitant with life in wartime Britain. It served as a physical reminder of both 
the dangers of war and the duties of each citizen in civil defense, as well as the 
government’s effort to protect its population. While early fitting tests discovered several 
issues, officials nevertheless concluded that they instilled confidence in civilians by 
“making them aware that efficient measures are being taken to provide for their safety 
[…].”151 Such fitting tests that allowed civilians to interact with the respirator also 
stimulated public interest in ARP.152 As such a symbol the gas mask featured particularly 
in imagery that directly associated it with civil defense efforts and protection. Civilians 
were often depicted being fitted for gas masks, such images working to both remind the 
viewer of the threat of gas and his or her own duties in being prepared.153 Civil defense 
workers were shown practicing for emergencies or carrying out their duties in gas 
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masks.154 Children, too, absorbed the gas mask into their everyday lives; even before the 
outbreak of war British toymakers began offering a variety of military-themed toys, 
including a toy gas mask that sold for sixpence.155 The civilian gas mask was enough of a 
symbol of the British government that members of the IRA burned scores of respirators in 
Belfast.156 
 The gas mask also featured in more humorous ways that clearly showcase its 
adoption as a necessary part of wartime living. One town held a civilian gas mask dance 
competition, with a prize going to the person able to keep their mask on the longest.157 
Gas mask races were also popular, such as one event that had participants racing in masks 
and hoods they were then asked to remove mid-way before returning to the start.158 At the 
Plymouth Greyhound Stadium a hound named “Gas Mask” participated in a race.159 The 
gas mask was also commemorated in popular music, with songs such as “My Wee Gas 
Mask” and “I Did What I Could With My Gas Mask” entertaining crowds with lyrics that 
used the respirator in non-approved, but humorous, ways.160 
 While developing a cheap and functional civilian respirator had not been easy, 
finding a way to protect small children was an even bigger concern.  In the 1930s Porton 
Down was working on developing a mask for adults, but no protection as of yet existed 
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for children and babies. This issue was concerning enough that Parliament specifically 
asked for solutions to protect young people and infants against gas.161 Young children had 
smaller faces, often making it impossible to achieve a proper fit with a normal-sized 
respirator. Their smaller lungs could also make it more difficult to draw or expel breath 
through the mask. Additionally, the gas mask was uncomfortable enough for adults who 
could be persuaded to wear them for their own safety, but young children were likely to 
tear off their respirators or become frightened by them. The British Small Child’s 
Respirator was developed specifically to address most of these concerns. 
 It was designed to fit small faces and to be worn safely by young children. Since 
children breathe less air than an adult, the container attached to the child’s respirator was 
smaller and of a lighter weight than that of the GCR.162 The cone-shaped type face piece 
of the GCR did not properly fit children’s faces and a more form-fitting face piece was 
necessary to ensure airtightness on a child’s face.163 Its facepiece was made of a 
lightweight, non-irritating, and soft rubber that would easily conform to the shape of the 
child’s face.164 The head harness was specifically designed for small children, providing a 
good fit without pulling too tightly and making it difficult for the child to remove the 
mask himself.165 The special construction of the mask also meant that its cost was more 
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than that of the GCR, costing as much as five shillings to produce in 1938.166 By 1943 a 
lost children’s gas mask cost three shillings and six pence to replace.167 
 It was important that a child’s respirator not be frightening. Some thought it very 
likely that children would become terrified at the sight of the “strange and rather awful 
looking piece of equipment.”168 The Small Child’s Respirator was made of colorful red 
rubber, two large eyepieces, red imitation nose, and blue filter. The soft but lightweight 
face piece and hard-to-remove harness made it ideal for small faces, while the 
“attractive” coloring was intended to entice children to wear it.169 Its unique coloring and 
makeup gave the mask the nickname Mickey Mouse gas mask.170 Not everyone agreed 
that the mask succeeded in being non-frightening to children. One mother at a trial of the 
mask wrote that despite belief that the color would attract a child, the bright color, two 
eyes, and nose actually made it more frightening than the adult mask to an older baby just 
beginning to recognize features.171 
  While the mask overcame the basic physiological problem of protection small 
children, psychological issues persisted. The Mickey Mouse mask was intended for 
young children who were not always obedient enough to wear a respirator without 
attempting to remove it and were too young to understand its purpose. It was likely that at 
some point a child would become tired of wearing the respirator and attempt to remove it, 
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requiring either constant adult supervision or some form of restraint for the arms.172 
While the mask was designed specifically to make it difficult for a child to remove, a 
child’s struggles could still displace the mask enough to leak and allow gas to enter.173 
Fitting trials found that the Mickey Mouse mask ought to be issued more as a matter of 
psychology than physiology, finding that it was near impossible to protect very young 
children determined to resist.174 Some resistant children were strapped into their masks 
by two adults using “sheer force” and, unsurprisingly, the researchers found these 
children became hysterical and unable to tolerate the mask.175 The trials also found that 
children who had at some point previously been given a general anesthetic for surgery 
regarded the wearing of the respirator with terror.176 
 These issues made it vital that parents accustom their children to the wearing of the 
mask. Government instructions suggested introducing the mask to young children “in the 
manner which is most likely to win their interest and collaboration in wearing it.”177 The 
best option was considered to be introducing the mask as a play object and to introduce it 
to a group of children at once.178 Even nervous children, it was suggested, could be 
inspired to don the respirator when seeing other children wearing it with confidence.179 
Children who failed to tolerate the Mickey Mouse respirator or became unduly frightened 
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while wearing it would need to be issued a Baby’s Anti-Gas Helmet, instead, although 
parents were urged to remove the child’s fear through persuasion.180 One parent crafted 
toy gas masks for each of her child’s dolls and teddy bears to accustom the child to the 
sight and idea of a respirator.181 
 The Mickey Mouse gas mask and the GCR provided protection for all British 
children over two years of age. The Mickey Mouse mask protected younger children, 
with smaller faces and less-developed lungs. Children as young as five could also be fit 
with the GCR. The three sizes of the GCR allowed it to fit a variety of faces and almost 
all British schoolchildren were issued a GCR for protection.182 The rapid growth of 
children, however, meant that a mask that was fitted properly one year might no longer 
afford efficient protection a year later. Teachers inspecting their students’ masks, often in 
the case of evacuated children, found many had outgrown their respirators and asked 
local authorities to fit the children with new masks.183  Children, however, were the 
biggest perpetrators of respirator wear and tear. Schoolchildren were mandated to carry 
their respirators to school and regularly had them inspected in class.184 Children were 
thus the only part of the population to regularly and consistently carry their respirators 
with them, causing damage to the masks at a higher rate than the rest of the civil 
population. In Oxfordshire a respirator inspection found around 5% damaged beyond 
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local repair, nearly every case one of a schoolchild.185 In Feltham an inspection 
discovered that 75% of schoolchildren had defective masks.186 The masks of 
schoolchildren often showed cracks in the eyepieces and perforation of the rubber face 
pieces, generally caused by normal wear and tear on the carton.187 Many masks were 
worn through where the rubber joined the mouthpiece through the constant movement of 
the mask against its container.188 Weather conditions sometimes exacerbated the wear on 
both carton and respirator.189 Some children carried their masks in metal containers 
instead of the cardboard box, which easily led to damage of the glass eyepieces.190 The 
Home Office also considered a national campaign to stop the use of soft carrier, 
especially among children, which they blamed for the majority of the damage done to 
respirators.191 Evacuation was a significant contributor to respirator damage. The LCC 
instructed its Head Teachers to inspect the masks of evacuated children and to make 
enquiries about the location of masks that may have been lost.192 
 Not all damage done to respirators was due to wear and tear, however, and there 
were consistent complaints from wardens and other inspectors about children’s treatment 
of their masks. One warden complained that the children did not at all care about their 
respirators, even kicking them about as footballs.193 One child had painted his gas mask a 
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vivid red in order to play “red Indians.”194 In Bradford two groups of children in their 
newly-issued respirators staged mock battles across parallel park trenches.195 Other 
children were playing conkers with their masks, a game that involved holding the carrier 
by its string while another child would attempt to hit the carrier with his own.196 One 
alderman was disgusted at seeing children playing soldier at night in the streets wearing 
their masks.197 Subsequently some local areas simply stopped inspecting children’s 
respirators on account of the shortage of spares and the impossibility of replacing the 
damaged masks.198  
 Evacuated children and their gas masks were a consistent problem for authorities. 
Children in reception areas, after the long travel or as a result of living in close quarters 
with many other children, often had broken, lost, or ill-fitted masks that required repair or 
replacement. Local authorities in the reception areas did not always feel responsible for 
the gas masks of non-local children.199 In some cases the local authority was unable to 
supply respirators to evacuated children because of low stock, as respirators had initially 
been supplied by the Home Office based on local population.200 One teacher in the 
Infants Department applied locally three times to have the broken mask of an evacuated 
child fixed, but was told the child would have to return to London for a new mask.201 The 
headmistress of a London girls’ school, finding several girls in need of bigger masks, 
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worried that if she sent them back to London to be fitted they would not return.202 Even 
when local authorities agreed to help, the solution was not always easy. A teacher of a 
London infants’ school found that the local ARP center in the reception area was only 
willing to repair masks for the price of 1 shilling and sixpence, which neither the school 
or foster parents could be expected to pay.203 Some schools paid the money for gas mask 
repairs and then sought to recover the cost from the child’s parents in London, but one 
school official worried about those parents who would be unable to pay.204 
 Fitting a respirator to a small child had been problematic, but protecting babies 
from poison gas presented an almost impossible problem. Babies under two years of age 
were too small, and too unwilling, to wear any type of mask on their faces at all. Their 
lungs were too underdeveloped to be able to draw breath through a gas mask filter. In the 
years leading up to war Porton Down, the MHS, and the War Office conducted extensive 
research and experiments to find the most effective and affordable means of protecting 
babies from gas. The Baby’s Anti-Gas Helmet was an imperfect solution that nevertheless 
offered full poison gas protection to the most vulnerable members of the population. 
 Researchers tested many different concepts of gas protection for babies. One 
suggestion for reducing the concentration of gas that would reach a baby was to wrap the 
infant completely in a blanket, overcoat, or waterproof, although it was admitted that this 
would not offer effective protection.205 A Belgian baby protection device was found to be 
inadequate, as it required an adult to wear a mask attached to a tray and bag combination 
that the baby would be inserted in, with the adult drawing breath through a filter for both 
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of them.206 Not only was the air flow not enough, but such a setup would prevent the 
adult from handing the baby off in an emergency.207 A baby bag invented by Messrs. 
Jenkins and Banners was found unsatisfactory because two hands were needed to operate 
the bellows, the pressure of pumping was imposed on the infant’s stomach, and the 
arrangement of the bellows was unsound.208 A different baby bag sought to have the baby 
supply its own air through a mechanism that would operate the bellows when the infant 
kicked.209 Ideas also included a gas-proof bed, which offered humidity control.210 Gas-
proof perambulator designs were considered inferior protection because it would require 
the purchase of a special perambulator and enclosed the child completely without a 
means to draw air inside.211 By the end of 1938 researchers determined that gas 
protection for babies would likely have to be a device which did not fit against the face 
like a gas mask, but enveloped the baby’s head or body in an airtight manner.212 The main 
requirements for such a device were its efficacy in protection, portability that would 
allow the baby to be passed off, a minimum of discomfort for the baby, and that it be 
acceptable to mothers.213 
 The Baby Anti-Gas Helmet (initially called the Protective Helmet Design) 
overcame the major issues of protecting babies. This design was developed because it 
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met all of the requirements and early trials showed it to be a “workable” design.214 After 
positive early trials in October 1938 the Home Office adopted the baby helmet as its 
design and began production.215 It consisted of a bag-like device of rubberized fabric that 
covered the baby completely from the waist up, a large cellulose acetate window to allow 
the infant to look out, a string around the opening to close the bag tight, and an external 
air pump that had to be operated by an adult.216 The hood was surrounded by and 
fastened to a light metal frame, lengthened on the underside and with an adjustable 
tailpiece to provide support and protection for the baby’s back.217 The underside of the 
bag was padded, although this could be removed since it was likely to be soiled by the 
baby, and mothers were encouraged to provide some type of washable padding or cover 
instead.218 The rubber bellows attached to the hood and, when operated, would draw air 
through a container that filtered all poison gas.219 The air would then pass through a 
specially shaped orifice that directed the air away from the baby’s head. A slow and 
steady rate of pumping at about 40 strokes per minute was enough to supply even an  
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older child with air and pumping could be stopped for several minutes if necessary.220 At 
trials it was found that an unassisted mother could insert her child into the helmet in an 
average time of about thirty seconds.221 
 Despite the helmet being the best solution for babies there were lingering concerns. 
Inserting the infant into the helmet was not always easy or quick and some worried that 
the hurried insertion during an air raid alarm would upset and terrify the child. The 
resulting screaming and struggling infant fighting the helmet was “most undesirable.”222 
Others recognized a potentially fatal flaw in the design for older children: if the child ran 
away from the adult in charge of the air pump the air would stop and the child could 
suffocate.223 During trials a four-year-old struggled determinedly when the mother tried 
to put her into the helmet, running away and attempting to escape out the door before the 
mother, instructed to imagine gas was entering the room, succeeded in inserting her into 
the helmet.224 The manpower required to supply air to the enclosed infants was a 
particular concern in hospitals and nurseries. One maternity hospital worried that 
although they had plenty of anti-gas helmets for the babies that in a crisis there would not 
be enough people to operate the pumps of each individual baby helmet.225 It was near 
impossible to safely feed the enclosed child and thus lengthy periods under a gas alarm 
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could easily led to hungry, crying infants.226 Cost was also a considerable issue. At a price 
of nearly £2 the Home Office and local authorities kept tight control of the baby’s helmet. 
 There were many suggestions on how to ensure a calm and compliant baby inside 
the helmet. One couple wrote to the MHS to offer suggestions, pointing out that they had 
acclimated their newborn son to his helmet by inserting him into it regularly and that 
there was no fear of the helmet on the part of newborn babies.227 They also argued that 
although the baby could see its mother through the window of the helmet, the mother 
would be wearing a feature-obscuring gas mask, as well, and suggested she regularly 
wear a bright article, such as a turban, while feeding the child that she could also wear 
with her gas mask to allow the baby to recognize her.228 A government memorandum 
suggested that most children took quite well to the helmet and many even went to sleep 
once inside.229 A rebellious, older child, the memo continued, could be quickly placed 
inside the helmet by an adult despite its resistance and, once inside, “such children 
usually cease to resist and appear contented.”230 
 At the start of the Munich Crisis there were no supplies of any type of protection 
for babies or children too young to wear the GCR.  A temporary solution was to provide 
children over two with the regular small size civilian respirator and to tighten the top of 
the face piece back over the head to make the mask fit closely on the cheeks.231 While 
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this would mean the eyepieces did not line up with the child’s eyes and impair visibility, 
parents were assured that the safety of the respirator would not be affected.232 While 
children over two could be partially accommodated with regular civilian masks, infants 
who had not yet been issued a baby helmet had no such options. It was suggested instead 
to prepare a gas-proof refuge in the house, through covering doors and windows with 
blankets and stuffing cracks with newspaper, and in case of an air raid warning to also 
place the baby inside a washtub or drawer, which could be covered with a blanket in case 
of a gas attack.233 This airtight and unventilated blanket-covered receptacle would offer 
gas protection for a few minutes and allow an adult to remove the child to a safe 
atmosphere.234 By mid-1939 limited supplies of both the baby helmet and the child’s gas 
mask became available, but local authorities planned to keep the masks in stock until an 
emergency arose.235 Production was still lagging behind need, however, and one 
suggestion was to use the Baby Anti-Gas Helmet, the production of which was ahead of 
the Mickey Mouse mask, for children over two but too small to wear a GCR 
effectively.236 Similar to the procedure adopted for the GCR, parents in some districts 
were asked to bring their infants into a center for fitting. In the City of Westminster 
wardens and other volunteers staffed five fitting centers for eight hours a day during one 
week in August 1939 to fit babies for the anti-gas helmet.237 
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 Once war broke out in September 1939 authorities were quick to issue protection 
for children and babies. The Secretary of State ordered that baby helmets be issued on 
September 7th, 1939 from distributing centers in the local authority.238 Supplies were still 
extremely limited and no protective helmet was to be issued to a child over two.239 By 
October all supplies of protective helmets and Mickey Mouse masks had been distributed 
already and the Home Office was only able to supply local authorities with around 40 to 
50% of their estimated requirements.240 The Home Office instructed the local authorities 
to issue the Mickey Mouse mask only to children who were under three and too big to 
wear the protective helmet.241 
 The General Civilian Respirator, the Small Child’s Respirator, and the Baby Anti-
Gas Helmet offered sufficient protection from poison gas for the vast majority of the 
British civil population. Some elements of the civil population, however, could not be 
fitted with regular respirators and, although this group represented a relatively small 
number, the government sought to find means of protection for those who fell outside the 
norm. Additionally, while the civilian respirator offered gas protection for someone 
quickly fleeing the scene of an attack, those civil defense volunteers who would be 
exposed to gas for longer periods of time in the pursuit of their duties required more 
sophisticated equipment. Volunteers of the civil defense services were issued either the 
Civilian Duty Respirator or the Service Respirator, depending on their specific duty. 
 Civilians with medical conditions often had difficulty using the regular gas mask. 
The General Civilian Respirator lacked an outlet valve and air passed out between the 
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edges of the face piece and the wearer’s face.242 This significantly increased the effort 
required to exhale and making it unusable for persons with respirator difficulties.243 The 
MHS found that the cheapest solution was simply adding an outlet valve to the existing 
respirator face pieces for people with asthma, fibrosis, tuberculosis, cardiac disease, old 
age, or obesity, who could produce a medical certificate signed by a doctor specifying 
that they required this special addition.244 The outlet valve added six pence to the cost of 
the General Civilian Respirator.245 A special helmet-type mask was developed 
specifically for persons completely unable to wear a conventional respirator and was 
intended for disabilities such as tracheotomy cases, facial deformity, extreme dyspnea or 
cardiac disease, tuberculosis, and head wounds with bandages.246 This helmet, similar to 
the Baby’s Anti-Gas Helmet, included bellows to provide filtered air to the wearer.247 
Supplies of this helmet were primarily intended for hospitals, with some issued to persons 
who could produce a medical certificate, as the price, over £1, was significantly more  
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than the regular civilian respirator.248 Despite the extra cost the MHS and Treasury 
Department decided to issue these special masks free of charge, arguing that persons 
required these adaptations through no fault of their own and often as a result of war 
wounds.249 
 The volunteers of the civil defense services also required special respirators to 
properly allow them to perform their duties. Initially called the Special Service 
Respirator, this mask was intended for personnel who would be asked to perform their 
normal duties in the presence of gas, but were not likely to be continuously exposed to 
higher concentrations.250 While similar to the Service Respirator, this gas mask was 
modified to simplify production and reduce cost.251 It consisted of a rubber face piece 
with a cylindrical container filter directly attached to the mask, two valves to facilitate 
breathing, and strong glass eyepieces.252 It was available in two sizes, “Normal” to fit 
most men and some women, and “Small,” intended for most women and adolescents.253 
The rubber face piece allowed the respirator to be boiled in hot water for decontamination 
purposes, which was a vital property if a gas attack had occurred to ensure a sufficient 
supply of respirators and to save cost.254 Some special face pieces were also made to 
allow the attachment of microphones, especially intended for telephone operators whose 
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speech was too distorted by the normal CDR to be heard.255 The Civilian Duty Respirator 
filter offered significantly improved protection, filtering, for instance, mustard gas at 
average concentrations for one week at six hours of use per day.256 Against phosgene in 
high concentrations, however, the CDR offered only five minutes of protection, although, 
since phosgene was expected to dissipate in five to ten minutes, this was not considered a 
problem.257 The cost, if produced by the government, was around six shillings.258 In mid-
1939 estimates for numbers of CDRs needed was over 1.3 million, with nearly half of 
that intended just for air raid wardens.259 A year later the number needed for local 
authorities and civil defense had increased to over 2.3 million.260 The CDR was issued to 
all civil defense workers who might be exposed to gas during the carrying out of their 
duties and who would need to be able to continue working even during a gas attack. This 
generally meant almost every civil defense worker was issued a CDR, particularly 
wardens, ambulance drivers, FAP staffs, Report Center staffs, stretcher bearers, and 
messengers.261 
 Some select civil defense workers received the Service Respirator. This gas mask, 
issued to the British armed forces, offered the best protection against poison gas. The 
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complete Service Respirator was made up of hand-moulded khaki-covered rubber face 
piece, two non-splinterable eyepieces, outlet valve, and adjustable head harness, anti-dim 
outfit, container, and haversack.262 The respirator weighed a total of about four pounds, 
and weight reduction was one of the primary requests in the re-design of the mask.263 The 
container of the Service mask was worn on the chest and connected to the face piece 
through a corrugated rubber tube, making the mask itself lighter to wear.264 It was also 
fitted with a double face piece so arranged that the intake of air passed between the two 
layers and across the eyepieces, keeping the eyepieces from fogging up.265 Its filter 
provided “an almost indefinite period” of protection against mustard gas and as long as 
forty minutes of protection against phosgene in a high concentration, significantly better 
than that offered by the CDR.266 The most expensive of all of the masks, the Service 
Respirator cost 18 shillings, six times as much as the GCR.267 This respirator was 
intended for those civil defense workers who might need to perform work in high 
concentrations of gas, such as firefighters and decontamination squads.268 
 Even the more sophisticated and expensive Service and Civilian Duty respirators 
were not free from problems and complaints. Requests for a means to automatically 
remove condensed moisture from the CDR face piece were not met and wearers were 
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instead instructed to follow the official method of bending forward to allow accumulated 
moisture to pass out through the outlet valve.269 On the Civilian Duty Respirator the 
rubber rib between the eye pieces pressed on the nose and sometimes caused significant 
discomfort.270 The head harness sometimes slipped from position, undermining gas 
tightness.271 In early trials, the Duty Respirator significantly interfered with speech, 
which was especially noticeable by telephonists.272 Like with the Service Respirator, the 
Duty Respirator had a problem with condensation. In early trials water collected quickly 
inside the face piece and eventually ran down the outside of the wearer’s neck and throat, 
a considerable concern especially in cold weather.273 Constables on the Isle of Wight 
complained that the anti-dim compound on the eyepieces was faulty at night and lasted 
for no more than thirty minutes, finding that a raw potato smeared on the eyepieces 
instead was far more effective.274 Unlike the General Civilian Respirator, however, the 
two special respirators did allow for the wearing of spectacles through the use of special 
frames that could fit under the face piece of the gas mask without undermining gas-
tightness.275 While the numbers of the CDR lagged behind expectation, production was 
especially behind in the case of haversacks to carry the respirator.276 
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 Despite these issues the CDR was a superior respirator to the GCR and civilians 
consistently tried to argue they needed it for the performance of their duties. The British 
Medical Association pressed the Home Office for an issue of CDRs to doctors on the 
ground on the basis that doctors may need to attend patients during an air raid.277 The 
Home Office agreed on the basis of the doctors paying cost price for the CDR.278 
Members of the clergy, who often ministered to the injured and dying during air raids, 
also requested better equipment from the government, some complaining that equipment 
was being issued to “all and sundry,” except the clergy who performed such a vital 
service.279 The Home Office eventually gave permission for clergy to purchase CDRs for 
those members specifically detailed by their church to aid casualties in the streets, at a 
price of seven shillings and six pence per respirator.280 In some locations superior gas 
masks were simply stolen, as was the case in Newcastle where Service Respirators were 
taken from soldiers and depots and the local newspaper had to remind civilians that if 
they carried such a respirator in the street they would be stopped by police to be 
questioned.281 
 The British government’s gas mask program was one of the most comprehensive 
anti-gas protection measures in the world at the time. Every British man, woman, and 
child, whether or not they carried or cared about their masks, were issued with a free 
respirator that would serve as the primary protection in the case of a gas attack. The 
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costly program was both a response to an anticipated gas attack that would wreak havoc 
on an unprotected population and the government’s effort to forestall panic and revolt if 
masks were not available or only available to the rich. The gas mask also served as a 
visible reminder to the civil population of both the very threat of war and a possible gas 
attack, as well as a symbol of the government’s effort to protect its civilians. While the 
overall response to the gas mask program and government instructions thereof were often 
underwhelming, the gas mask nevertheless was a potent symbol of the war and civil 
defense. 
 208 
Chapter 6 - “The Modern Troglodyte:” Sheltering Civilians from Air Raids 
 
 
 The damage that could be caused by aerial raids became apparent during the course 
of WWI, and it was clear to government officials and researchers that future raids with 
high-explosive (HE) or gas bombs would devastate the civilian population. The 
experience of soldiers on the Western Front had shown the usefulness of burrowing into 
the ground for protection and this concept influenced the development of shelter 
programs for the British civil population in the interwar period and leading up to WWII. 
While the limited raids on Britain during WWI did not necessitate the creation of special 
shelters, the expected intensity of future raids required that the government develop a 
shelter program to protect its civil population from bombs. In WWII this shelter program 
comprised an extensive collection of various types of shelters that sought to protect the 
vast majority of the British population. Ranging from structures for individual protection 
to communal deep shelters, the British air raid shelter program was a successful and vital 
aspect of civil defense that ensured the protection of civilian lives and the preservation of 
morale. 
 In WWI, there were generally no shelters made available by the government, and 
civilians improvised so as to find protection from air raids. The government’s official 
instructions told civilians to seek shelter in their homes, but many people in poorer 
neighborhoods, particularly the worst-hit East End, sought better shelter elsewhere.1 The 
most obvious place to shelter for most was London’s Underground Railway, or the tube. 
After one false warning in 1917, people thronged the staircases and platforms to the point 
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where movement was almost impossible and railway staff were unable to cope.2 
Realizing it was impossible to keep shelterers out of their 90 stations, the railway 
company made arrangements with police to assist in regulating the incoming crowds.3 So 
many people massed in the stairwells and on the platforms that it often impeded regular 
tube travel and conditions became deplorable, with many individuals and families 
camping in the stations all night.4 At Shildon, in the county of Durham, a colliery drift 
was used as shelter by women and children, but conditions were considered to be too 
unsafe to allow the drift to remain open.5 
 In London, the primary target of raids, officials arranged for some protection. 
Police stations and government departments were allowed to be used as shelters by the 
public, with a placard exhibited outside reading “Air Raid Shelter” upon the issue of a 
warning.6 While not bombproof, these shelters would provide protection from splinters 
and flying glass. These arrangements could accommodate around 900,000 people, but 
this still left many Londoners, particularly those in poorer districts, without shelter.7 A 
special committee sought to find other possibilities for shelter and considered providing 
dugouts in the parks, but as these were thought to provide no better protection than the 
average house the idea was dismissed.8 The LCC instructed its schools to prepare plans 
of action in case of an air raid. Children were to be kept indoors and away from the 
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windows.9 Under no circumstances was more than one department to be kept on one 
floor, to prevent mass casualties should a hit occur.10 Issues arose when some parents, 
alerted by nearby warning sirens or police patrol, attempted to force their way into the 
school to remove their children before a raid and the London Education Department 
asked the police for help in keeping order outside of its schools.11 
 The damage to infrastructure and loss of life had been relatively limited in WWI 
raids, but it was clear that future raids with improved technologies would have a much 
more devastating effect. While in the interwar period the CID sought to find ways to 
protect civilians from poison gas, they were also asked to answer questions on how to 
protect the population from bombs. Various commissions sought the best type of 
protection while remaining fiscally feasible, and Porton Down conducted extensive 
experiments into the blast and splinter protection conferred by certain shelters and 
materials. Similar to the government’s decision on gas masks, Britain’s WWII shelter 
policy was driven by both concerns over cost and psychology. 
 The government decided early on that shelters would be required for the civil 
population. In 1924, the CID concluded that the Office of Works should prepare plans for 
the provision of public shelters.12 While the interest lay primarily in protecting civilians 
from HE bombs, the CID also recommended that shelters provide protection against gas 
and that the Chemical Warfare Committee be involved in designing shelter plans.13 In a 
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1925 meeting to discuss the protection of civilians against gas the CID again determined 
that shelters ought to be provided at the outbreak of war.14 The Chemical Warfare 
Committee included public shelters as one of the main components in protecting the civil 
population from poison gas.15 In February 1939 a conference was convened, under the 
chairmanship of Lord Hailey, to advise on certain aspects of shelter policy. The resulting 
Hailey Report was to be the most influential on British shelter policy, the committee 
members having been charged by the Lord Privy Seal to advise him on air raid shelter 
policy.16 One of the primary conclusions of the resulting report was that shelter ought to 
be accessible. The report argued that it was better to offer more widely-available shelter 
even if it offered less complete protection.17 Since bomb-proofing shelters was not 
feasible, a communal or individual shelter needed to protect the population from 
splinters, blast, and falling debris.18 The conference also determined that people could go 
no more than 300 yards by day and 150 yards by night to reach shelter after a warning 
sounded.19 Surface shelters were more practical than tunnels because of the difficulty of  
tunneling in major cities, such as London, with their sewage, gas, and electricity lines.20 
The report also heavily advocated the protection of workers at their jobs, particularly 
because skilled laborers were an irreplaceable asset.21 
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 Ultimately, the British government’s shelter policy was to provide protection for all 
of its citizens, largely at government expense. The Civil Defence Act of 1937 authorized 
local authorities to build shelters for their civil population that would be eligible for 
grants from the government.22 The grant payable to the local authority depended on its 
population, and ranged from 60 to 75% of the cost of the shelter.23  A committee formed 
to address the air raid shelter problem recommended that to provide the necessary 
accommodations to the public the government ought to construct sectional steel shelters, 
propped basements, and pill-boxes, to strengthen lower floors of tenement houses, and 
the basements of shops, offices, and large houses, and construct communal shelters and 
trenches.24 It was also recommended that no future residential building should be erected 
without the inclusion of an air raid shelter of a size to accommodate all inhabitants.25 
Many in the government preferred domestic-level protection over communal shelters, in 
part due to people being forced to leave their homes at all hours of the day to reach a 
neighborhood shelter, overcrowding risks, health risks, and potential chaos.26 While the 
government accepted responsibility for protecting its citizens at home and in the street,  
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the responsibility for protecting civilians at work fell largely on the employer.27 Local  
authorities were to be responsible for providing shelter for those who could not afford to 
provide it for themselves and for people caught out in the streets, using financial and 
material assistance provided by the government.28 
 Dispersal was considered one of the primary objectives of British shelter policy. 
The Hailey Report directly recommended a shelter policy of dispersal, arguing that mass 
catastrophes, as might happen if all occupants of a large shelter were killed, would have a 
far greater effect on the public mind than a similar number of isolated casualties.29 The 
shelters, more than any other aspect of ARP, needed to follow the government’s policy of 
dispersal and deep shelters ran particularly counter to this idea. A deep shelter, 
necessarily large to accommodate perhaps thousands of people, could also have 
potentially led to high numbers of casualties in the case they were not as bomb-proof as 
assumed.30 One official worried that despite advice to disperse being given in a pamphlet, 
not enough people would follow it to ensure a “sufficiently wide dispersal of the 
population at night.”31 A communal shelter was to house no more than 50 persons in 
order to minimize casualties resulting from a direct hit.32 Where this restriction was 
impossible due to available space, the maximum allowable number of persons in a shelter 
was 200, with strong dividing walls providing internal bulkheads to mitigate the 
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explosive consequences of a direct hit.33 Part of the policy of dispersal was the concept of 
sheltering at home. Encouraging the public to shelter at home would prevent them from 
massing in other types of shelters where high numbers of casualties could occur. In a 
statement to the House of Commons, the Home Secretary pointed to the advantages of 
sheltering inside of the home, listing dispersal as the first point.34 In an October 1940 
speech Winston Churchill urged civilians not to shun small shelters in favor of larger 
ones, adding that “dispersal is the sovereign remedy against heavy casualties.”35 
 Sheltering at home also partially put the responsibility for civilian protection on the 
civilians themselves, removing some of the burden on the government. A 1941 pamphlet 
detailed civilians’ options for sheltering in their own homes, suggesting that wanting to 
remain at home was a natural inclination and a sound instinct.36 The Ministry of Health, 
too, advocated for the use of domestic shelters, suggesting that the advantages in safety 
and health of the domestic over large public shelters be impressed upon the public at 
every opportunity.37 What one official referred to as “the calamity risk” also led to the 
decision not to include nursery bays in large public shelters, fearing that an incident that 
at once injured or killed scores of babies and toddlers would be particularly detrimental to 
the morale of the public and parents.38 
 There were to be no deep shelters under British shelter policy. In accordance with 
conclusions drawn in the Hailey Report, the primary aim of shelters was the protection 
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from falling debris, splinters, and blast. There were also some concerns that deep 
sheltering would negatively affect civilian psychology. Some worried that if deep shelters 
were provided only for a section of the population, such as for laborers engaged in work 
of national importance, it would have a detrimental effect on the psychology of the rest of 
the population.39 Another argument was that once people were safe in their deep shelters 
they would refuse to come back out even after the danger had passed.40 Crowd control at 
shelter entrances was also a concern.41 Many worried that a shelter that was to house 
hundreds or thousands of people could cause massive crowds at entrances that might lead 
to panic and disaster.42  After the outbreak of war, it also became clear that building deep 
shelters was physically impossible, as there was already such a shortage of materials, 
cement especially, that there was barely enough to build the needed surface shelters.43 
Some in the House of Lords, however, worried that if the government did not construct 
bomb-proof shelters prior to the outbreak of war, there would come a time when the 
demand from the public would be so high as to force compliance at a time when it was 
both dangerous and nearly impossible.44 One Lord suggested that deep shelters could 
serve the dual purpose of car parks and could thus produce a substantial revenue, as well 
as bomb-proof protection.45 Another Lord argued that deep-level shelters would provide 
great moral support to the civil population.46 
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 Deep shelters were also rejected because there was a general antipathy towards the 
idea of going underground. One Lord compared the idea of modern deep shelters to the 
cave dwellings of his Pictish ancestors, saying that “[t]he wheel has come full circle. We 
are back to barbarism […].”47 Others referred to deep-level shelters as “funk holes.”48 
The Lord Privy Seal, in a speech to the House of Commons, undermined the idea of deep 
shelters by arguing that Britain could not be asked to adapt its whole civilization to 
compel people to live and work “in a troglodyte existence deep underground.”49 Another 
official wrote that regularly going deep underground would be fatal to the morale of those 
who did it.50 If people were to use the few deep shelters the government had built, he 
added, it would be better to assign those “already infected than to infect 40,000 fresh 
ones.”51 After London’s five deep shelters were opened to the public, the Illustrated 
London News wrote an article about the thousands of Londoners “now living the lives of 
troglodytes far underground […].”52 Lamenting the fact that many people had set up 
permanent residence in underground shelters, one reporter referred to them as 
troglodytes, admitting, however, that it was preferable to be “a live troglodyte than a dead 
householder.”53 
 Despite the issuing of gas masks to every civilian, officials nevertheless were 
concerned about poison gas entering shelters. One Lord considered that, unless some 
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provision was included to prevent gas from entering deep shelters, the results would be 
“too terrible to contemplate.”54 The proposed car park deep-level shelters were to include 
an air filtration and drainage system to prevent gas from entering air vents or drains.55 
The Hailey Report had recommended no gas precautions for shelters, citing the issue of 
gas masks, although it was suggested that gas protection might be advisable in larger 
shelters.56 
 While the gas mask program had been sufficiently advanced to offer protection for 
most adults at the start of the September Crisis, the shelter program significantly lagged 
behind needs. Home Secretary Samuel Hoare wrote that while the government had gone 
far in providing gas protection they were “dangerously backward” in regard to protection 
against high explosives.57  While at the start of the crisis the Home Office advised local 
authorities to hold off on digging trenches, just a few weeks later it instructed local 
authorities to take immediate steps to begin digging.58 Trench shelters were to be dug in 
public parks, squares, and playgrounds. Even these preparations, however, were 
inadequate—across London the trench shelters were intended to accommodate just over 
300,000.59 Instructions to local authorities suggested trench shelters should accommodate 
10% of their populations.60 With no public shelters in place, the Home Office called on 
householders to dig shelter trenches in their backyards for protection. Unsurprisingly, this 
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drew significant criticism, particularly from those who could not afford the materials.61 
While many of the hastily-built trenches were never completed, there were nevertheless 
questions on what to do with the existing trench shelters once the crisis passed. Members 
of the House of Lords called on the government to make a decision on the trench shelters, 
arguing that while they had offered temporary and makeshift protection, they still offered 
some value in more rural districts.62 The Home Secretary suggested that the trenches 
ought to be completed, lined with concrete, and roofed.63 Furthermore, realizing the lack 
of progress on the government’s shelter program, he recommended making detailed 
preparations and surveys for trench systems in vulnerable areas, surveying buildings 
suitable for use as shelters, providing detailed recommendations for householders on 
digging trenches, and requiring workplaces to provide shelter accommodations for their 
employees.64 
 The criticisms of the government’s poor shelter preparations were widespread. The 
Labour Party referred to the government’s lack of air raid precautions and shelters during 
the crisis as a “criminal failure.”65 “Nowhere has the government muddle been greater,” 
they wrote, “than in shelter policy.”66 The News Chronicle questioned the lack of street 
shelters, citing a recent air raid exercise in Chelsea that had shown the only available 
shelters were roped-off areas that offered no protection at all.67 The Evening News 
criticized the lack of any progress report given by the government as to the production, 
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distribution, and fitting of shelters.68 In order to address these criticisms the government 
now focused on providing a newly-produced domestic shelter to householders and to 
encourage local authorities to construct communal shelters. 
 Unlike other combatants, Britain sought to offer protection for many of its citizens 
within the vicinity of their own homes. Shelters that offered protection for just a few 
people were financially inferior to larger shelters, but smaller shelters fitted into the 
government’s larger policy of dispersal. As bomb-proof shelters were not practical 
officials expected shelters to receive direct hits resulting in casualties. A direct hit on a 
family shelter would be a tragedy, but in the grander scheme would not greatly influence 
casualty statistics. A bomb falling on a communal shelter could cause hundreds of 
casualties and negatively affect morale. Additionally, a shelter in a family’s home or 
backyard was more likely to be used and cause less disruption to sleep and schedule. 
Criticism over the government’s lack of a shelter program after the September Crisis also 
meant that some type of shelter was needed to pacify public opinion. As a result the 
government sought to provide domestic protection to as many civilians as possible. The 
most prominent of these types of shelter was the Anderson shelter. 
 The Anderson shelter offered protection for families or small groups of people. 
Officially called the Galvanized Corrugated Steel Shelter, it derived its colloquial name 
from then-Home Secretary Sir John Anderson. The shelter consisted of several steel 
panels to be sunk partially into the ground and its rounded top piled with dirt. At six feet 
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tall and four by six feet wide, conditions inside the shelter could be relatively cramped.69 
Erection of the shelter required the digging of a hole to the depth of four feet into which 
the shelter would be sunk.70 A minimum of 15 inches of earth on top of the shelter was 
needed to provide adequate protection and hold the shelter in place.71 The shelter was 
intended for cottage-type houses on modern building estates with ample garden space and 
two-storied terrace types of houses with backyards, both of which were unsound or 
flimsy in nature and could not be properly strengthened in other ways.72 Some Anderson 
shelters were erected indoors, although this was very rare as the requirements of an 
emergency escape, space, and lateral protection could not be met by most dwellings.73 
While the Home Office provided detailed instructions and encouraged householders to 
erect their own shelters, many were erected by the local authorities.74 Issue of the first 
Anderson shelters began in February 1939 and within six months of the start of 
production, over 800,000 shelters had been distributed to householders and local 
authorities.75 Not every family, however, received their own shelter and on average two 
Anderson shelters were shared by less than three families.76 
 The government heavily subsidized the distribution and erection of the Anderson 
shelter. A 1938 report on the air raid shelter problem determined that the sectional steel 
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shelter was the best solution to provide shelter, and in light of the criticism experienced 
during the 1938 crisis, that such shelters needed to be supplied by the government.77 The 
report concluded, however, that the Anderson shelter should satisfy public opinion.78 In 
mid-1939 approximately £20 million had been set aside by the government to provide the 
shelter to householders.79 The Anderson shelter was provided free to all who were 
compulsorily insured under the National Health Insurance Act, or, for those not so 
insured, to householders earning less than £250 per year (increased by £50 for each 
school-aged child in excess of two).80 Where the local authority erected Anderson 
shelters for the householders, their expenses were partially reimbursed by the 
government.81 For those whose income disqualified them from receiving a free shelter, 
the government made the materials available for purchase at cost.82  Most local 
authorities found that there was a low demand for the purchase of shelters, so 
Birmingham, for instance, had just 150 inquiries, partially because by the time shelters 
were available for purchase most householders had made other arrangements.83 
 As had been the case with respirators, supplies of Anderson shelters did not always 
meet demand at the outbreak of war. In one region just over 10% of local authorities had 
received the promised Anderson shelters by early September 1939.84 The Home Office 
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was also greatly displeased to find that many people who had been issued free shelters 
had failed to put them up and considered making it a penal offense to fail to erect the 
Anderson shelter within ten days.85 Those wishing to purchase the shelter had to wait 
until shelters had been issued to everyone who qualified for a free one, causing some 
anxiety.86 
 The Anderson shelter may not have been proof to a direct hit, but it offered 
significant protection for many British civilians. Prior to the distribution of the shelters, 
one member of the House of Lords worried that as soon as a few civilians were killed in 
their Anderson shelters the public at large would refuse to continue to use them.87 Tests 
showed that occupants in a correctly-erected Anderson shelter were safe from a 500 lb. 
bomb at 30 feet.88 J.B.S. Haldane, who observed the tests, concluded that the shelter was 
by far better than anything the ARP department had done previously and that it provided 
better protection than sheltering inside a house.89 One official suggested sending an 
information leaflet  with each shelter, explaining the tests to which it had been subjected, 
to improve public confidence in its efficacy.90 The public was less convinced of the safety 
of the Anderson shelter, however. The shelters’ shape and seemingly dubious efficacy led 
some to label them as “steel mousetraps.”91 Others referred to the shelters as “dog-
kennels.”92 The volume of correspondence received by the Public Relations Department 
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made it clear the public was very uneasy about their new shelters.93 In Shoreditch, only a 
quarter of those who had an Anderson shelter available used it for shelter, the rest seeking 
protection in the larger public shelters.94 A 1942 poll found that at least four percent of 
people were not intending to use their Anderson shelter in the event of a raid, although 
those most skeptical of future raids occurring were also less likely to use their shelter.95 
Six percent of householders had failed to use their Anderson shelter in past raids.96 Some 
skepticism was due to reports or personal knowledge of people having been killed inside 
their Anderson shelters and government officials discussed how to convince civilians of 
the efficacy of the shelter.97 One official suggested collecting examples where the shelters 
had withstandood air raids to be used as “propaganda for the use of Andersons in the East 
End and elsewhere.”98 
 There were also consistent complaints and problems with the Anderson shelter. 
Made from sides of steel and covered partially with dirt the Anderson shelter was 
particularly uncomfortable in wintertime.  The walls were highly thermo-conductive and 
thus very cold to lie against in winter, which also led to excessive condensation on the 
walls enough to soak clothes or bedding coming into contact with them.99 The unscreened 
opening of the shelter also allowed cold air to penetrate, significantly lowering the 
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temperature inside.100 Many people had little knowledge of the official requirements for 
the earth covering of their shelter, exposing themselves to danger.101 Some people had 
installed oil stoves or suspended car batteries and water bottles from the ceiling, creating 
potentially hazardous conditions.102 Perhaps the biggest issue with the shelter was 
flooding. Damp arose from water seeping from the subsoil or flowing into the shelter 
from the entrance, sometimes enough to cover the shelter floor.103 In many areas with 
high water tables or poor drainage, water leaked into the shelters, in some cases making 
them unusable.104 An official investigation found that most civil defense regions had 
some flooding of their Anderson shelters, with the proportion of flooded shelters ranging 
from 24 to 42 percent.105 
 The MHS sought to address some of the issues through improvements to the shelter. 
Householders were issued a pamphlet with instructions on improving the conditions 
inside the Anderson shelter during the winter.106 For personal comfort MHS suggested 
bringing hot drinks for consumption and using hot water bottles or bricks inside the 
bedding for warmth.107 Hanging a blanket over the shelter entrance would prevent cold 
air from entering.108 The public was warned, however, not to use oxygen-consuming 
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heating appliances, such as lamps or oil stoves, inside the shelters for risk of 
suffocation.109 Newspapers reiterated the information given by the Home Office to 
distribute the information on how to make the shelter more comfortable to an even wider 
audience.110 Such articles particularly focused on how to improvise sleeping 
arrangements and how to keep warm while spending the night in the shelter.111 To address 
the problem of flooding, most local authorities decided to concrete and seal the pit the 
shelter was sunk into. Four inches of thick concrete lining was found to waterproof the 
Anderson shelter even in areas with very wet sub soil and could be accomplished at a cost 
of just over £3 per shelter.112 Despite efforts to waterproof the shelters, just two years 
later a poll found 15% of householders complaining about damp or wetness in their 
Anderson shelters.113 While concreting the shelter pit was the primary solution, some 
local authorities in areas with wet subsoil simply instructed their householders to erect 
the Anderson shelter indoors.114 Initially, an official report opposed the construction of 
Anderson shelters inside the home because of space, limited protection against shrapnel, 
the danger of the collapse of the shelter should the house collapse, and debris trapping the 
occupants.115 Several local authorities reported satisfaction among the public with their 
now dry and warm shelters, particularly in areas that had previously suffered extreme 
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wetness.116 Erecting the shelter indoors, however, incurred significant extra costs at over 
£5 per shelter, due to the need for extra protection and strutting.117 
 The increased duration of air raids also came to alter the purpose of the shelter. 
Initially it was thought that the Anderson shelter, in close proximity to one’s home, would 
allow civilians to seek protection at the sound of the air raid siren and then return to 
normal life once the raid was over. While in early raids people spent a few hours in their 
shelters they eventually waited out the raids for the entire night, never returning to their 
beds.118 Once it became clear that people were preferring to sleep all night in a shelter 
rather than be roused constantly by air raid sirens, the Home Office realized the need to 
provide some type of sleeping arrangements. To draw people away from the large public 
shelters, where people had been spending their nights, the Home Office decided to issue 
bunks for the Anderson shelter.119 The bunks came in two sizes, adult and child, and up to 
four adult and one child’s bunk would be supplied free of charge to householders who 
had qualified for a free Anderson shelter.120 In the small space of the Anderson shelter the 
bunks were fitted with two six foot adult bunks on the floor along the sides of the shelter, 
another two adult bunks mounted above those and a shorter, but wider, child bunk 
transversed the adult bunks at the closed end of the shelter, creating very cramped 
conditions.121 Some balked at the cost of providing free bunks, at over £2 per set, and 
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suggested instead householders should be encouraged to find their own way to make the 
Anderson shelter suitable for sleeping in.122 Some local authorities found, however, that 
those shelters that had been concreted against flooding could not properly fit the bunks 
and adjustments were required to thousands of bunks to fit them into the shelters.123 
 The Anderson shelter offered good protection to many civilians, but a few months 
into the war the government shifted its attention to a new type of domestic shelter. By 
December 1940 it was decided that there should be a shelter that could be placed indoors 
and that could be built with existing materials. Steel shortages made the production of 
more Anderson shelters impossible and the requirement for a backyard or large-enough 
space to construct the shelter meant many families went without one.  The cheaper and 
more practical solution was a shelter that used less steel and could fit into existing spaces 
of a family’s home. The result was the Morrison shelter. 
 The Morrison shelter offered protection in a more practical manner. Named after 
then-Home Secretary Herbert Morrison, the shelter was also referred to as the steel 
indoor shelter and the table shelter.124 It consisted of a strong frame, a flat top made of 
steel, an attached spring mattress forming the floor, and mesh sides to prevent the 
entering of debris or shrapnel.125 Its flat top allowed the shelter to be used as a table 
during the day and it could be moved after construction, thus being much less 
cumbersome indoors than an Anderson shelter. To allow shelterers to escape if the house 
collapsed, the Morrison shelter was to be placed in the middle of a room, with open space 
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on all sides.126 Along with the materials, recipients of the shelter were also given 
instructions on how to put it together. The pamphlet How to put up your Morrison 
“Table” Shelter offered illustrated instructions in seven steps, as well as information how 
to use the shelter as a table.127 While construction of the shelter was said to be easy, and 
in some local areas boy scouts had been recruited to build them, one official worried that 
without special staff to complete the work it would lead to badly erected shelters and 
future trouble and expense.128 The Morrison shelter also solved the problem of outdoor 
sheltering in areas with wet subsoil. Government engineers specifically instructed local 
authorities to provide one or two Morrison shelters to householders instead of erecting an 
Anderson shelter indoors in those areas where flooding was common.129 The Morrison 
shelter was also offered to householders whose Anderson shelter had already flooded, but 
where no steps had been taken to remedy the problem.130 By 1942 a two-tier Morrison 
shelter had come into production, intended for families with two adults and more than 
two children.131 This larger shelter was over four feet tall, allowing for two mattresses to 
be placed inside and thus offering protection for twice the number of people.132 
 Capable of withstanding significant weight, the Morrison shelter certainly saved 
lives after its introduction. The CDRD conducted several experiments to test the weight-
bearing capacity of the Morrison shelter, finding that the shelter was capable of holding 
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up a collapsed floor.133 There were repeated reports of Morrison shelters saving their 
occupants whose houses had collapsed and trapped them under heavy debris.134 Demand 
for the shelter was high, amounting to as many as 5,000 requests per day in London by 
mid-1944.135 The commencement of the flying bomb attacks also led to a higher demand 
for Morrison shelters, and the government ordered more shelters and expanded eligibility 
as a result.136 Shelters were also collected from other parts of the country to be issued to 
Londoners and, particularly, to those living in the corridor that made up the likely path of 
the flying bombs.137 
 Like the Anderson shelter, the government also subsidized the Morrison shelter. 
Shortly after its introduction, with sales and demand lagging, one official suggested that 
this was due to people waiting to see if the income limit for free provision of shelter 
would be raised.138 Qualifications for free issue of the Morrison shelter were similar to 
that of the Anderson shelter, but the Home Office, with the consent of the Exchequer, 
raised the annual income limit to £350.139 Anyone who had already been issued an 
Anderson shelter, however, or who had a share in a nearby communal surface shelter, was 
not eligible to receive a Morrison shelter, unless they wished to purchase it.140 Preference 
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in distribution was given to those civilians who had no reasonable shelter of any kind 
available to them.141 The purchase price of the Morrison shelter was reduced by mid-
1941 from nearly £8 to £7.142 By October 1943, one million table shelters had been 
produced.143 
 Both of the domestic shelters offered good protection in a convenient manner and 
while the government ensured that even the poor had access to them there were still 
families without the space to erect either shelter. Poor and crowded neighborhoods and 
particularly those in an urban environment often did not have a yard to install an 
Anderson shelter or the space in the house for a Morrison shelter. The solution had to be 
some type of communal shelter, yet a type not so big as to cause massive casualties in the 
event of a direct hit. Communal shelters were built by the local authorities and could take 
one of several forms, but most common were surface brick shelters and trench shelters. 
 In many communities the surface brick shelter offered protection for several 
families. Such shelters were made of brickwork, mass concrete, or concrete block 
masonry with a reinforced concrete roof and a concrete floor.144 The standard design 
allowed room for six persons, but this could be extended for up to twelve.145 Communal 
surface shelters were sometimes the solution to a lack of Anderson shelters.  Regions 
where the delivery of Anderson shelters had fallen short of need often asked permission 
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to build surface shelters instead.146 Persons entitled to a free Anderson shelter who lived 
in areas in danger of flooding or who lacked the space to erect the steel shelter, were 
generally provided with a surface brick shelter by the local authority.147 By 1941 there 
were also some safety concerns about the surface shelters built early on. Earth shock or 
blast had, in some instances, caused failure of the surface shelters and vulnerable shelters 
were strengthened by the adding reinforced concrete to the existing brickwork.148 
 The Home Office began an education campaign to encourage civilians to make use 
of their local shelter. In 1941, a meeting involving several departments of civil defense 
was called specifically to discuss how to extend the use of public shelters.149 Members 
present suggested that the Home Office begin a campaign to convince the public that the 
surface shelters provided a high degree of safety, although they recommended waiting to 
begin the campaign until all faulty shelters had been closed.150 The factual information on 
surface shelters was to be disseminated via newspaper articles, broadcasts, short films, 
posters, and the wardens.151 While officials recognized that many people went 
underground simply to get away from the noise of the air raids, they also claimed people 
could be dissuaded from doing so.152 Surface shelters, civilians were to be told, would 
allow children to be put to bed at a normal hour and cause less disruption to family life 
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and sleep times.153 It was also suggested to have an exhibition of a small-scale fully-
equipped surface shelter near the Town Hall or some other well-visited locale, with a 
warden nearby to offer information and advice.154 The Home Office was aware that it 
required concrete proof of the safety provided by the surface shelters to convince people 
to use them.155 One suggestion was to have experts say that they had overestimated the 
dangers of blast and splinter, against which the surface shelter offered less protection, and 
had underestimated the dangers from flying glass and debris, against which the surface 
shelter provided good protection.156 To prove convincingly the superiority of the surface 
shelter over one’s own home, a poster campaign was started showing surface shelters 
standing intact besides demolished houses.157 The Home Office also collected 
information from its civil defense regions on how the shelters stood up to air raids. A 
report from Region 7 lists the incidents of surface shelters that survived nearby 
explosions, although an aside mentions that there were other incidents where such 
shelters were badly damaged but that the information was not included because the Home 
Office was not interested in it.158 While some officials worried that putting up posters in 
areas that had yet to be raided would lower morale, others argued that it was the perfect 
time to educate people regarding the shelters as they were now more receptive to the idea 
after disaster had struck other areas.159 In some areas, surface shelters were being 
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frequently used by firefighting parties, which proved to have a positive effect on the 
opinion of the rest of the population.160 Suggestions for increasing interest in surface 
shelters also included adding bunks, heaters, and a bay for smokers, with signs posted 
outside to inform people of these amenities.161 
 A second aspect of the education campaign was to convince civilians to take a 
personal stake in their public shelter. Not owned by any one person or family the surface 
shelters were often in poor condition. Some officials believed that the public’s reluctance 
to use the surface shelters often stemmed as much, if not more, from a lack of amenities 
than anxiety over their safety.162 The 1941 meeting on shelter policy recommended to 
educate the public in how to make public surface shelters “pleasant and homelike 
[…].”163 They also suggested fully equipping one shelter in each neighborhood and 
telling other civilians their shelter could be similarly equipped if they were to use and 
take care of it.164 Such equipment usually included a door, with the key being given to 
one family, and whitewashing the interior walls.165 In some surface shelters, bunks were 
installed, but since these shelters were not always of uniform size, fitting bunks was left 
to the local authority.166 Comfort, appearance, and amenities were deemed essential for 
the surface shelters if the government wanted to prevent a mass exodus from them into 
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deep shelters.167 Officials believed that if surface shelters were fitted with proper, non-
slatted doors and a key given to the family intending to use it, a sense of proprietorship 
would result that would see the shelter being used and cared for regularly.168 
 Trench shelters were less sophisticated and were often intended as an emergency 
shelter for those caught out in the streets. Such shelters were the responsibility of the 
local authority and were often built near nodal points where people congregated.169 Many 
of those in existence at the start of war had been hastily built during the September Crisis 
to unexacting standards and some were left unfinished. By the end of 1938 the Home 
Office issued official instructions for the construction and permanent lining of trenches to 
ensure uniformity and proper protection.170 
 Trench shelters were often uncomfortable and lacked the amenities that drove 
people to the larger public shelters. One official report admitted that comfort in the trench 
shelters was “not easy to obtain.”171 The space was usually cramped and limited, with bad 
lighting that did not allow for reading.172 The nature of trench shelters meant that drafts 
were common and these contributed to the uncomfortable conditions, particularly during 
the winter months.173 Suggestions for improving these conditions included installing 
better lighting, providing doors or curtains to prevent drafts, and, where possible, having 
some type of mobile canteen arrangement.174 
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 While trench and brick shelters were most common, communal shelters also took 
other forms. In the LCC’s Council Estates, often lacking the space for a brick surface 
shelter but requiring shelter for hundreds of people, one solution was to convert the 
ground floor apartments into air raid shelters.175 Initially this was done by using steel 
struts, but when steel became scarce brick supports were used instead.176 Many housing 
estates were outfitted with semi-sunk shelters in the courtyards, although this was only an 
option in areas where they were not likely to flood.177 In larger public and private 
buildings the best solution for protection was often the basement. To offer good 
protection such basements were required to be strutted and strengthened, as well as 
outfitted with certain amenities according to Home Office guidelines.178 In some 
boroughs shelterers sought refuge in church crypts.179 In St. James’s Church in the 
Borough of Paddington the crypt shelter was outfitted with amenities such as electricity, 
bunks, fans, and chemical closets.180 In one town, civilians could lease shelter space in a 
former chamber of horrors entertainment venue, complete with the severed head of 
Charles I, for a price of five to ten shillings.181 Government departments often had their  
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own sophisticated shelters, which they were reluctant to share with the population. When 
it was suggested civilians might use the Ministry of Labour shelter during nighttime, 
when the shelter was empty, the Ministry refused, claiming that their own staff or another 
department’s staff might still need the shelter.182 
 There were some efforts to gas-proof the various communal shelters, but these were 
mostly unsuccessful. By mid-1940 there were some efforts to outfit public shelters with 
gas curtains, treated fabric that could be dropped to cover doorways of shelters to prevent 
the penetration of gas. In a Home Security circular, the MHS urged local authorities to 
provide these curtains and render public shelters gas-proof.183 This presented various 
concerns, however, and some local authorities refused to comply. The associated cost and 
amount of labor and materials required made provisioning all public shelters with gas 
curtains difficult.184 Respirators were to be the primary protection against gas and 
providing gas curtains might undermine public confidence in their respirators and 
perhaps lead them to think they did not need them.185 Additionally, it was impossible to 
make most communal shelters gas proof and thus a curtain would only extend the time 
until gas penetrated the interior.186 Lack of ventilation in shelters was also a concern, and 
with doors covered by a gas curtain the conditions inside the shelters could quickly 
deteriorate to the point where people would abandon the shelter.187 One official pointed 
out that as people continuously enter a shelter after the siren had sounded, the curtain 
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would actually be quite useless.188 Gas-proofing communal shelters but not the domestic 
shelters could also have had the unintended effect of people abandoning their Anderson 
and Morrison shelters for the public shelters.189 By 1941 the Home Office had withdrawn 
its initial instructions with another circular stressing the need for proper shelter 
ventilation.190 It was estimated that only 5% of surface shelters and 25% of trench 
shelters had been provided with any kind of gas-proofing equipment.191 The problem of 
gas-proofing public shelters, however, was a continuous one and the Home Office again 
attempted to address the issue at a meeting in 1942.192 The committee members again 
concluded that the respirators ought to be the first line of protection and that it was 
impractical to gas-proof public shelters, suggesting that no systematic program of gas-
proofing should be undertaken.193 Officials also worried about potentially gas-
contaminated civilians entering an occupied shelter, where the gas vapor in confined air 
could prove disastrous to the other shelterers.194 Solutions to this issue lay in asking 
wardens to guard shelter entrances, to close shelters entirely after a gas alarm, or to install 
a gas curtain that would allow contaminated persons to shelter outside the curtain but 
under cover.195 Despite respirators being the first, and often only, line of defense against 
gas, many civilians failed to carry their respirators when entering a public shelter. While 
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no one was to be denied entry into a shelter for lacking a gas mask, local authorities were 
urged to remind culprits to carry their masks or have them repaired or replaced in the case 
of problems.196 In large shelters posters were exhibited that read “This Shelter is not Gas 
Proof—Always bring your Gas Mask with you.”197 
 There were problems with the communal shelters, too. While ideally a shelter 
would remain open all day to allow people to seek shelter during a raid, experience 
showed that in many places pilfering, misuse, and vandalism occurred in shelters that had 
been left open. In most areas, public shelters were thus kept locked during the day and 
opened at a specific time each evening.198 In the case of some surface brick shelters, 
selected families would receive the key for the shelter, allowing them to use the shelter 
when needed and giving them a sense of the shelter being theirs.199 Like the Anderson 
shelter, some communal shelters were also prone to flooding, particularly those partially 
or completely sunk beneath the surface.200 Over a quarter of the LCC’s outside shelters, 
provided primarily to their housing estates, were unusable due to flooding.201 Many 
trench shelters were not bunked which made spending the night in them an 
uncomfortable experience that many avoided by sheltering elsewhere.202 In many public 
shelters the lighting was not up to reading standards.203 The slatted doors installed on 
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many of the brick surface shelters offered no privacy and let in drafts during the colder 
months.204 Furthermore, the brick shelters were often cold and uncomfortable, although 
the officially-recommended “flower-pot stove” was said to provide enough heating. This 
consisted of a flower pot with a candle set near its center, set on something allowing a 
free draft of air, and another flower pot turned upside down on top of the first one.205 
Similar to the Anderson shelter, the Home Office also issued a pamphlet for the 
communal shelters, titled Your brick street shelter this winter, to educate people on how 
to keep warm in the shelter, what type of bedding to use, how to keep drinks hot, and 
what items to bring along.206 Lack of heating and proper ventilation led to frequent 
complaints of the surface shelters, particularly when condensation built up inside.207 
Tenants of LCC housing estates were sometimes found to frequent public shelters other 
than those to which they had been assigned, complaining of overcrowding in the official 
council estate shelters.208 One official complained that those sheltering in trenches were 
“frequently disinclined to be organised,” for purposes of entertainment and shelter 
improvements, and were less of a community than those sheltering in surface or basement 
shelters.209 The extremely limited space of a trench shelter made entertainment activities 
even more difficult. In one trench shelter an official crowded as many people as possible 
into the angle of the bay, conducting a discussion and cinema show, and then moved on to 
the next corner of the trench for a repetition.210 Officials also struggled to find ways to 
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offer entertainment options in surface shelters, but saw this as a vital component in 
enticing families to use them.211 One option considered was to set aside one shelter in a 
local group of such structures for play activities for children and recreation for adults, as 
well as canteen arrangements, that would allow for some formation of social life even in 
the surface shelters.212  
 The British government’s shelter program offered a variety of good shelters for its 
citizens, whether in their own home or in a community setting. Most of these shelters 
were on or near the surface and were clearly incapable of providing protection from a 
direct hit. Despite education campaigns intended specifically to convince the general 
public of the efficacy of the various shelters, many remained unconvinced that steel 
panels, brick, or wood could protect them against bombs. Other civilians found the noise 
of air raids too disruptive and nerve-wracking, which was compounded by hearing 
bombs, ack-ack guns, and air raid sirens, while they took up space in their shelters. As a 
result many Londoners, the hardest hit by German raids, found a different solution for 
shelter— the London Underground Railway, or tube. 
 Initially the tube was not an authorized shelter. As the tube had been used mostly 
successfully as a shelter during WWI, government officials considered the underground’s 
potential for the next war. As early as 1936 the possibility of using the tube tunnels as an 
air raid shelter was addressed.213 While estimates suggested 140,000 shelterers could be 
accommodated on the platforms and 675,000 if the tube were shut down entirely, many in 
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the government had reservations.214 The Hailey Report determined the potential shelter 
contribution of the tube as being limited, due to the system’s extent and limited access 
points, although it considered using the underground as a casualty clearing station.215 As 
surface transport was likely to be severely interrupted by war conditions, some argued 
that it was essential to maintain the underground railway as a transport system only.216 To 
facilitate the continuation of transport, particularly of essential personnel such as police 
and ARP workers, one suggestion was to install doors and barriers at stations to prevent 
the system being rushed by “disorderly mobs.”217 There were also concerns about 
flooding in tube stations arising from damage to nearby sewer or water mains that could 
potentially cause casualties.218 Some considered, however, that if a decision was taken 
that the tube was not to be used as a shelter, then there would be a public outcry in the 
event of an emergency.219 Even members of the House of Lords called for the 
government to consider the underground system as an official shelter, being unsatisfied 
with the response of “technical difficulties” they had received.220 By the end of 
September 1940, just a few weeks into the Blitz, the tube stations had been officially  
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recognized as shelters, but overcrowding was so extreme that regulation was required.221 
Even as the tube was recognized officially as a place of shelter and local authorities were 
adding amenities, the Ministry of Information urged that nothing be printed in the press 
about this that might attract people to shelter in the underground.222  
 No government directions or other available shelters could stop Londoners from 
crowding into the tube at the first signs of an air raid. It had been clear to government 
officials even prior to the war that it would be impossible to keep a crowd out of the 
underground if they were determined to get in.223 Those seeking shelter in the tube simply 
paid the minimum fare and then spent the night on the platforms and stairwells while the 
air raid raged above them.224 On September 7, 1940, the first night of raids on London, 
shelterers invaded the tube stations and there was no night subsequently during the war 
that did not see scores of civilians seeking refuge there.225 Eighty tube stations were 
ultimately used as shelters, plus three non-traffic stations and two tunnels.226 The 
numbers of the nightly shelter population varied over the years as danger from raids 
decreased. What officials referred to as a “hard core” of shelterers sought protection in 
the tube even during times of enemy inactivity, that in some boroughs amounted to as 
much as 50% of the regular shelter population.227 Many people also flocked to the tube 
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for companionship, warmth, and light.228 The movement of trains and people offered 
distraction, as did the shelter entertainment programs.229 Deep underground shelterers 
were removed from the disruptive noise of air raids and could thus get a good night’s rest 
that was almost impossible above ground.230 The shelter population was highest during 
the Blitz, with the record for nightly shelterers, recorded in September 1940, at 
177,000.231 Over three years the nightly population averaged around 36,000 and by mid-
1943 the total number of shelters up to that point had surpassed four times the population 
of Greater London.232 During 1943 the average nightly shelter population was around 
10,000, with an increase of about 7,000 if an alert sounded.233 The advent of the flying 
bombs once again drove Londoners into the tube, with numbers during July and August 
1944 averaging well over 25,000 shelterers per night.234 The tube had sheltered a total 
population of 63 million by the end of the war.235 
 Many shelterers spent the entire night in a public shelter. After the start of the Blitz 
it became clear that night raiding was to be expected and many civilians simply took 
shelter from the evening until the next morning whether a raid occurred or not. This 
meant that many shelters now became dormitories and required the type of amenities that 
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would see crowds of people through the night. Just a few months into the Blitz, bunks 
were starting to be provided in many of the stations and other public shelters. The type of 
sleeping facilities used in the tube stations consisted of three tiers of bunks, one above the 
other, with the middle bunk capable of being let down so as to form a backrest for 
someone sitting on the bottom bunk.236 By 1943, 80 out of 120 tube stations had 
dormitory arrangements, each accommodating approximately 1,000 people.237 Soon 
ticketing systems were put in place to allow shelterers into tube stations and other large 
public shelters. Such shelters were known as ‘reserved shelters’ and required ticket 
holders to produce their ticket before being allowed to enter.238 It was common, however, 
for shelterers to exceed bunked space, particularly in areas with many theaters, cinemas, 
or dance halls that could suddenly see hundreds of people seeking temporary shelter. At 
Covent Garden station, for instance, there were bunks for 180 people, but as many as 700 
crowded into the station, with the majority sleeping on the platforms.239 At another 
station, people crowded the platforms all the way up to the rail edge, making it nearly 
impossible to carry a fainting case to the first aid post.240 Staircases and escalators were 
often packed with people sitting, standing, or sleeping, making ingress or egress 
difficult.241 
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 It was vital to maintain the well-being of the shelterers. While the Home Office was 
concerned with providing shelters, the Ministry of Health was responsible for issues of 
public health, medical care, public order, admission to the shelters, entertainment, 
bunking, lighting, stoves, and canteen arrangements.242 To maintain order, a set of public 
rules of conduct in shelters was adopted and posted in every public shelter. Such rules 
prohibited nuisance behaviors like spitting, littering, and disturbing the peace and 
discouraged unwelcome people who were drunk, “offensively unclean,” or verminous.243 
Lavatories were considered one of the most important factors in the comfort and health of 
shelterers.244 While all shelters had some type of lavatory, water-borne systems were 
preferred over the Elsan-type chemical lavatories, which were small and required regular 
emptying.245 Two lighting systems were recommended, one bright enough to allow 
people to read, and another blue light system that would allow for sleep at a certain time 
when the regular lights were switched off.246 
 A vital component of shelterers’ well-being and morale was the provision of 
canteens. Many civilians came to the shelters directly from work and thus providing some 
type of refreshment was almost a necessity. The Tube Refreshment Service commenced 
by the end of October 1940 at the Holland Park station, but soon extended across the tube 
network.247 Canteens were generally provided for all shelters with a capacity over 200, 
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although some smaller shelters used for sleeping had canteen arrangements, as well.248 
The Tube Refreshment Service was a sophisticated system that ensured access, at a 
minimum, to hot tea and light snacks for the majority of civilians in London’s public 
shelters. Canteens and service points sold items such as tea, cocoa, milk, cookies, Swiss 
rolls, potato chips, fruit pies, and steamed potatoes, varying in price from a half to three 
pence.249 Canteens had been set up in 80 tube stations, with the expectation of feeding an 
estimated 80,000 people.250 Sales were particularly high during the Blitz, but continued 
even during the calm periods. In one week of March 1944, the Tube Refreshment Service 
sold 80,000 cups of tea, 63,000 slab cakes, 30,000 cookies, 30,000 Swiss rolls, and 
40,000 buns.251 By 1945, the lack of air raids had so reduced the nightly shelter 
population that the refreshment service was operating at a significant deficit and service 
points were reduced to just 25, with the possibility of shutting the service down entirely if 
the number of shelterers continued to fall.252 By the end of the war the refreshment 
service had served over 545,000 gallons of tea to shelterers in London’s underground.253 
 To alleviate boredom, a variety of entertainment options were available in public 
shelters. Space, however, was a consistent problem that undermined these entertainment 
efforts. Many activities were chosen simply because they could take place in the limited 
space of a public shelter. Libraries with a variety of books were available in many large 
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public shelters, with bookcases provided at government expense.254 Some shelter wardens 
kept toys and books for children to keep them entertained and out of trouble.255 In some 
smaller shelters concerts, arranged by the Council for the Encouragement of Music and 
the Arts (CEMA),  were found to be very popular.256 The Emergency Music Scheme, 
however, was primarily focused on entertaining the recent victims of bombing raids in 
rest centers.257 Knitting parties were popular with both shelterers and shelter officials. 
Knitting was a quiet activity that required little space and directly aided the war effort by 
producing knitted garments that were sent to the troops, civil defense workers, or 
evacuated children.258 The forming of shelter choirs was also strongly encouraged as it 
was an activity suitable for any type of shelter, and competitions between choirs were 
arranged to encourage participation.259 In several shelters, play centers were set up, one, 
for instance, in a railway arch, but lack of space was a persistent problem.260 Shelterers 
were also encouraged to care for their own well-being by arranging amateur theatricals, 
spelling bees, singing songs, or arranging for small competitions between shelter bays or 
compartments.261 In London’s boroughs, many public shelters arranged informal 
Christmas parties, usually run by the shelterers themselves with no financial aid from 
official channels.262 Entertainment options sometimes spread beyond the confines of the 
                                                        
254 TNA: HO 207/417, 
255 TNA: HO 207/417, Ruth Dalton to Mr. Thomas, August 8, 1941. 
256 TNA: HO 207/386, London Civil Defence Region, Education and Entertainment in Shelters, November 
7, 1940, 3. 
257 TNA: HO 207/386, C.E.M.A., Emergency Music, n.d., 1. 
258 TNA: HO 207/386, Lady Gowers to M.A. Creswick Atkinson, February 21, 1941, 1. 
259 TNA: HO 207/386, Regional Welfare Adviser to Controller, March 24, 1941. 
260 TNA: HO207/386, A Report on Shelters & Youth enquiries, 1941, 1. 
261 TNA: HO 207/386, M.A. Creswick Atkinson, Plan for Welfare in Shelters, February 5, 1941, 3. 
262 TNA: HO 207/386, Christmas Parties, December 15, 1941. 
 
 248 
shelter and registered London shelterers, for instance, could receive half rate admission to 
the London Zoo.263 Eight of the boroughs arranged some type of open-air recreation for 
their shelterers during the day, such as concerts, picnics, open-air theaters, and 
swimming.264 Competitions between shelters, covering vocal music, variety 
performances, and drama competitions, were hoped to encourage participation and foster 
a self-help spirit.265 Most of the London boroughs also created Shelter Welfare Councils 
or Committees that were directly responsible for setting up entertainment and recreation 
in their local shelters.266 The appointment of a borough Shelter Welfare Officer was 
justified for shelter populations over 10,000, a requirement met by seven boroughs.267 
One official, however, pointed out that since the overall policy emphasized dispersal, the 
large public shelters ought not to be made too attractive.268 Another argued that focusing 
on entertainment in shelters was losing sight of the dispersal policy, and particularly 
complained about one large shelter were it was said people were living the entire time 
and doing nothing to aid the country in its war effort.269 Professional entertainments were 
therefore to be rare and could only be put on as a surprise so as to avoid advertising and 
drawing people away from their communal surface shelters.270 Films were also restricted 
and although they could be shown somewhat frequently, regular and recurring 
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performance was to be avoided.271 Most films were around ten minutes long and covered 
topics on the armed forces, the colonies, the allies, types of arms, jobs for women, and 
the history of topics such as transport, the wireless, the postal service, and savings 
banks.272 Health films were also readily available, educating viewers on immunizations, 
eugenics, home nursing, maternity and child welfare, nutrition, personal hygiene, 
physical education, physiology, disease prevention, road safety, and social hygiene.273 A 
score of civil defense films urged civilians to volunteer and aid the war effort.274 
 Education programs and talks were particularly useful, as they served both a 
practical purpose and could be put on easily in almost any shelter. In the small communal 
shelters on their Housing Estates, the LCC set up education programs, consisting of travel 
talks, needlepoint classes, and choral music.275 Each borough council, in cooperation with 
the LCC, also arranged for classes in all of London’s public shelters. These classes were 
usually only held during autumn and winter, when there was less daylight for people to 
enjoy the outdoors.276 The shelter classes often revolved around topics of self help, such 
as dressmaking, needlecraft, keeping fit, war time cookery, knitting, first aid, home 
nursing, make-and-mend, boot repairing, rug making, infant care, and English.277 Other 
classes instructed shelterers on travel, current events, appreciation of music, the story of 
London, dramatic literature and elocution, civics and citizenship, community singing, 
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general health, drawing, painting, international affairs, social questions, horticulture, and 
psychology.278 One official suggested that shelters were a good place to spread 
propaganda, as the shelter population was “almost terrifyingly receptive,” although he 
cautioned that such propaganda speakers had to be amusing and interesting.279 Talks for 
children between 5 and 14 covered such topics as careers, life in the armed forces, animal 
care, and model-making for boys, while girls heard talks on dressmaking, knitting and 
crocheting, cookery and housekeeping, nursing as a career, and elementary first aid.280 
 A major concern was also the health of shelterers, particularly in the larger and 
crowded shelters, such as the tube stations. The Ministry of Health strongly encouraged 
the provision of washing facilities and lavatories in every public shelter where people 
slept.281 Shelters where 50 or more people slept regularly were to be cleaned daily.282 
Drinking water was to be supplied either through a piped system or an appropriate 
vessel.283 Shelters with capacities of 500 or greater were required to have a medical first 
aid post set in a space screened from the rest of the shelter.284 The purpose of such first 
aid posts was not to treat air raid casualties, but to tend to minor illnesses and injuries 
arising from shelter living, as well as to facilitate the detection and prevention of 
infectious diseases.285 Groups of smaller shelters could be served by one first aid post in a 
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convenient location no more than 200 yards from any shelter.286 Such posts were to be 
staffed by nurses, with a doctor employed to visit the large shelter first aid posts 
regularly.287 To prevent infectious diseases from spreading, health officers offered free 
vaccinations for diseases, such as diphtheria, in the shelters.288 Those suffering from 
tuberculosis were offered alternate shelter and each family with a tuberculosis case was to 
have their own shelter, even receiving priority distribution of the Anderson shelter.289 
Smoking was prohibited in all public shelters, but such restrictions were largely ignored 
and pipes or cigarettes hastily hidden at the sight of an official or warden.290 One official 
suggested sandwiching a health hygiene film between two amusing ones to ensure they 
would be watched and enjoyed.291 
 Special shelter wardens were appointed to keep order. Any public shelter where 
civilians regularly spent the night required shelter wardens, at the rate of one male and 
one female warden for shelters with under 200 shelterers and two paid wardens per 500 
shelterers in shelters with over 500 regular shelterers.292 The selection of shelter wardens 
required care and only those capable of being firm without “adopting a bullying or 
domineering attitude” were to be chosen.293 Wardens were also required to be 
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sympathetic, tactful, and confident.294 Shelter wardens received training in such subjects 
as crowd control, the prevention of panic, shelter cleaning, hygiene, sleeping 
arrangements, canteens, women and girls in shelters, medical arrangements, 
entertainment, and stimulation of self-help.295 In some shelters, after complaints were 
received, shelter wardens received access to a small cubicle or other private space where 
they could hang their clothes, write reports, eat their meals, and sleep, away from the 
general public.296 Those who supported the idea of a private space for shelter wardens 
argued that public morale was largely dependent on the morale of the shelter warden.297  
 Despite the relatively sophisticated system set up to run the tube shelters, 
complaints were plentiful. Overcrowding was one of the primary complaints. At the 
entrances to tube stations the crowds were particularly worrisome, all rushing into the 
station at the sound of a siren, often with no system of order. Civilians suggested adding 
strong handrails to entrances, forcing people to enter in a single, orderly line, or making 
two entrances, one for men and the other for women and children.298 Sometimes those 
who had been allotted bunks inside the stations had to fight their way through crowds 
blocking stairways, escalators, and entrance halls.299 During a raid people sought 
protection in the tube stations wherever they could find space, massing on escalators, 
platforms, stairwells, and entrance halls and this caused particular problems when packed 
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trains arrived with passengers needing to exit.300 One observer remarked at the crowds 
pushing and people climbing over railings to escape the throng that “everything was there 
for the making of a catastrophe.”301 Bug infestations were not uncommon in public 
shelters. Old Street tube station drew particular ire from officials for its supposed bed bug 
infestation and overcrowded conditions, although an official inspector failed to find any 
vermin at the station.302 At Finsbury Park, shelter health officials traced an outbreak of 
vermin to the bunk of one shelterer with infested bedding, worrying that bugs on the 
platforms could be picked up by tube passengers and increase the infestation.303 Just a 
few days later several more tube stations reported sighting bed bugs and London’s civil 
defense and public health officials issued a circular on how to combat bed bug 
infestations.304 Officials considered the shelterers’ bedding “one of the greatest sources of 
danger” and a variety of solutions to the dirty bedding problem were proposed.305 
Leicester Square, for instance, offered wooden cubby holes where shelterers could leave 
their bedding during the day for the charge of one shilling.306 Other authorities contracted 
with a laundry to have bedding collected in the morning and returned washed in the 
evening for a small charge.307 The tight conditions also made nuisance behavior a 
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particular problem. In one tube station shelterers complained about the disturbance made 
by a woman’s pet monkey.308 
 Officials worried especially about the shelterers and passengers of the tube in the 
case of a gas attack. The question of poison gas and the underground network was 
addressed as early as 1936. One official called on the CDRD to investigate gas-proofing 
the tube before any determination could be made on whether the underground could be 
used as a shelter.309 While experiments indicated that some stations could be gas-proofed, 
the extensive and overlapping system as a whole made generalizations impossible.310 The 
Chemical Warfare Committee initially ruled out the tube as a sheltering system, because, 
despite it providing good protection against HE bombs, they assumed the ventilation 
system would draw gas into the tunnels and gas anyone sheltering there.311 By 1943 a gas 
warning device had been installed at 34 tube stations to alert officials and shelterers 
should gas enter the tubes.312 A protocol was also established for dealing with the 
presence of gas near a tube station. If gas was present in the vicinity of the station, fans 
were to be immediately switched off, the stations on either side notified, the drivers and 
guards of each arriving train were to be warned, a sign displayed on forward headwalls to 
indicate the presence of gas and slow the trains to 15 mph, and passengers exiting the 
train alerted with a prominent sign of the presence of gas that also instructed them to don 
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their respirators.313 The shelter warden was to be responsible for ensuring that those 
sheltering on platforms put on their gas masks.314 As with the communal shelters, the tube 
stations were not gas proof and thus the respirator was the primary method of defense 
against a gas attack. Officials found, however, that only a minute proportion of the public 
actually carried their respirators into the tube, creating concerns of mass casualties should 
a gas attack occur.315 Borough of Kensington officials asked for permission to refuse 
admission to the tube shelters to anyone not carrying their respirator, but civil defense 
regional officers did not want to give such powers to local authorities.316 Officials 
particularly worried about the panic that would erupt when gas entered a tube station and 
only few people had respirators.317 Others envisioned the “rougher elements in the 
shelter” appropriating the respirators of people too weak to fight them.318 
 While deep shelters had never been a priority for the government, five deep shelters 
were eventually built in underground railway tunnels. Construction on these new shelters 
began as early as January 1941 and even after they were completed at the end of 1942, 
these shelters were held in reserve, not to be opened until necessary.319 The bunk capacity 
of the deep shelters was around 64,000.320 One use considered for the deep shelters was 
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as a dormitory for night workers who could thus sleep restfully during the day.321 The 
press, however, found out about the shelters and published hyperbolic articles that the 
government thought would undermine morale. The News Chronicle published a story that 
described the new shelters as luxurious, with a “central avenue 16 ft. across, flanked with 
miniature hospitals, shops, restaurants, offices and inquiry and washing stations.”322 The 
shelters were said to hold one million people in total and were “bomb, gas, water and fool 
proof.”323 Such exaggerated articles clearly undermined the government’s efforts to 
promote existing shelters. One annoyed official, scrawling in the margins of the article, 
asked “How did this silly story happen?”324 In a letter to newspaper editors the Home 
Office urged them not to advertise the deep shelters, to avoid giving the world a false 
impression of how London was coping with the new menace of the flying bombs and to 
avoid instilling a deep shelter mentality in the public.325 Too much press coverage 
concerning the deep shelters could also undermine the public’s trust in their existing 
shelters and as there was not enough space in the deep shelters for likely demand, this 
could potential lead to chaos and loss of faith in the government.326 The flying bomb did 
ultimately induce the government to open the deep shelters. Over a period of two weeks 
in July 1944 the five shelters were opened to shelterers transferred from other stations 
and to new shelterers bombed out of their homes, as well as women and children.327 
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 Sheltering underground might have appeared as the safest option, but there were 
nevertheless casualties in the tube shelters. There were relatively few fatal accidents 
inside the tube shelters, but direct hits on tube stations did lead to casualties. On three 
consecutive nights in October 1940, three tube shelters were hit, killing 90 shelterers 
total.328 Direct hits also underscored the government’s dispersal policy, as casualties were 
often significant for single incidents. 64 people were killed in a direct hit on Balham 
station, while 53 shelterers died at Bank station during a raid.329 The worst loss of civilian 
life during the war also occurred at a tube station, although this was not due to bombs, 
but as a result of the very panic civil defense was aiming to forestall. On the evening of 
March 3rd, 1943, an alert sounded that saw hundreds of those living nearby hurry to seek 
shelter at the Bethnal Green tube station, a number that was quickly swelled by patrons 
from two cinemas and three buses setting their passengers down outside the shelter.330 
Within ten minutes of the alert, 1,500 people attempted to enter the shelter through the 
stairwell when a nearby rocket battery discharged a salvo that created panic in the 
crowd.331 Believing the noise to be enemy bombs the crowd surged forward and, when a 
woman at the bottom step fell, the pressure of the crowd was so intense that many were 
pushed forward, on top of others that fell, creating a mass of bodies five or six deep.332 
The chief investigator wrote that in the span of ten seconds the stairwell was converted 
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from a “corridor to a charnel house.”333 With the crowd on top of the steps still surging 
forward to enter the shelter and those at the bottom a tangled mass, extrication was nearly 
impossible.334 When the crowd was finally cleared and casualties removed and sent to 
hospitals, the death toll was staggering. 173 people had died, most of them women and 
children, and all had died as a result of suffocation and extreme compression.335 A special 
investigator was appointed who blamed the disaster on a variety of reasons, both 
psychological and physical. The tube station’s single entrance, poor lighting in the 
stairwell, and lack of handrails and crush barriers were contributing factors, while the 
mad rush of several hundreds of people attempting to push into the shelter was the 
primary reason for the disaster.336 As the Borough had, as early as 1941, contemplated the 
very disaster that actually occurred, yet had failed to address the issues they had 
highlighted, some of the blame was also directed at the local authority.337 In 1939 the 
Hailey Report had advocated ramps be provided over stairs in shelter entrances, 
suggesting that stairs were likely to lead to disaster.338 
 Larger issues of civil defense were consistently at play in the British shelter 
program. While physical protection of the civil population was the primary and most 
important purpose of air raid shelters, the shelter program also served other purposes that 
fitted into the wider objectives of civil defense. The British government certainly worked 
actively to offer its population at least basic protection from air raids, but government 
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departments and officials also aimed to make sure the population knew the government 
was trying to protect them. The distribution of the Anderson shelters, although they did 
serve a protective purpose, was also intended to quiet the rising criticisms of the 
government’s poor shelter preparations. The goal of maintaining morale infused much of 
the shelter program, as it did other parts of civil defense. While protecting civilians from 
physical harm certainly had the side effect of preserving morale, the addition of amenities 
in shelters, such as bunks, lighting, canteens, and entertainment programs were almost 
entirely intended to serve this objective, as well. Despite the burden of providing shelters 
falling on the government and local authorities, the concept of self-help, vital to the 
success of civil defense, was pervasive in the shelter program, as well. This primarily 
consisted of encouraging civilians to build and improve their own shelters and to take an 
interest in their own protection, but was also reflected in the self-help-oriented shelter 
classes given in large public shelters. Shelter officials specifically instructed that, in order 
to ensure collective welfare, “the self help spirit must be encouraged and taught.”339 
While the British shelter program most certainly saved civilian lives, it also reinforced 
the general ideas of civil defense that were vital to the nation’s continued resistance.  
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Chapter 7 - “Anything but house-trained:” Civil Defense and Issues of Class, 
Gender, and Childhood 
 
 
 In the lead-up to WWII and during the war itself, civil defense became intrinsic to 
British society, informing all aspects of everyday life. Many people volunteered their 
time and efforts for some type of civil defense work so that civil defense became 
integrated into many aspects of civilian life. Even those civilians who did not directly 
volunteer interacted with elements of civil defense during their daily lives, whether by 
carrying a gas mask, seeking protection in a shelter, or following blackout guidelines. 
Civil defense became a part of war-time society to the extent that almost no aspect of 
everyday life remained untouched.  While civil defense had a direct impact on British 
society, society and culture, in turn, also influenced civil defense. Issues of class were 
pervasive in British society pre-war and even the great equalizing force of war could not 
always erase biases and prejudices. Civil defense efforts also often caused great 
consternation as many feared that war-time living would corrode moral values. Children, 
unable to participate properly in civil defense and considered a particularly vulnerable 
population, presented one of the largest challenges. Their physical and spiritual wellbeing 
were ongoing concerns that required careful solutions. The primary response, evacuation, 
directly correlated with the wider civil defense policy of dispersal. 
 There was a well-developed class system in British society prior to WWII. While 
years of war certainly affected all classes and sometimes even required cooperation 
between classes, the poorer working class, particularly those of dense urban areas like 
London’s East End, carried the heaviest burden. Despite shared experiences of rationing, 
sheltering, poison gas anxieties, and aerial raids, the prevailing view of the lower classes 
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among their social betters remained relatively unchanged. Negative views of the working 
class as uncouth, unintelligent, and troublesome also informed aspects of civil defense. 
Issues over class arose in ARP jobs, shelters, with gas masks, and, in particular, with 
evacuation. 
 Class issues were particularly evident in the shelters. A report on ARP measures in 
WWI praised “the more educated and responsible” part of the population, who listened to 
the advice to stay at home during a raid, in contrast to “the masses, particularly those 
living in the East End” who were determined not to stay at home at the least sign of a raid 
and sought better shelter in their thousands.1 Because most of these civilians sought 
refuge in the underground stations, causing significant overcrowding and impeding 
regular business, the government issued a request to news editors to refrain from 
publishing articles that might add to “the apprehension already prevalent among the 
poorest and most ignorant classes.”2 One newspaper correspondent complained about the 
condition of shelters in Coventry, describing how “the atmosphere of the ‘great 
unwashed’ met [him] at the head of the steps” and claiming he would not even send his 
dog to shelter there.3 A Salvation Army officer found it remarkable that two female 
workers had served tea to a shelter crowd of six thousand who were considered “to say 
the least, rough” without being jostled, despite having not even a rail to separate them 
from the masses.4 
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 Issues of class also played a role in public health. Old Street tube shelter, infamous 
for its supposed bug infestation, had a shelter population made up largely of shelterers 
from “poor and sometimes dirty houses” and the bugs found in a place where people slept 
were “presumably brought in by shelterers.”5 The Birmingham Daily Gazette pointed out 
that “poorer people” in shelters preferred the types of food condemned by nutritionists 
and did “not take readily” to healthier food, although the sales figures of the Tube 
Refreshment Service suggest all types of Londoners were guilty of such indulging.6 One 
speaker blamed the poor hygiene and bad behavior of evacuated children on their point of 
origin, explaining that slum children had unsocial habits and were not fit to mix with 
children enjoying a private education.7 Another writer agreed that vermin infestation (and 
nits on the head in particular) was a condition of poverty and a family ‘disease’ that was 
spread between children and adults in their homes.8 He added that even if such children 
were treated at school, they would return to dirty homes in their poor neighborhoods to be 
reinfected.9  
 Parenting skill was also sometimes defined by class. In trials at Southampton of the 
baby’s anti-gas helmet, four out of seven babies cried continuously throughout the test, in 
two cases even driving the mothers to tears as they operated the bellows. The trial report 
added that the mothers of the three infants who had remained calm were “intelligent and 
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firmer than those of the babies who cried.”10 A second test, held in a different part of the 
city, asked the mothers for their impressions on the helmet, because they were “of a 
superior class” than those who had attended the Southampton test.11 One writer argued 
that some people made extremely bad parents due to a disinterest in children, ignorance, 
or poverty.12 Attempting to solve the problem of evacuated children, who had been 
deloused and their behavior adjusted, returning to their poor homes and bad parents, the 
writer suggested that a considerable proportion of such children could “live quite happily 
away from their parents.”13 Evacuated children’s poor table manners were blamed on 
parents and foster parents were appalled to hear that some children had never seen their 
mothers cook.14 The Chief Inspector for the Board of Education suggested that in the case 
of children who came from the worst homes the conditions that made for sound education 
had been greatly improved by the children’s evacuation.15 
 The war also created a new type of class—those homeless as a result of air raids. In 
some areas the newly homeless simply lived in public shelters where they had access to 
sleeping arrangements and some basic amenities. While many said they would prefer 
accommodations if they were available, they were ignorant as to how these would be 
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obtained.16 Others refused new billets on the grounds that no shelter was available there, 
preferring to remain in a less comfortable environment that offered protection.17 
 Conflict was not solely confined to issues of class. Jews often found themselves the 
target of mistreatment or contempt. In one London shelter a man was removed and barred 
from returning for causing a “disturbance” against Jews sheltering there.18 In a shelter 
used predominantly by Jews the shelterers considered Jewish religious services 
inadvisable.19 The LCC had to arrange for a rest center specifically for Jews, as it was 
often too difficult to accommodate their needs, such as Yiddish speakers and kosher food, 
in the regular rest centers.20 
 Foreigners also often faced mistrust. A “foreign element” in a public shelter was 
justification for the appointment of a Shelter Welfare Officer, regardless of the number of 
shelterers.21 Lack of British citizenship was also often a bar to volunteering for various 
ARP posts. Even Shelter Welfare Officers were required to possess British nationality.22 
The refugees from Gibraltar were none too popular. Overcrowding at three tube station 
shelters was attributed to Gibraltarian refugees who refused to use the shelters provided 
for them at their hostels.23 In some stations, groups of these refugees took over entire 
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platforms to the annoyance of officials.24 At the South Kensington station they took 
possession of the bunks at an hour earlier than shelterers were normally allowed to, 
causing an uproar among the regular shelterers, who had to be sent on to another 
shelter.25 Their habits were deemed “unpleasant” and they were separated from the other 
shelterers.26 The Gibraltarians were also said to be unpopular due to their “none too 
cleanly habits.”27 Some referred to the refugees as “anything but house-trained.”28 The 
Borough of Kensington even wrote to complain, arguing that it was not their duty to 
provide shelter for refugees.29 WVS workers, however, painted a different picture, 
suggesting that the permanent shelterers had been extremely rude to the refugees and had 
started the conflict.30 The problems seemed to disappear when two of the refugees were 
appointed as shelter wardens.31 Another problem station was Notting Hill Gate, where, 
one official wrote, the “Gibraltarian children have not yet been brought under control.”32 
The children were said to have been seen begging from passengers and the shelter warden 
wished to find a way to “freeze out the Gibs who are the trouble here.”33 Evacuees from 
Malta were also maligned for declining to use their allocated shelters and heading straight 
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for the tubes.34 One minister of religion blamed an influx of Irish, whom he deemed 
“lazy, irresponsible, parasitic, and often treacherous,” for the filthy condition of many 
evacuated children.35 Irish parents, he claimed, would rather spend their funds on pubs 
than soap and allowed their children to become filthy and savage.36 
 While sheltering behavior was often correlated with class, people’s attitude towards 
their gas masks was sometimes similarly described.  In fitting tests of the GCR officials 
concluded that people of at least the middle-class would quickly learn to adjust and wear 
the respirator when the time came and that they would be unlikely to panic in an 
emergency. For the poorer classes, however, it was felt that respirator demonstrations 
would have more positive results and ought to be made compulsory.37 
 Issues over class also often revolved around ideas of morality. Religious figures, 
charities, and moral crusaders concerned themselves with the potential corruption of the 
moral fabric of society as a result of war-time living. Civil defense, forming such a 
significant part of civilians’ everyday life, was concerning because of its potential to 
upend family life and traditional societal roles. The potential corruption of youth was also 
a persistent concern. In aiming to prevent a corrosion of morals the focus of most of those 
concerned with the topic was firmly directed towards the lower classes, whose moral 
fabric was often already questionable and easily influenced. 
 Shelter living presented a particular problem to those concerned about morality. 
The Public Morality Council, established in 1899 and made up of several church 
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denominations and social and educational societies, tackled the question of the moral 
condition of public shelters in WWII.38 The Council considered that the shelter presented 
a moral problem in two aspects: improper use of empty shelters during daytime and 
crowds using the shelter during raids.39 One official wrote that the government’s 
immediate efforts ought to focus on preventing the “unnatural shelter existence having a 
deteriorating effect on health, morale, and morals.”40 He added that the public shelters’ 
worst feature was the destruction of family life and that the maintenance of the family 
unit would ensure a strong public rejection of immoral behavior.41 The London Church of 
England Temperance Society (LCETS) and the Churches’ Committee on Gambling 
conducted a survey of 150 public shelters to determine the problems arising from shelter 
living for youth, in particular.42 Their survey discovered concerning issues of gambling, 
drinking, and apathy, exacerbated by limited religious instruction.43 
 The congregation and intermingling of large numbers of people naturally led to 
complaints about behavior and disturbances, inside and outside of the shelters. Bad 
behavior was to be dealt with through police action, as it was unfair to “decent, orderly 
people” to have their shelter lives made miserable by “quarrelsome and disorderly 
persons.”44 Youths under army age were found to be the source of a lot of the trouble, and 
shelter wardens were instructed that it was not a sign of weakness to ask for a policemen 
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to check in on the shelterers and to deal with quarrelsome behavior.45 One Juvenile Court 
probation officer blamed shelter living and high wages for increases in juvenile crime.46 
Children sometimes used empty shelters as playgrounds, and public toilets, during the 
day to the consternation of officials.47 Foreign soldiers and sailors were accused of not 
being accustomed to the moral standards of Britain and some complaints were received 
about their behavior.48 One man was beaten by a crowd and subsequently arrested after 
being discovered in a shelter with a three-year-old girl that he was accused of having 
unlawfully and indecently assaulted.49 The shelters themselves also offered opportunities 
for thieves and in many locations public shelters were robbed of their electric lightbulbs, 
closets, picks, and shovels.50 
 The mixing of men and women, particularly in a dormitory setting, was especially 
concerning. One official suggested that, in order to curb the anxiety arising out of this 
mixing of the sexes, shelters, where it was possible, should so move or allocate bunks 
that blocks of compartments of them could be reserved for different groups.51 The groups 
would be arranged with unaccompanied men first, then older boys, family parties, girls, 
and unaccompanied women.52 Screens were to be set up for nursing mothers behind 
which they could nurse in privacy.53 The Chairman of East London’s juvenile court 
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claimed that any young girl going into a shelter without her mother and father was 
“simply asking for trouble.”54 One shelter warden claimed he kept his population under 
control and out of trouble by separating the men’s beds from those of the women and 
children.55 The same warden also turned away young, unaccompanied girls from the 
shelter, claiming that the shelter was there to offer protection and not free lodging for 
girls looking to attract men.56 Issues over the mixing of the sexes could occur even in 
domestic shelters. One woman, whose family shared an Anderson shelter with a neighbor 
and her male lodger, would refuse to lie down on the bunks as she could not put her feet 
up in the presence of a man.57 
 The presence of vices in the population was consistently a reason for complaint. 
Drinking was common “among certain groups of people” and some of these brought their 
drinking into the shelters.58 Problems with drunkenness were particularly noticeable on 
paydays, weekends, and evenings without raids when people would spend their time in 
pubs before returning to the shelter.59 The presence of drink or drunkenness in shelters 
sapped moral conduct among shelterers, although many people likely drank as a result of 
boredom.60 Drinking among both young men and women was increasing and again 
intense boredom was cited as the cause.61 One observer suggested it was the combination 
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of drink and women that led to “objectionable incidents.”62 Reports of drunkenness in 
shelters were widespread. In some shelters drunken brawlers terrorized women and 
children and continued their fights even during an actual air raid.63 Several such drunken 
brawlers received month-long prison sentences, although magistrates wished they could 
impose harsher punishments on such men.64 Gambling was an even more common sight 
than drinking, with small groups of people engaged in various games, usually secluded in 
a corner or bay.65 The presence of children in shelters, who might observe these games, 
made gambling a more pressing concern.66 Social workers and the clergy particularly 
wanted to avoid the initiation of youth into gambling habits and occurrences of gambling 
in shelters were dealt with strictly.67 Across the country shelterers caught gambling could 
be charged under the Vagrancy Act, which deemed anyone playing by way of wagering in 
public a vagabond, or under the Gaming Act of 1845, which could see fines as high as 
£50 or even jail time for an offense.68 In several cases, men, women, and juveniles were 
fined between two and twelve shillings for playing games such as pontoon, Brag, and 
rummy.69 Card sharpers, who moved from shelter to shelter and preyed on youth and 
women, were considered a particular nuisance.70 While the responsibility for catching 
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gamblers and notifying police rested with the shelter warden, shelterers themselves were 
encouraged to report such behavior.71  
 Even outside of the shelters gambling and betting were considered immoral vices. 
Although sports associated with betting were suspended at the outbreak of war, within 
just a few weeks horse and greyhound racing, as well as football, returned and with them 
gambling quickly rose to almost its pre-war levels.72 When it was suggested that betting 
pools on football matches would improve the morale of the working man by giving him 
something to do in the evenings, one official in the Northwestern Region commented that 
this was a “confession of moral bankruptcy that needs no comment.”73  
 Shelters were also sometimes linked to inappropriate sexual behaviors. The 
conditions of darkness and congestion in shelters were said to cause immoral behavior.74 
In central London young men and women supposedly used the large shelters as meeting 
points and then returned to unused surface shelters for sexual activities.75 Most 
concerning, however, were the rumors that in some districts prostitutes used shelters to 
ply their trade.76 A member of the Church Army reported that “undesirable women” were 
making use of a shelter in Portsea Place and that one woman in particular had made it a 
habit to bring different men in and out while keeping to a dark corner of the shelter.77 
Another observer claimed one basement shelter, its dim lighting making it difficult to see 
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what was going on, was being used for immoral purposes and quoted the shelter’s warden 
as claiming the shelter was nothing more than a brothel.78 Shelter wardens received 
specific training in how to deal with prostitutes, although they were cautioned about 
identifying a woman as a common prostitute, as a mistake could bring “serious 
consequences.”79 The primary duty of a shelter warden in regard to prostitutes was 
simply to stop solicitation and prevent the annoyance of shelterers.80 In another shelter a 
teenaged girl commandeering the darkest part of the shelter was said to regularly invite 
boys her own age to “share her blanket,” a state of affairs the Church Army found “very 
distressing.”81 At several stations complaints were made about “luridly jacketed so called 
novels” on display and officials quickly withdrew the offending books.82 At the Ramsgate 
Tunnels shelter, officials had to institute new rules about the use of cubicles for sleeping 
and remove curtains and doorways after public morality concerns arose.83 The City 
Council of Gloucester also complained about immoral behavior occurring in their public 
shelters, but police were too short-handed to effectively combat the problem.84 A juvenile 
court probation officer blamed problems of immorality on adolescents sleeping huddled 
together in the public shelters.85 
 Women, and their morality and plight, generally received special attention. The 
presence of women in shelters sometimes occasioned concern. Shelter wardens were 
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specifically trained to deal with “special cases” of women, including prostitutes, “strays,” 
and women with children who were neglected.86 Strays included runaways from homes 
or schools, stranded girls, and “generally wayward girls,” which, in all cases, required the 
involvement of the police to return the young women to their proper location.87 When 
women ambulance drivers asked to be issued the men’s combination suit, which was 
more practical, instead of the traditional woman’s greatcoat, officials were initially 
reluctant, pointing to the resistance of Herbert Morrison and Lady Reading to female civil 
defense workers wearing trousers.88 One official thought that the opposition to trousers 
was based on “the fundamental grounds of aesthetics” instead of practicality, however.89 
The Home Office eventually acquiesced, allowing female civil defense workers to wear 
uniform trousers, if their local authority approved.90 Some worried that women wearing 
trousers, a much more common sight during the war as a result of women in the 
workforce and the civil defense services, negated their function as women and that the 
war would have been fought in vain were it to continue.91 One vicar considered the 
wearing of trousers an “evil habit,” condemning the increasing practice on the basis of 
the Bible.92 Others merely opposed women wearing trousers on the grounds of aesthetics, 
wishing a law could be enforced to end the practice.93 
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 The persistent apathy among shelterers was a concern for the government. Apathy 
was particularly concerning because it undermined the civil defense principles of self-
help and the upkeep of morale. One person complained that “the young industrialist in 
the Shelter is becoming the spiritual and mental antithesis of his brother in the Spitfire.”94 
The apathy among shelterers was also referred to as “dumb stoicism” and led to a lack of 
enthusiasm for the war and the necessary work that could threaten to undermine the war 
effort.95 To combat this apathy, suggested one civilian, it was necessary to increase and 
improve the social amenities available in the shelters and to do this shelter space needed 
to be enlarged, as well.96 The survey conducted by the LCETS found that lack of space 
for welfare activities and social life resulted in apathy and a deterioration of “gay courage 
into dumb stoicism […].”97 
 While actual cases of improper behavior may have been isolated, concerns over 
immorality received widespread attention. So much so that the issue of shelter immorality 
was serious enough to be addressed by the House of Commons, although the 
Undersecretary of the Home Office reassured members that claims of immorality made 
by the Public Morality Council specifically had been greatly exaggerated.98 Newspapers 
were quick to take up the cause and both the Daily Mirror and the Evening Standard 
published articles about immoral behavior occurring in shelters and the response needed 
                                                        
94 TNA: HO207/386, Head of the Oxford House to Councillor Key, April 9, 1941, 1. 
95 TNA: HO207/386, A Report on Shelters & Youth enquiries, 1941, 3. 
96 TNA: HO207/386, Head of the Oxford House to Councillor Key, April 9, 1941, 1. 
97 LMA: A/PMC/071, The Churches’ Committee on Gambling, Youth in Air Raid Shelters, March 1941, 1. 
98 United Kingdom, House of Commons, “Shelters,” Parliamentary Debates, No. 52, Vol. 371, 23 April 
1941. 
 
 275 
to combat the problem.99 The News Review described moral conditions inside London’s 
air raid shelters as horrifying and praised Bishop Godfrey Fisher, Chairman of the Public 
Morality Council, for his dedication to eradicating the problem.100 Immorality was 
concerning not merely for its spiritual implications, but because a decay in morality was 
likely to impact public morale, in general.  
 Civilians, government officials, and the clergy were continuously attempting to 
combat these perceived problems. A Salvation Army officer claimed that immorality was 
an issue only in poorly-managed shelters, suggesting that close control and oversight 
were the solution.101 The primary method to address vice was to alleviate boredom, as 
most officials and clergy believed that boredom was the main impetus for bad 
behavior.102 A strong community spirit also aided the prevention of immorality.103 In 
areas where a large proportion of one church’s congregation sheltered together the impact 
of religion on shelter life was “bold and authoritative,” ensuring good conduct and the 
absence of immorality.104 The presence of good shelter wardens would control conduct 
and ensure a high standard of behavior in the shelters.105 Additionally, an increased police 
presence could deter bad behavior and Scotland Yard formed an anti-vice squad of forty 
policewomen specifically to prevent immorality in or around air raid shelters.106 An 
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informal committee was formed to address social problems in shelters, made up of 
representatives of organizations such as the Church of London Temperance Society, the 
Church of England Moral Welfare Council, the Church Committee on Gambling, and the 
LCC.107 The committee instituted a survey that asked youth about drinking, gambling, 
and sexual immorality in shelters and what could be done to combat this.108 One vicar 
asked the LCC to convert his unsuitable church building into an air raid shelter to have all 
of his flock under his control, as the only alternative for the people was to shelter in small 
groups in nearby basements and brick shelters.109 In one district the bothersome juveniles 
were given jobs to do to keep them occupied and out of trouble.110 One group handed out 
pamphlets detailing the dangers and immorality of games of chance through the use of 
quotes and anecdotes in an attempt to combat gambling in the shelters.111 
 Religious ministration was one of the primary means of combating problems of 
behavior and morality. The Salvation Army ministered to the spiritual, temporal, and 
moral needs of those in the shelters, seeing the provision of refreshments to shelterers as 
a means to attend their spiritual and moral needs, as well.112 The Baptist Union of Great 
Britain and Ireland saw in the shelter population a “good Christian opportunity of 
influencing them for moral or spiritual good.”113 One Reverend claimed “opportunities in 
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Shelters are unbounded,” but cautioned his colleagues to first make the people “God-
conscious.”114 The Church Army’s slogan was “Prayer in every Shelter every night” and 
they issued a pamphlet with prayers specifically intended to uplift the spirit of those in 
shelters.115 A Conference of Clergy met specifically to address how to make the best use 
of spiritual opportunities in public shelters. One Reverend boasted of the success of 
church services in shelters, explaining how in one shelter a group of men who regularly 
played cards would drop their game when the service began to join in the singing and 
prayer.116 The Derby Christian Social Council saw religious intervention as a means to 
combat rising juvenile crime rates, suggesting that a more vital interest in Sunday School 
work and wiser and stricter guidance in the home could solve the problem.117 
 Children, as a particularly vulnerable group, presented a pressing concern to both 
government and civilians alike prior to the outbreak of war. Despite the issue of gas 
masks and provision of shelters for the population, the remaining risk to children from air 
raids was still considered unacceptable. Casualties were inevitable in war and even those 
children who were not harmed directly by raids would nevertheless suffer from the 
strains of war-time living. The best solution to protect vulnerable children in urban areas 
likely to be bombed seemed to be an extreme form of dispersal—to evacuate them to 
safer locations. The government’s evacuation program aimed to remove school-aged 
children from big cities, such as London or Birmingham, and send them to live with 
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volunteer families in rural areas of the country. While the evacuation program came into 
action almost immediately upon the declaration of war in September 1939, its overall 
success is difficult to determine.118 
 Evacuation was under consideration even before the outbreak of war. The idea was 
part of the government’s larger policy of dispersal and proposed removing large parts of 
the population from zones of danger in the case of war. Parliament, the press, government 
officials, and the public at large considered whether evacuation was feasible and to what 
extent. As early as 1925 the CID considered solutions to limit damage from air raids in 
London and concluded that, although those vital to maintaining the city’s activities 
should remain, arrangements ought to be made to evacuate “the unnecessary mouths.119” 
A committee formed in 1938 to specifically address the idea of evacuation similarly 
concluded that in order to ensure the continuance of the national war effort and supply 
essential civilian needs, the large industrial towns needed to be maintained, but that 
evacuation should be considered for non-essential parts of their populations.120 For the 
                                                        
118 For a more detailed look at Britain’s evacuation scheme see John Welshman, Churchill’s Children: the 
evacuee experience in wartime Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Travis Crosby, The 
impact of civilian evacuation in the Second World War (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Jessica Mann, Out 
of harm’s way (London: Headline, 2014); Julie Summers, When the children came home: stories from 
wartime evacuees (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Edward Stokes, Innocents abroad: the story of 
British child evacuees in Australia, 1940-1945 (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1994); 
Mike Brown, Evacuees: Evacuation in Wartime Britain, 1939-1945 (New York: The History Press, 
2013). 
 
There are also many published memoirs and recollections of former child evacuees, including Doreen Lehr, 
A Girls War: A Childhood Lost in Britain’s WWII Evacuation (Charleston, SC: Advantage Media Group, 
2010); Gillian Mawson, Evacuees: Children’s Lives on the WW2 Home Front (Casemate Publishers, 
2014); Janice Anderson, Children of the war years: childhood in Britain during 1939 to 1945 (London: 
Futura, 2008); Christina Rex, Children’s voices of the Second World War: doodlebugs, gas masks & gum 
(Stroud: Amberley, 2015). 
119 TNA: CAB 24/171, Committee of Imperial Defence, Sub-Committee on Air Raid Precautions, Report, 
July 8, 1925, 13. 
120 Ministry of Home Security, Civil Defence in the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1942), 6. 
 
 279 
purposes of evacuation the country was divided into three categories: Evacuation Areas, 
the most congested industrial areas in danger of attack, Neutral Areas, less congested 
areas not to be evacuated but not suited for receiving evacuees, and Reception Areas 
where evacuees were to be billeted.121 Three groups qualified for evacuation under the 
government scheme: schoolchildren, who were to be accompanied by their teachers, pre-
school aged children accompanied by their mothers or other women, and adult blind or 
handicapped persons.122 At the time of the September Crisis in 1938 hasty plans were 
made for evacuation, which were then extended or replaced by much more detailed plans 
in the intervening year before the outbreak of war.123 
 At the outbreak of war evacuation was to follow a set plan. The government 
eventually established three evacuation plans to cover all schoolchildren, as well as 
mothers with young children, although the initial wave of evacuation only dealt with 
schoolchildren. Plan V, also referred to as “the Trickle,” evacuated school-aged children 
to billets in reception areas.124 Plan VII transported mothers and young children through 
the government’s scheme, while Ev. 10 allowed mothers and children to evacuate to self-
selected billets, such as a relative’s house, using railroad vouchers.125 Emergency food 
rations were to be issued or sent forward to last each evacuee 48 hours, to ensure that the 
receiving area’s strictly-rationed food supply was not overwhelmed until proper supplies 
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could be allocated.126 Each child evacuee received a bag containing one can of meat, two 
cans of milk, one packet of biscuits, and a quarter pound of chocolate.127 Adults were 
issued the same supplies, plus an extra can of meat, and were instructed to rely on the 
emergency rations for the first few days in the reception area.128 A particular problem for 
the evacuation scheme were children under school age whose mothers could not 
accompany them. Mothers could send their young children with another woman willing 
to look after them, who would qualify for the same lodging benefits as the mother, or 
they could apply for one of the very limited spaces in a country nursery.129 To register for 
evacuation parents were asked to contact the child’s school, or, if the mother planned to 
evacuate, as well, to register at an emergency rest center.130 For each child the 
government paid the receiving householder between eight shillings sixpence and 15 
shillings, depending on the age of the child.131 Parents were obligated to pay six shillings 
a week per evacuated child, although this fee was adjusted based on means.132 Similarly, 
for mothers evacuating with their children, a lodging allowance would be paid to the 
householder taking them in, although such lodgers were generally expected to supply 
their own food.133 Parents were also asked to supply their children with boots, clothing, 
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and little necessities before sending them off, but children whose parents could not afford 
to do so were outfitted by the government and through charities, such as the WVS.134 
Parents were allowed to visit their children, although they were encouraged to let the 
children settle in and not to visit too often as not to clog up the roadways and railways 
vital to the war effort.135 A fourth evacuation scheme, the Bombed Babies Scheme, dealt 
with the evacuation of children being discharged from hospitals who normally resided in 
an evacuation area. Unlike the other schemes, which were entirely voluntary, by 1941 a 
regulation empowered authorities in evacuation areas to order the removal from the area 
any child “suffering in mind or body as a result of hostile attacks or is in such a state of 
health as to be likely to suffer if he remains in that area.136” Officials would strongly 
encourage the parents of injured children to consent to evacuation, either with the school 
class in the case of school-aged children or with a nursery party in the case of 
unaccompanied younger children.137 
 The benefits of evacuation, for children especially, were plentiful. Removing 
children from areas likely to be bombed was the best solution to providing safety. 
Shelters, not immune to direct hits, could not only not guarantee safety, but offered poor 
living conditions. Removing the children from danger would also allow parents to avoid 
worrying about their safety, ensuring they could focus their full attention on supporting 
the war effort. Evacuation was a particularly potent argument when it came to the 
“bombed babies,” or children who were in the hospital as a result of enemy action. 
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Government officials were anxious that such children, especially those sent to recover 
outside of evacuation areas, not return to the dangerous cities and instead be evacuated.138 
Besides safety, evacuation was touted as providing several other benefits to children. 
Health and well-being of children was a popular talking point for those advocating 
evacuation and was reiterated consistently by the evacuation propaganda material. The 
fresh country air was seen as beneficial to children living in crowded cities.139 Shelter 
living, with its associated lack of fresh air, sunlight, restful sleep, and risk of disease, was 
considered a serious hazard to the health of children and evacuation was offered as the 
alternative.140 A 1941 Ministry of Information pamphlet claimed that “practically all the 
[evacuated] children have improved in physique, general health, poise and bearing […]” 
during their stay in the reception area.141 Such an improvement was attributed to the fresh 
air, as well as increased availability of fruit and vegetables.142 
 Education was another benefit of evacuation. While schooling in urban cities, and 
London in particular, was severely interrupted, children could continue full-time school 
work in the reception areas.143 Despite the LCC’s attempts to keep schools open if some 
attendance could be achieved, many schools in the five boroughs and the City had to be 
closed.144 LCC officials estimated that only one out of six London children were 
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attending school and those schools that were open averaged fewer than fifty pupils.145 
Additionally, the reduced school hours of twenty per week were even further diminished 
by air raid alarms that would see pupils and teachers huddle in shelters for hours a week 
without educational instruction.146 A pamphlet designed to convince mothers to evacuate 
their children told readers that “it is not fair” for children to go without education or fresh 
air and uninterrupted sleep.147 Evacuating the children was also said to make life easier 
for those remaining. There would be more spaces in shelters and less food, fuel, and care 
would be needed for those remaining in the city.148 Citing these benefits of evacuation 
was not only intended to convince parents of evacuating their children, but also assured 
them they need not worry. Dispersal, intending to reduce mass casualties and preserve 
morale, was even more important in the case of children, whose deaths were likely to 
negative affect morale across society. Thus evacuating and protecting British children 
was another means by the government to ensure the preservation of civilian morale. 
 The press supported the evacuation scheme by publishing articles and pictures of 
evacuated children enjoying their new surroundings. The Sphere depicted evacuated 
London children enjoying an exercise session on the beach and roaming the woods and 
fields in Devonshire.149 The Scotsman pictured smiling evacuees playing in a cornfield 
and reassured readers that the children were settling down happily.150 A writer for the 
Coventry Herald argued that, although six months after evacuation many people 
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considered the scheme a failure, evacuation had had positive benefits. Not only were the 
children safe, but they were improving in knowledge, outlook, experience, and health.151 
Country life was said to have a remarkable effect on the children’s physiques.152 The 
Newcastle Evening Chronicle showed evacuated local children happily smiling at the 
camera surrounded by nature, while one of them held a dog.153 An official government 
pamphlet, issued by the Ministry of Information, was similarly reassuring, depicting 
evacuated children frolicking in hay, helping out with farm work, receiving education, 
playing in nature, and cuddling with farm animals.154 
 Complaints about evacuation were nevertheless plentiful. Evacuation was hugely 
unpopular among the population. Parents who did evacuate their children were 
sometimes criticized by their neighbors.155 As the initial evacuation scheme only covered 
schoolchildren, many doubted the government’s sincerity, questioning why younger 
children were not included, as well.156 Evacuation officials also believed that parents had 
a false sense of security as a result of Anderson shelters and balloon barrages, but feared 
that compulsory evacuation would breed resentment and would be opposed by the 
people.157 Evacuation officers estimated that as many as 80% of parents in London would 
refuse to evacuate their children if the scheme were made compulsory.158 The Minister of 
Health, although a proponent of compulsory evacuation, argued that forcing parents to 
                                                        
151 “Has Evacuation Scheme Failed?” Coventry Herald, March 2, 1940. 
152 ibid. 
153 “Gateshead Children in Cheery Mood,” Newcastle Evening Chronicle, September 8, 1939. 
154 LMA: EO/WAR/5/18, Ministry of Information, The Schools in Wartime (London: HMSO, 1941). 
155 LMA: EO/WAR/1/48, Compulsory Evacuation, 1940, 1. 
156 ibid. 
157 ibid. 
158 ibid, 3. 
 
 285 
evacuate their children would seriously impair the morale of the population.159 Some 
people were wary about evacuation because of rumors that empty homes with furniture 
would be commandeered by the government for billeting purposes, and the furniture 
sold.160 While school-aged children were evacuated with their school class, younger 
children could not be evacuated on their own. Mothers were encouraged to evacuate with 
their young children, although, many women were reluctant to leave behind husbands, 
older children, or other relatives who required their assistance.161  
 With tensions rising in Europe, the evacuation scheme was put into motion two 
days before the outbreak of war. On September 1st, 1939, the government evacuation 
scheme came into effect and immediately required the transport of one and a half million 
people across the country, more than half of them children.162 Evacuation was mostly 
completed in two to three days, suggesting the detailed plans created after the crisis in 
1938 had been successful.163 In London, the scheme evacuated 286,000 people on day 
one, 192,000 on day two, and over 100,000 on day three.164 While tens of thousands of 
people were evacuated under the scheme, things did not always go smoothly. 
Transportation was complicated, particularly outside of London, and some schools found 
themselves in remote locations with no local schools or education supplies, while other 
schools were split up across several small villages.165 Many of the receiving areas, rural 
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locations with small resident populations, had school accommodations only sufficient for 
local children.166 Officials thus spent weeks moving schools, re-billeting children, 
sending books and equipment, and pressing into service halls, large houses, and other 
buildings to serve as school rooms.167 
 Finding places to billet the children and adults accompanying them was not always 
easy, either. Some women and children evacuated to a Scottish town found themselves 
bunked in a large hall with sacks of straw and jail mattresses as bedding, because the huts 
intended for them were not yet available.168 Finding billets for mothers and their young 
children was particularly difficult and the LCC considered the initial 1939 evacuation of 
this group a failure due to the lack of skilled social workers to assist the receiving 
authorities.169 Mothers were said to present the biggest billeting problem, as they were 
often unhappy and prone to upset the householder of their billet. Many returned home to 
their husbands in the danger areas, taking their children with them.170 Some groups of 
people, such as the aged and infirm, invalids, the mentally disabled, and the blind, were 
considered unsuitable for billeting with private householders and required hostels or 
institutions in the reception area.171 Schoolchildren who were physically disabled, 
behaved poorly, or were of difficult character were also not to be billeted in private 
homes.172 Some civilians suggested making use of the unused country homes of the  
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wealthy to accommodate evacuated children. One owner of such a house, however, 
argued that there was not enough domestic staff to look after children, that the 
government billet fee was too small, and that “the cottage is more suitable than the castle 
for billeting purposes.”173 
 The government invested heavily in several publicity campaigns to solve this 
problem. The Ministry of Information created posters and advertisements intended to tug 
at the heartstrings of potential foster mothers, convincing them of the vital part they could 
play in the war effort. Such advertisements mentioned the safety of the children, their 
improved health and behavior, and the gratitude of parents and the government towards 
the foster mothers.174 Taking in evacuated children was touted as “splendid service to the 
nation.”175 While the National Service Campaign recruited volunteers for civil defense 
jobs, caring for evacuated children was also advertised as “real National Service.”176 
Householders who took in evacuated children were thus reassured that this represented a 
vital contribution to the war effort and the nation. The Ministries of Information and 
Health also published a booklet describing the difficulties of billeting and suggested ways 
of overcoming these problems. The booklet mentioned three primary difficulties in 
billeting evacuees: a hesitation among the population to accept evacuees, a bad 
atmosphere that had sometimes developed between hostess and the evacuee mother, and a 
lack of volunteers for the many services required to take care of the evacuees.177 To 
                                                        
173 D.G. Greig, “Points of View; Evacuation, 1940,” The Scotsman, March 2, 1940. 
174 LMA: EO/WAR/5/20, Evacuation Advertising. 
175 LMA: EO/WAR/5/20, Evacuation Advertising, “Someone here is going to need your help,” n.d. 
176 ibid, “Caring for this boy is real National Service,” n.d. 
177 LMA: EO/WAR/5/19, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Information, Publicity to assist in The 
Problem of Billeting, 1941, 2. 
 
 288 
overcome these problems the booklet suggested breaking down the resistance among the 
population in regard to evacuees, bringing the hostess and evacuee mother together to 
make them see each other’s point of view, and making people in receiving areas 
conscious of their responsibilities.178 To achieve this, solutions were sought by using 
different avenues of publicity intended to saturate the receiving areas. Press advertising 
was one of the easiest means of reaching local populations and evacuation advertisements 
were specifically aimed at breaking down resistance to billeting and creating a better 
feeling between parties.179 Other advertisements sought to recruit volunteer social 
workers and other helpers, such as leaders of sewing parties and staff to man communal 
feeding centers.180 Additionally, local meetings were advocated as a means of breaking 
down resistance.181 The local press was encouraged to support the campaign by writing 
articles that emphasized the danger of leaving children in crowded and bombed areas, as 
well as by directing columns and articles directly at improving the atmosphere between 
hosts and evacuees.182  
 Unaccompanied children under five, however, presented the greatest problem. 
These children were too young to be evacuated alone and, without their mother to 
accompany them, they required adult supervision. Evacuated residential nurseries were 
set up to take in these children, but space was extremely limited.183 Such nurseries for 
children under five were run by the British Red Cross or the WVS and took in children 
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according to their priority class.184 Children were classed under different priority groups, 
with Priority 1 cases having been actual air raid casualties, while Priority 2 children were 
suffering due to air raids but had not been actual casualties.185 By 1942 there were 390 
nursery parties and 12,000 total cots available for unaccompanied children between the 
ages of two and five.186 The WVS was particularly involved in taking care of the under-
fives, keeping track of the over 28,000 who were sent to nurseries in the country and 
running three receiving centers in London, where children were examined and outfitted 
before being sent on.187 
 The negative opinion of evacuation among the public did not change even after 
several months of successful evacuations. Many parents were refusing to evacuate their 
children and officials began a campaign to stimulate interest in evacuation. In London, in 
particular, officers aimed to make nightly visits to public shelters and daytime visits to 
homes and public gatherings, such as queues.188 Home visits were believed to be more 
fruitful and London’s dispersal officers aimed to make visits to all homes in each borough 
where children might be living.189 In the County of London, officers were able to reach 
over 134,000 parents, but only around 30,000 agreed to register for evacuation after being 
spoken to.190 Over 20,000 refused outright and gave no reason, but many refused to 
register their children because other family members, such as older children, 
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grandparents, and fathers, were not eligible to go.191 Nearly 18,000 refused as a result of 
an earlier unsatisfactory evacuation.192 Other parents believed London was just as safe as 
elsewhere in the country, while some did not trust strangers with their children.193 The 
Bombed Babies scheme suffered not only from a lack of available space, but the whole 
process was much too slow to prevent injured children from being returned to a 
dangerous area.194 The process could often take weeks during which the child recovered 
and was either returned home or took up a valuable hospital bed.195 A rumor that 
evacuated children were being asked to fight fires caused by incendiary bombs in 
agricultural fields worried some parents, although officials were quick to reassure the 
public that this was not the case.196 Those parents with the means to avoid government 
evacuation paid their children’s way to a safer location, many as far away as America, 
Australia, and Canada.197 Other parents bought weekend cottages in the countryside or in 
Wales to evacuate themselves and their children to safety.198 
 There were also consistent complaints about the children themselves. Children 
evacuated from Glasgow were reported to have arrived at the receiving area in a 
“verminous condition.”199 In another area, both mothers and children were accused of 
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arriving in dirty and verminous states to the point where mattresses they had used needed 
to be destroyed.200 Elsewhere the children were not only verminous upon arrival, but 
some of them also had “unsatisfactory house habits.”201 Some children were also accused 
of being ill-clad, undisciplined, and unhealthy, suffering from scabies, impetigo, and 
other skin diseases supposedly brought on by dirt and lack of good food.202 Their 
behavior was also shocking to those receiving them, as they swore, lied, pilfered, refused 
to sit down for meals, failed to use cutlery, or even asked for beer.203 One writer 
considered the discovery of verminous and ill-trained children a national blemish, but 
suggested that in this case war had rendered a service in allowing the country to fix this 
problem.204 A minister called for severe penalties for parents who allowed their children 
to become verminous and who refused to clean their homes.205 Some officials, however, 
thought the claims of dirty children had been greatly exaggerated. The Secretary of State 
for Scotland considered the idea that almost no child left its home in a clean state to be 
nonsense, although he conceded that there certainly had been some cases of children 
arriving at their billets in filthy condition.206 One reverend was appalled to hear that some 
towns were refusing evacuees because of the rumors of vermin, explaining that while 
some children had arrived in filthy condition they were not the majority.207 He suggested 
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that remedying the problem was as simple as water, carbolic ointment, and patience.208 
While the majority of the hundreds of thousands of evacuees were clean and well-
behaved, there certainly were cases of vermin and disease, some serious enough to 
involve the police. Two Glasgow parents were sentenced to six months imprisonment 
after the evacuated mother and her three children had been sent home from the receiving 
area for being in a verminous and filthy state.209 
 While the government successfully evacuated hundreds of thousands of children, 
the program was not entirely successful in protecting vulnerable populations. Between 
the start of evacuation in September 1939 and the first intense bombing raids on Britain 
almost a whole year passed, leading many civilians to believe there was no need for 
evacuation. By October 1940, about 300,000 London schoolchildren had been evacuated 
by the government or through private means, while evacuated mothers with young 
children numbered over 100,000.210  During this period before intense bombing began, 
however, half of all children evacuated with their school parties and nearly all children 
evacuated with their mothers returned home.211 Some mothers had returned within just a 
month of being evacuated.212 While many returned because of a lack of perceived danger 
in the evacuation areas, others were dissatisfied with conditions in the reception areas.213 
Some were said to have become “fed-up with country life.”214 For many parents the lack 
of serious raids and the desire to have their children with them ultimately overcame the 
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fears that had led them to evacuate the children in the first place.215 A large number of 
children returned home when, at the end of October 1939, the parents’ first monetary 
billeting contribution came due.216 London was the primary focus of evacuation schemes 
and ultimately had the most people evacuated, but cities across Britain sent their 
vulnerable populations to safer areas. In Scotland, a total of 175,000 people were 
evacuated in 1939, most of them children.217  
 Interest in evacuation, and consequently the numbers of evacuees, rose and fell 
depending on the perceived danger in big cities. All evacuation areas saw a slow trickle 
of returnees almost immediately after evacuation had begun. By the end of 1939 only 
about 63% of those who had evacuated remained in the reception areas and by April of 
the next year only 300,000 evacuee children were still in the country.218 Authorities 
estimated that roughly over 120,000 school children had remained in London, although 
the start of the Blitz a month prior had again increased the interest in evacuation.219 
Additionally, the German invasion of the Low Countries and France increased the threat 
of air attack and invasion and also meant that some areas previously categorized as 
reception areas were now evacuation areas.220 Roughly 17,000 mothers and children were 
evacuated weekly from London under all schemes at the start of October, but even at that 
rate officials worried full evacuation of vulnerable children would take several months.221 
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The LCC urged another propaganda campaign to convince those parents unwilling to 
evacuate their children, but London’s Dispersal Officers thought the public had reached 
their saturation point with evacuation publicity.222 Also, the reception areas were also not 
immune from air raids and many lacked shelter facilities, making parents cautious about 
sending their children.223  Again several hundred evacuated schoolchildren returned to 
London per week in October 1940, worrying officials.224 Some considered ordering the 
railroad authorities not to carry children from reception areas to the cities without a 
certificate signed by a responsible local official.225 By the end of 1940 the number of 
children in evacuation areas had again risen to 620,000, although this was still well below 
the numbers officials would have liked.226 The introduction of the flying bomb in 1944 
again increased the interest in evacuation. On July 1st, shortly after the first buzzbombs 
fell on London, children and mothers were again urged to evacuate and applications for 
unaccompanied under-fives rose dramatically.227 The advent of this new weapon also led 
to the inclusion in the evacuation scheme of a new group, the elderly, select cases of 
whom were sent from London to special hostels.228 The knowledge that the rich had sent 
their children to safety across the Atlantic led to calls of unfairness and this, coupled with 
a growing threat of German invasion, led the government to form the Children’s Overseas 
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Reception Board (CORB) in 1940.229 This scheme intended to evacuate children to safer 
overseas locations, primarily to the Dominion countries of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and South Africa.230 The program lasted only a few months before a ship 
carrying evacuees to Canada was torpedoed and sunk, costing the lives of over 70 
children.231 The public outcry and the blame directed at the government and CORB led to 
the abandonment of the scheme and ultimately fewer than 3,000 children were evacuated 
under the program.232 Despite the various evacuation schemes many children remained 
in, or returned to, urban areas that ultimately saw extensive air raids.  
 Officials consistently complained that there were too many children in London 
shelters. One report argued that children’s parties in shelters were to be “deplored,” as it 
would only encourage parents with evacuated children to retrieve them in order to take 
part in such events.233 While some Christmas festivities were allowed in public shelters, 
officials urged that there be no reference to children’s Christmas parties so as to avoid 
encouraging parents who kept their children in domestic shelters from bringing them into 
the public shelter.234 Unofficial parties occurred nevertheless, and 11,000 toys were 
distributed to shelter children on Christmas Day 1940.235 Children living in shelters were 
sometimes described as neglected, as families spent as much time as possible in the 
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shelter and otherwise wandered the streets or sat in public parks, the children never 
receiving a proper bath and becoming “verminous or diseased.”236 Those officials 
working in public shelters, such as shelter wardens, were encouraged to persuade people 
who brought young children into shelters to evacuate them.237 Doctors and nurses were to 
be part of this task, and were asked to convince parents that shelters were no place for 
small children.238 It was also considered to have Child Welfare train workers specifically 
to go into the shelters in which there were a number of children in order to talk with the 
mothers and “preach the gospel of evacuation.”239 As a private initiative, the Association 
of Psychiatric Social Workers specially trained 150 women to go to shelters with an 
“abnormal” number of children and contact the mothers to “preach evacuation.”240 
 The behavior of children in shelters was often a source for discontent. One report 
referred to the young children frequenting public shelters as “little hooligans.”241 Shelter 
wardens and officials were instructed to record the names and addresses of children in 
shelters and find out which ones were not attending school, passing on this information to 
school attendance officers.242 “Young hooligans” was a repeated description used in  
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complaints about youth behavior, particularly the damaging of shelters.243 Outside of the 
shelters, children with nothing to do since schools had closed in many urban areas 
roamed the streets as “batches of young hooligans,” thieving and generally causing 
mischief.244 
 Solutions to this problem usually revolved around occupying the children in some 
way. One suggestion was to draw the children into groups where quiet occupation could 
be arranged for them, such as drawing, charades, or quiet games.245 Sometimes this 
welfare work with shelter children extended outside the shelter. One official was very 
positive about the “Save the Children Fund’s” effort to engage children outside of the 
communal shelters where they slept, watching as “approximately 40 slum children” 
worked in the street at carpentry, modeling, sewing, and drawing, and judged this to be 
good welfare work because it was done in the open air.246 Another solution was the 
provision of dormitory shelter at the local Boys’ and Girls’ Clubs, allowing the clubs to 
continue their work during the evening and removing a major source of nuisance, 
adolescents, from the larger public shelters.247 
 While participating in the war effort and civil defense drew together all factions of 
British society, some negative aspects could not be overcome. Different elements of 
society often mingled to a greater extent than they had before the war, working together 
as civil defense volunteers, standing in food queues, working in factories, living in 
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shelters, or being evacuated together, yet old prejudices persisted. A negative perception 
of the lower classes permeated almost every aspect of civil defense, but particularly 
shelter living and evacuation. Opinions of foreigners and Jews also sometimes affected 
how people viewed certain shelters or workers. The mingling of the sexes, increasing 
through civil defense work and shelter living, was concerning to some members of 
society who were particularly focused on issues of immorality. Wartime living, in 
general, was accused of having a negative impact on morality, especially through 
sheltering, but also the increasing role of women in society and the breakup of families. 
As a vulnerable population that could offer little help to civil defense efforts, and whose 
deaths would certainly be considered more tragic and undermine morale, children 
consistently received special attention. Following civil defense principles of dispersal, the 
government’s solution was to evacuate all children from dangerous areas, ensuring not 
only safety for the children themselves, but also lightening the burden on industrial areas 
in terms of services needed. Additionally, removing the children from danger would 
ensure that parents, freed from worry, could focus their attentions on contributing to the 
war effort. While hundreds of thousands of children were ultimately evacuated, a 
persistent return of evacuees and re-evacuation ultimately makes it difficult to determine 
how many lives were successfully saved by such schemes. 
 299 
Conclusion - “Civil Defence is Common Sense” 
 
 At the end of the war in 1945, British civil defense had proven a relative success. 
The various services, from the volunteer firefighters and demolition teams disregarding 
their own safety to put out flames and rescue survivors, to the WVS volunteers braving 
bombs to supply hot tea, had saved both civilian lives and infrastructure and had 
preserved morale. Despite occasional problems, long hours, understaffing, and an 
increasing lack of supplies as the war continued, all of the civil defense services had 
succeeded in performing their duties. Civil defense workers, however, were much more 
likely to suffer injury or death than the average civilian in the pursuit of their duties. 
Volunteers who sustained “war service injuries,” that is physical injuries suffered while 
on civil defense duty, were eligible for free treatment in all general hospitals, or at first 
aid posts for more minor injuries.1 As indication of the risks faced, the London 
Ambulance and Rescue Services had lost over 30 volunteers killed by March 1941.2 
 The other aspects of civil defense enjoyed similar successes, albeit often hampered 
by issues of organization or supply, but ultimately providing the protection they were 
intended to. In the end, chemical weapons were not used in WWII and none of the anti-
gas protective measures were put to the test. The psychological impact of poison gas on 
civil defense and the population, however, was significant. Not only did gas masks 
reassure the population that the government was taking steps to protect them, but the 
masks also served as a reminder of a citizen’s responsibilities in wartime Britain. Gas 
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masks were a consistent, physical reminder of civil defense and the threat of poison gas, 
offering both a means to ease anxiety while simultaneously ensuring anxiety was present 
in the right amount needed for participation in civil defense. The shelters, although not 
proof against a direct hit, offered protection for millions of civilians during air raids. The 
underground sheltered many Londoners for the duration of the war, offering not only 
protection, but also companionship, entertainment, and hot meals or drinks. The 
government’s policy of dispersal in sheltering proved generally successful to the extent 
that even when there was a direct hit on a shelter, the numbers of casualties were not 
shockingly high. Some of the highest single-event casualty figures of the war occurred 
later on, when people had become more complacent about sheltering and many 
entertainment venues were open again.  In 1943 a bomb dropped on a cinema in East 
Grinstead, collapsing the roof and sidewall, and caused 190 casualties, 69 of them fatal.3 
The V2 rocket, lacking the distinctive sound of the V1, exploded without warning and 
left civilians no opportunity to seek shelter, undermining the government’s attempt at 
effective dispersal and low casualty numbers. It was estimated that over 1,000 V2 rockets 
fell on southern England between September 1944 and the end of the war.4 One V2 fell 
on a row of flats, killing 134, while another killed 110 shoppers at a market.5 Over 160 
people died at a Woolworth’s department store when a V2 exploded in the store during a  
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sale.6 None of these major incidents received newspaper coverage at the time, however, 
partially because of the morale-lowering effect of mass casualty figures, but also because 
the government censored all reports of V weapon damage to prevent the Germans from 
knowing their successes and improving targeting.7 
 Despite the best efforts of civil defense personnel, German air raids did cause 
significant casualties among the British civilian population. During the first month of the 
Blitz in London alone, there were over 14,000 casualties, of which nearly 6,000 proved 
fatal.8 By June 1944, when the V rockets added another element of danger, 51,822 British 
civilians had been killed in the war, with another 63,000 injured seriously enough to 
require hospital admission.9 57,298 civilians had been killed by August 1944, over 7,000 
of them children.10 A final total of 146,760 British civilians became casualties of WWII, 
with over 60,500 killed, among them nearly 8,000 children under the age of 16.11 Air 
raids also significantly impacted the infrastructure of the country. Out of 13 million 
houses in Britain at the start of the war, 4.5 million had been damaged by enemy action, 
with many completely destroyed or damaged beyond repair.12 
 Civil defense as a topic enjoys much popular and academic recognition, with a 
large literature being devoted to the issue. The image conjured up at the mention of civil 
defense, however, is that of Cold War America and the often humorous aspects of 
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American civil defense procedures, such as the much-ridiculed ‘Duck and Cover.’  In 
Cold War Britain, civil defense also played an important role and the creation of the Civil 
Defence Corps in 1947 sought to ensure civilian protection in the case of atomic war. 
What accounts of Cold War civil defense fail to fully address, however, is that its 
practices and idiosyncrasies have their roots in WWII Britain and its successful, and war-
tested, civil defense services. Additionally, the impetus that drove much of civil defense 
creation (and which was consistently used as a means to alarm the population sufficiently 
for participation in civil defense) was the threat of poison gas. Most of the major themes 
of Cold War civil defense are direct reflections of its earlier counterpart. Cold War civil 
defense, and even modern-day schemes, are evolutions of British WWII civil defense 
adapted for new or different threats. 
 Fear and anxiety drove the creation of civil defense programs. As it was clear to 
government officials in the 1930s that a future war would see devastating attacks on 
civilians, the potential destruction that could be wrought on civilian populations by a 
nuclear war was even more evident after 1945. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
made it clear to all observers that if atomic bombs were used in a future war the danger to 
civil populations was higher than ever before. Civil defense had been a successful tool in 
Britain during the war as it not only reassured the population, but also made them useful 
tools in the war effort. Civil defense programs could once again be useful to governments 
in soothing their populations’ anxieties and fears. Additionally, a new type of invisible 
terror now loomed. Where poison gas had been the concern that informed every aspect of 
civil defense, after 1945, when the true realities of the atom bomb became apparent, the 
 
 303 
invisible and terrifying enemy now became radiation and fallout.13 In mid-1945 a 
Committee on Chemical Warfare considered the future use of gas against Britain 
“extremely remote,” although they concluded that gas could potentially be used in 
conjunction with the atomic bomb.14 The Committee also concluded that the use of a 
biological weapon could not be ruled out, either by itself or in conjunction with the 
atomic bomb, suggesting that poison gas had now been replaced by two new threats.15 A 
recruitment pamphlet for the Civil Defence Corps suggested that “survival might depend 
on CIVIL DEFENCE,” presenting the reader with a horrifying scenario of a burning and 
demolished city and a “trail of radioactive dust downwind.”16 Wardens, previously on the 
frontline of a potential gas war, were now trained to use radiation-measuring equipment 
instead of testing for gas.17 The Civil Defence Pocketbook No. 3 contains sections 
dealing with radiation dangers, fallout, and protection therefrom, but makes no mention 
of the poison gas that had been such a popular topic prior to 1945.18 While WWII 
pamphlets had provided instruction on making shelters gas proof, Cold War pamphlets 
instructed civilians on how to protect themselves from fallout.19 The American booklet 
Survival Under Atomic Attack sought to negate the fear of fallout and radiation, arguing 
that it ought to be less feared than blast or heat and that only 15 percent of deaths would 
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likely be due to radiation.20 The use of such fears, particularly stressing the invisible 
nature of the threat, was vital to achieve compliance among the population with civil 
defense measures. Objects such as gas masks served as a reminder of this threat, but also 
soothed anxieties with their mere presence, ensuring that the population was anxious 
enough to participate in civil defense, but not so anxious that panic would ensue.21 
 Civil defense was the face of the war on the home front. While Cold War programs 
consistently broadcast this idea, in WWII civil defense was quite literally fighting the war 
in the domestic sphere. In recruitment campaigns, civil defense services were consistently 
equated with national and war service, suggesting that what a civilian could do at home 
was often just as important as what British soldiers could do overseas. Cold War civil 
defense schemes adopted this idea of civilians fighting the war at home, particularly as a 
nuclear war would have mostly targeted the home front.22 A 1955 advertisement in a 
British newspaper calling for civil defense volunteers is reminiscent of those of WWII, 
suggesting there were jobs only civilians could do and that civil defense was a way for 
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everyone to play a part in national defense.23 The British Civil Defence Corps advertised 
for recruits in local and national papers, urging readers to “join now” as volunteers were 
urgently needed.24 Another advertisement called for “many thousands” who were needed 
to staff the various civil defense services, similar to recruiting posters from before and 
during WWII.25 
 Civil defense was a tool to control the population’s behavior. As recruiting ads and 
government pamphlets often mentioned, civil defense sought to teach people certain 
skills so they could then perform them without problem when needed, such as first aid, 
fire fighting, or putting on a gas mask. Civil defense training thus ensured that civilians 
could perform the actions necessary to save their own and others’ lives in a crisis. In 
WWII, this training was repeatedly and successfully put to the test, not only by the 
volunteers of the civil defense services, but by those civilians who sought shelter at the 
sound of a siren, those who could use a stirrup pump to extinguish a fire, and those who 
could quickly don their gas mask upon hearing the gas rattle. Cold War civil defense 
volunteers never used their skills during an actual crisis, but repeated exercises 
nevertheless ensured the behavior was ingrained and could be performed without 
problem under duress.26 Both volunteers and regular civilians were then expected to react 
in a specific, desired way should war come, without becoming frightened, disoriented, or 
creating chaos. Offering prescribed actions in the event of an emergency also served to 
redirect civilian attention away from fear of death to a more useful set of behaviors. 
                                                        
23 “Q: Whose job is civil defence now?” Yorkshire Post and Leeds Mercury, April 27, 1955. 
24 “Your local Civil Defence Services want men and women urgently,” Cornishman, December 14, 1950. 
25 “Civil Defence - Join Now,” Nottingham Evening Post, December 2, 1950. 
26 For more on Cold War civil defense and civilian behavior see Davis, Stages of Emergency; Oakes, 
Imaginary War; Grossman, Neither Dead Nor Red. 
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  Civil defense sought to ensure the psychological soundness of civilians as much as 
it aimed to protect physical bodies. The idea that civil defense offered psychological 
benefit to the populace was a major component of the British scheme in WWII. Through 
controlling civilians’ behavior, the government hoped to also sustain morale and control 
panic. Both were consistent concerns among government officials, as low morale could 
severely undermine the population’s willingness to endure war and panic would create 
chaos. Civil defense also reassured civilians that there was something to be done in the 
face of danger, offering action instead of fatalism. This was even more important during 
the Cold War, as the potential for mass annihilation was a serious threat to public morale. 
While WWII civil defense volunteers actually engaged in valuable work that saved lives, 
Cold War civil defense workers had to derive their morale from being reassured that they 
could do something if war did happen.27 Giving civilians specific tasks to do if atomic 
war occurred, such as filling containers with water to carry to the shelter, allowed them to 
concentrate on something other than certain annihilation. Objects sometimes also served 
this purpose of reassurance. In WWII, the gas mask was a visible and tangible reminder 
that civilians could protect themselves from gas, as long as they followed the prescribed 
steps. During the Cold War the objects of civil defense were much more symbolic, 
generally offering limited protection unlike their WII counterparts. Cold War gas masks 
and shelters did offer some protection, against fallout and blast, but were unlikely to 
actually save lives in a nuclear war. These objects thus served mostly to reassure civilians 
that they could be protected.28 Although officials had realized by the mid-1950s that 
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existing shelters left over from the War provided only limited protection against an 
atomic bomb, they nevertheless decided not to demolish existing structures because of 
the anticipation that the population would expect the government to provide some form 
of protection.29 While civil defense recruitment pamphlets painted horrific images of a 
hydrogen bomb explosion, they were also quick to reassure people that there was 
something to be done and that passive acceptance was unacceptable.30 Civil defense was 
still important, one pamphlet argued, because although a nuclear attack on Britain would 
be devastating, millions of people would nevertheless survive and need help afterwards.31 
Such messages served both as a reassurance that survival was possible and also redirected 
the civilian towards a useful task—civil defense. 
 The government used civil defense to gain support for its policies. By ensuring the 
physical and psychological soundness of civilians, civil defense in turn also offered 
support to the government’s policies. In WWII, providing a scheme of civil defense that 
would see civilians sheltered, rescued, treated, fed, transported, and generally protected 
ensured that the British government could enter the war knowing an attack on its civilian 
population was likely. Civil defense also reassured the population that the government 
was there to take care of them, helping to create a more positive image of government in 
a time of war. During the Cold War, civil defense was a vital tool that allowed the 
American government to undertake its policy of deterrence and mutually assured 
destruction. The government thus used civil defense as a means of reassuring the 
populace and negating people’s fear of a nuclear war by offering solutions for survival 
                                                        
29 TNA: HO 322/161, Demolition of Last War Shelters, March 8, 1955, 2. 
30 TNA: INF 13/284, Home Office, Join the Civil Defence Corps, n.d., 3. 
31 TNA: INF 13/284, Why Civil Defence Needs People Like You, n.d., 2. 
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and life after the bomb.32 The British government, too, posited the need for the hydrogen 
bomb as a tool of deterrence and suggested that civil defense was the solution to deal 
with the threat of the bomb.33 One pamphlet suggested that for deterrence to work, the 
country needed not only a strong military, but strong civil defense, as well.34 
 Ideas of self-help and personal responsibility permeated civil defense. As much as 
civil defense was the government’s scheme to protect its population, civil defense relied 
on every civilian’s desire and willingness to participate. While the British government 
offered protection in the form of gas masks and shelters, people needed to be actively 
engaged to make full use of what the government provided. A significant part of the 
responsibility for protecting oneself thus lay with the civilians themselves and the 
government actively encouraged civilians to be prepared for emergencies beyond just the 
minimum. For the civil defense services to work, civilians also needed to be encouraged 
to participate and to be reminded that they had a duty to their nation to serve. Urging 
civilians to take their own precautions, in accordance with government instructions, also 
removed some of the burden of responsibility from the government. During the Cold War, 
British civilians were encouraged to form domestic self-help parties under guidance of 
their local warden.35 In Cold War America, the burden of providing protection fell much 
more heavily on the civilians themselves, who were encouraged to build their own 
shelters and stock them with supplies, making self-help a primary theme of American 
                                                        
32 For more on civil defense and deterrence see Oakes, Imaginary War; Garrison, Armageddon. 
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civil defense.36 As it had been during WWII, ideas of self-help were heavily reflected in 
government issued pamphlets on how civilians could protect themselves. The U.S. 
Government’s In time of Emergency was a handbook for citizens intended to teach them 
about nuclear attack and offer various means of protection from fallout.37 The handbook 
suggested that preparedness would raise the chances of survival and urged readers to 
follow a checklist that included knowing the warning signals, knowing what to do in case 
of attack, building a fallout shelter or improvising one in an emergency, learning first aid, 
and stocking supplies in the shelter.38 
 Dispersal was a key component of civil defense programs. In WWII Britain 
dispersal worked on a much smaller scale than would be the case during the Cold War. 
Here, the government had actively sought to disperse the population to avoid large 
clusters of casualties that could have the potential to seriously undermine morale and the 
war effort. Additionally, those elements of the population who could not directly 
contribute to the war effort, such as children and invalids, were dispersed by being 
removed from areas of danger. During the Cold War, dispersal operated on a much larger 
scale, as the potential radius of destruction of an atom bomb was significantly larger than 
conventional bombs.39 The British evacuation scheme called for the evacuation of 
                                                        
36 For more on self-help as a theme of American civil defense see Krugler, Only a Test; Grossman, Neither 
Dead Nor Red; McEnaney, Begins at Home; Boyer, Bomb. 
37 Office of Civil Defense, in time of Emergency, a citizen’s handbook on nuclear attack, natural disasters 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1968). 
38 ibid, 6-7. 
39 For more on themes of dispersal in American civil defense see Boyer, Bomb; Vanderbilt, Survival City; 
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everyone 18 and younger, largely because of the susceptibility of youths to the hazards of 
radiation.40 
 While American civil defense post-1945 was created almost entirely from scratch, 
British Cold War civil defense could build upon existing structures and schemes. WWII 
civil defense had not only proven successful, but had also put a significant financial 
burden on the British government, which saw no reason after the war not to make use of 
existing objects and structures. As early as 1944, the War Office and Home Office 
considered the preservation of existing civilian respirators for a few years after the end of 
the war.41 Initially after the war the Home Office ordered local authorities to collect all 
special types of gas masks, such as the child’s mask and baby’s helmet, which were to be 
kept alongside existing stores of civilian and service respirators to form a strategic five-
year reserve.42 The poor result, in both numbers and condition, however, coupled with 
new fears of nerve gases and biological weapons, led officials to conclude new types of 
respirators needed to be developed.43 The existing stores of 34 million were nevertheless 
kept as a basic precaution.44 A 1954 experiment tested the ability of various gas masks to 
withstand the heat flash of a nuclear bomb.45 
 The shelter program had protected millions of Britons from German air raids during 
the war, but government officials now wondered if the same program, reworked, could 
                                                        
40 TNA: HO 322/161, Home Office, Conference of Regional Directors of Civil Defence, Minutes of a 
Conference held in Room 530, Horseferry House, March 10, 1959, 5. 
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protect the population against a nuclear bomb. While immediately after the war domestic 
and communal shelters were demolished, by 1947, on economic grounds, shelters were to 
be demolished only where it would result in the recovery of steel.46 The Berlin Crisis in 
September 1948 led to the decision that shelter demolition ought to be stopped entirely.47 
Since it was considered impractical to embark on a new program of shelter construction, 
the old shelters were expected to serve a useful purpose in the case of future hostilities.48 
Not even the introduction of the hydrogen bomb changed this perception and officials 
argued that, outside of areas of complete devastation, shelters from the last war “should 
give reasonable protection against blast and heat and radiation […].”49 There was some 
consternation, however, that such shelters were taking up space in public parks and fields 
and by the late 1950s it was decided that where a shelter obstructed playing fields it could 
be demolished.50 Based on information gathered in a shelter survey, officials determined 
that in 1955 roughly 100,000 domestic shelters and 10,000 communal shelters remained 
across the country.51 In 1954 the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment tested the 
value of the Anderson shelter as a form of protection against the atomic bomb.52 The 
Anderson shelter was chosen in part because of its efficacy against HE bombs, but also 
because it was assumed that the shelter would play a large role in any emergency shelter 
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49 ibid. 
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program in the future.53 The tests found that the Anderson shelter was extremely efficient 
at protecting against blast, allowing survival as close as 460 yards from a nuclear 
explosion.54 Unsurprisingly, however, the tests also showed that 100% of potential 
occupants would have died from radiation exposure, undermining the use of the shelter in 
an atomic world.55  By 1961, the Minister of Defence told an audience concerned about 
the government’s plan for nuclear attack that air raid shelters were of no use in the next 
war.56 The government’s policy was nevertheless the maintenance and development of 
existing shelters as a primary task of civil defense.57 
 The civil defense services were restructured during the Cold War, but retained their 
original purpose. Air raid wardens, a cornerstone component of the civil defense services, 
were again recruited as a vital asset to safeguard British civilians. Wardens were to be the 
link between the civil defense services and the public at large, as they had been in WWII, 
and were to reconnoiter, report, and organize their communities.58 The Rescue and 
Ambulance Services retained their former purpose and names, with the same eligibility 
requirements.59 First Aid Parties remained a part of civil defense to provide emergency 
medical care.60 A new Pioneer Section was created for men who would help restore and 
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rebuild infrastructure in an emergency.61 For women volunteers, the Welfare Section 
combined several of the WWII jobs under one heading, such as assisting with evacuation, 
working in rest centers, and running mobile canteens and emergency feeding centers.62 
 As in WWII, civil defense workers were issued pamphlets or pocketbooks that 
offered written instructions on civil defense.63 The AFS remained a separate, but 
complementary, part of civil defense during the Cold War, continuing its wartime 
mission.64 The service did, however, now seek to recruit “men—and women— of 
courage and intelligence,” the intelligence now necessary to handle the equipment 
designed to fight fires caused by nuclear attack.65 While in WWII employers had been 
encouraged to create their own civil defense sections at their factory or place of business, 
for the Cold War the government created an entire section specifically for industrial civil 
defense. The Industrial Civil Defence Service had its own headquarters section, wardens, 
rescue and first aid parties, welfare section, and fire guards.66 Volunteers trained directly 
at their place of work, so as to be immediately prepared and available in the case of 
emergency.67 The WVS, too, continued their civil defense work after the end of the war, 
engaging again in the welfare type of work which they had performed during the war.68 
British Cold War civil defense also found it difficult to recruit new members, as door-to-
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door canvassers encountered repeated arguments from civilians who had learned about 
the hydrogen bomb’s effects from scientists, which seemed to undermine the purpose of 
civil defense.69 While the civil defense services had plenty of wartime experience, they 
lacked necessary data on atomic explosions to prepare for the aftermath of a nuclear 
attack. In order to provide such data Britain simulated an attack on the Port of London by 
detonating an atomic bomb in a ship off Australia’s coast in October of 1952, titled 
‘Operation Hurricane.’70 In America, the most important finding in a report on a 
simulated nuclear attack with over 200 targets was that civil defense preparedness could 
reduce the casualties of the assumed attack from approximately thirty percent of the 
population to just three percent.71 
 Civilians continued to receive civil defense instruction from the government, with 
the primary focus now on an atomic bomb. Government officials still worried about 
finding the balance between scaring the population enough to take action, but not so 
much as to create panic and fatalism. In 1959, civil defense officials considered whether 
using the 10 megaton bomb as an example in the Householder’s Handbook was excessive 
and whether or not a two or five megaton bomb should be used to explain the atomic 
bomb’s effects.72 The government once again invested time and money into civil defense 
recruitment, using films, posters, pamphlets, and newspaper advertisements. In post-1945 
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Britain civilians were now to be convinced to join civil defense with a catchy slogan: 
“Civil defence is common sense.”73 
 In America, civil defense permeated every aspect of Cold War life, much as it had 
done in wartime Britain. Artists, especially, incorporated themes of civil defense into 
their works. In WWII Britain, George Formby’s popular songs, such as “I Did What I 
Could With My Gas Mask” and “Mr. Wu’s an Air Raid Warden Now,” made humorous 
occasions of civil defense.74 Florence Desmond’s “The Deepest Shelter in Town” 
managed to turn an everyday part of wartime life into a racy metaphor.75 In WWII 
Britain, artists who painted or sketched scenes on civil defense could have their works 
purchased by the Artists’ Advisory Committee and exhibited publicly.76 American artists 
during the Cold War focused either on the humorous side of atomic civil defense or used 
their art as a form of protest. Tom Lehrer’s “We Will All Go Together When We Go,” 
made fun of the idea that civil defense could protect the population against an atomic 
bomb, while one of Bob Dylan’s earliest songs, “Let Me Die in My Footsteps,” protested 
the idea of going underground for safety.77  
 Since its inception as a scheme to protect civilian populations from modern war, 
civil defense has existed in some type or form in many societies. After the end of the 
Cold War interest in civil defense waned as there seemed to be no more need for it, but 
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the events of September 11, 2001 brought a resurgence of civil defense thinking, 
particularly in the United States. While contemporary preparedness lacks the 
governmental civil defense structures and schemes, the focus has entirely shifted to the 
self-help and personal responsibility aspects, urging civilians to prepare for potential acts 
of terrorism. Preparedness instructions, posters, and pamphlets nevertheless are 
reminiscent of the civil defense instructions of WWII and beyond. An American Red 
Cross pamphlet on preparing for terrorism instructs civilians to make a plan, stock 
supplies, familiarize themselves with local emergency schemes, learn first aid, and to 
shelter.78 Instructions for sheltering in place post-9/11 are similar to instructions for 
creating a gas proof refuge room prior to WWII.79 A terrorist preparedness booklet 
published by a U.S. Congressman reiterates the idea of civil defense as psychological 
preparedness, suggesting that knowing how to respond to an emergency will allow the 
reader to remain calm and avoid panic.80 Additionally, the threat of terrorism has also 
renewed fears of chemical weapons, with the advocation of protective measures such as a 
modern-day gas-proof refuge.81 Since its inception in the 1930s, civil defense  has played 
a significant role in western societies in various iterations and schemes, with many of the 
basic themes and elements remaining similar over the years. Fear was always a driving 
factor of civil defense programs, both the fear of physical attack on civilians, such as air 
raids, but also the fear of something that appeared more gruesome or terrifying. Prior to 
and during WWII this fear revolved around poison gas and influenced every aspect of 
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British civil defense, serving both as the impetus for civil defense and as a persistent 
reminder of its necessity. During the Cold War, radiation took the place of poison gas, but 
civil defense schemes in both Britain and America built on the very principles and ideas 
that had worked successfully in WWII Britain. Even modern-day schemes of civil 
defense, less organized and intense, nevertheless use the imagery of both of these terrors 
to create in civilians a need for urgency and participation. 
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